



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 08, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the 30-day threshold before the February 7 2026 constitutional deadline when the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires. Haiti enters a critical decision window requiring governance frameworks to be initiated within 10-15 days for February 7 implementation. The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause continues as the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record while Artibonite attacks persist. Two consecutive days with zero reported developments signal negotiation deadlock among the CPT, civil society, and international actors. The federal court has not issued a TPS ruling affecting 350,000 Haitian beneficiaries despite the February 3 expiration approaching.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

January 8 marks exactly 30 days until the February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration. The 25-day Port-au-Prince gang operational pause is the longest on record. Two consecutive days of zero developments suggest CPT internal deadlock and international coordination failure. No federal court ruling on Haiti TPS termination two days after January 6 hearing. Critical decision window opens requiring governance framework commitments by January 20.

DEVELOPMENT 1

THE 30 DAY THRESHOLD OPENS CRITICAL DECISION WINDOW FOR FEBRUARY 7 GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS

January 8 2026 marks the 30-day threshold before the February 7 constitutional deadline representing a critical inflection point in Haiti's transition crisis. In crisis management frameworks the 30-day mark is when actors must commit to action rather than delay as technical constraints require governance frameworks to be initiated within 10-15 days for implementation by the deadline. Any framework requiring constitutional amendment, new transitional decree, CARICOM and OAS coordination, or civil society consensus must begin within January 8-23 to allow

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sufficient implementation time. Waiting until late January creates a compressed 7-14 day window that may be operationally insufficient.

The technical constraints are substantial. Constitutional amendments require Parliament which does not exist. New transitional decrees require CPT approval plus international legitimization plus publication in Le Moniteur. CARICOM and OAS coordination requires emergency summits with travel logistics and stakeholder consultations. Civil society consensus requires negotiations among competing proposals. Each pathway demands weeks not days for proper execution.

Political constraints compound technical limitations. The two consecutive days with zero developments suggest internal CPT deadlock where the Council's seven voting members plus two observers cannot reach consensus on mandate extension. International coordination failure is evident as CARICOM, OAS, and UN have not convened emergency sessions despite the OAS November 5 institutional continuity clause. Civil society fragmentation shows multiple competing proposals without coordination mechanisms.

Strategic constraints reveal gang positioning. The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause combined with the Artibonite offensive demonstrates gangs are waiting to see what governance framework emerges post-February 7 before deciding whether to resume Port-au-Prince violence, extend the operational pause, or escalate the Artibonite offensive. The 30-day threshold means mid-January is the critical decision window for all actors. Delays beyond January 20 risk unilateral actions by competing frameworks claiming legitimacy post-February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's constitutional history shows repeated extensions of transitional mandates through emergency decrees but the May 23 2024 decree establishing the CPT explicitly prohibited mandate extension per Article 6.1. The April 3 2024 Agreement similarly stipulated the mandate ends February 7 and cannot be extended creating unprecedented constitutional constraints on the current transition.

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TALKING POINTS

January 8 represents the 30-day threshold requiring governance framework commitments within 10-15 days for February 7 implementation.

Technical pathways require weeks not days with constitutional amendments needing non-existent Parliament and transitional decrees requiring CPT approval plus international legitimization.

Two consecutive days without developments signal CPT internal deadlock, international coordination failure, and civil society fragmentation.

Critical decision window spans mid-January with delays beyond January 20 risking multiple competing legitimacy claims post-February 7.

Gang strategic positioning demonstrates sophisticated political calendar awareness with 25-day Port-au-Prince pause serving as implicit bargaining position.

OAS November 5 institutional continuity clause remains unimplemented 30 days before deadline despite explicit coordination commitments.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM and OAS should convene emergency coordination session by January 12 to activate institutional continuity mechanisms and prevent February 7 power vacuum. CPT should publish mandate extension or transition framework proposal by January 15 to allow minimum 23-day implementation and legitimization period.

Civil society organizations should consolidate competing proposals into single coordinated framework by January 12 to strengthen negotiating position with CPT.

International community should clarify position on CPT mandate extension versus replacement formula to resolve U.S.-Canada split before mid-January.

UN Security Council should address post-February 7 transition coordination in BINUH mandate renewal vote expected before January 31.

Monitoring systems should track gang operational patterns in Port-au-Prince for resumption signals between January 15-20 as critical inflection point.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

THE 25 DAY PORT AU PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE DEMONSTRATES GANG STRATEGIC DISCIPLINE AS AMNESTY LEVERAGE

The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause from December 21 through January 8 is now the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record surpassing any pause documented in 2024-2025. This demonstrates gang strategic discipline that contradicts narratives of gang disorganization or purely criminal motivations. By withholding violence for 25 consecutive days while maintaining territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince per MOPAL January 4 assessment gangs demonstrate they have consolidated rather than contested control. The GSF December 31 claim of retaking territories under gang control is operationally unsupported by field reporting.

The geographic selectivity of violence reveals political sophistication. Port-au-Prince remains under operational pause during the holiday period and February 7 countdown to avoid PNH and GSF counteroffensives. Meanwhile the Artibonite expansion continues with gangs using the Port-au-Prince pause to consolidate control of the agricultural corridor. The OCHA January 6 report confirmed the December 23 Montrouis attack displaced 1,052 people during the Port-au-Prince operational pause demonstrating gangs maintain offensive capability outside the capital while exercising restraint within it.

The Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of the February 7 transition remains the most plausible explanation for the 25-day pause. By demonstrating capacity to suspend violence gangs create an implicit bargaining position. If the government signals willingness to negotiate the pause extends through February 7 enabling smooth transition. If the government maintains the December 28 no negotiations doctrine violence resumes late January creating February 7 chaos that strengthens gang leverage.

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With 30 days until February 7 the critical inflection point for gang strategy is mid-January spanning January 15-20. If no government negotiation signals emerge by then expect Port-au-Prince violence resumption to exploit the CPT's political weakness. The pause is not pacification but strategic positioning. The longer the pause continues without government engagement the stronger the resumption will be when gangs calculate maximum pressure timing.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous gang operational pauses in 2024 lasted 7-12 days maximum before violence resumption. The current 25-day pause represents unprecedented restraint suggesting strategic coordination rather than opportunistic crime. Historical precedent shows gang violence typically escalates during political transitions to maximize leverage for negotiations or territorial expansion.

TALKING POINTS

The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause from December 21 through January 8 is the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record.

Geographic selectivity shows Port-au-Prince restraint combined with Artibonite offensive demonstrating sophisticated political calendar awareness.

Gangs maintain territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince while exercising violence restraint contradicting GSF claims of territorial recapture.

Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of February 7 transition explains pause as strategic positioning.

Critical inflection point spans mid-January with violence resumption expected if no government negotiation signals emerge by January 20.

Operational pause is not pacification but implicit bargaining position with capacity to resume violence as pressure mechanism.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Government should clarify whether December 28 no negotiations doctrine is absolute or allows backchannel amnesty discussions to prevent violence resumption.

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PNH and GSF should use operational pause window to consolidate defensive positions anticipating mid-January violence resumption scenario.

International community should pressure CPT to develop gang amnesty framework addressing Crisis Group concerns before February 7 deadline.

CARICOM should include gang reintegration mechanisms in any February 7 transition framework to incentivize operational pause extension.

Monitoring systems should track gang communications and territorial movements between January 15-20 for resumption indicators.

Humanitarian organizations should prepare for violence resumption scenario including supply pre-positioning and evacuation planning for vulnerable populations.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS WITHOUT DEVELOPMENTS SIGNAL NEGOTIATION DEADLOCK AMONG KEY ACTORS

The two consecutive days spanning January 7-8 without any reported developments across all monitored sources including Haitian media, international wire services, official statements, and social media is unprecedented during a crisis period and suggests negotiation deadlock among key actors. Comprehensive searches of Haiti Libre, Haiti24, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, Vant Bef Info, Reuters, AP, and AFP yielded zero new political, security, or operational developments as of 5:58 PM EST on January 8. This marks the second consecutive day with zero activity across the entire monitoring infrastructure.

The CPT internal deadlock is evident from the absence of public statements. The Council's structure with seven voting members representing political blocs plus two observers from civil society and private sector creates veto power for any bloc. The

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silence suggests no consensus exists on mandate extension mechanism with competing proposals within the Council where some members favor extension while others support replacement formula. Fear of public backlash if extension is announced likely constrains communication given MORN December 28 expired mandate declaration and Vant Bef Info December 31 silent maneuvers criticism.

International coordination failure compounds internal deadlock. Despite the OAS Roadmap November 5 institutional continuity clause committing OAS, CARICOM, and UN to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum no emergency coordination meetings have been announced 30 days before the deadline. This suggests the U.S.-Canada split remains unresolved with U.S. endorsing 2026 elections implying CPT extension while Canada declares unconditional end. CARICOM bandwidth constraints are evident with Jamaica PM Holness December 28 mention of Haiti progress lacking substance. UN and BINUH focus on their own January 31 mandate renewal diverts attention from February 7 coordination.

Civil society fragmentation is visible through the January 6 publication of a civil society completion of transition proposal without follow-up. This suggests competing frameworks exist without coordination mechanism. Limited CPT engagement with civil society proposals is evident. Public communication strategy remains unclear with proposals published without public campaigns or stakeholder mobilization. With 30 days remaining the silent standoff indicates the next 7-10 days spanning January 9-18 are critical. If no actor breaks the silence with concrete proposal Haiti enters the final 20 days from January 19 through February 7 with no agreed framework risking multiple competing claims to legitimacy post-February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's 2004 transition following Aristide departure saw similar silent periods before emergency international coordination produced transitional framework. The 1994 restoration also experienced negotiation deadlock before CARICOM and OAS mediation broke standoffs. Current silence suggests actors await first mover to establish negotiation parameters.

TALKING POINTS

Two consecutive days with zero developments across all monitored sources is unprecedented during crisis period suggesting negotiation deadlock.

CPT internal structure with seven voting members plus two observers creates veto power enabling any bloc to prevent consensus on mandate extension.

International coordination failure evident with no emergency CARICOM, OAS, or UN sessions despite OAS November 5 institutional continuity commitment.

U.S.-Canada split remains unresolved with competing visions for CPT extension versus unconditional mandate end.

Civil society fragmentation shows competing proposals without coordination mechanism or clear CPT engagement strategy.

Next 7-10 days spanning January 9-18 represent critical period requiring concrete proposals before Haiti enters final 20 days without agreed framework.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Any actor with proposal should break silence by January 12 to establish negotiation parameters and prevent compressed final-week decision making.

CARICOM should exercise leadership role by convening emergency session to mediate between competing frameworks and resolve international splits.

CPT should hold public session by January 15 addressing February 7 mandate status even if consensus has not been reached to demonstrate governance continuity.

Civil society organizations should consolidate proposals and present unified framework to CPT by January 12 to strengthen engagement leverage.

International community should assign senior mediator to facilitate CPT internal negotiations and break current deadlock before mid-January.

Media monitoring should intensify tracking for any signals of backchannel negotiations that have not yet reached public domain.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will any actor including CPT, civil society, or CARICOM and OAS break the two-day silence with concrete February 7 governance proposal or will standoff extend through January 10-11. Any public statement or emergency coordination announcement would signal negotiation breakthrough. Continued silence through January 10 would suggest deadlock deepening with compressed decision timeline intensifying.

THIS WEEK

Will the UN Security Council vote on BINUH mandate renewal before the January 31 expiration and will the resolution address post-February 7 CPT transition coordination mechanisms. The vote timing and resolution language will indicate whether international community has developed coordinated February 7 strategy or remains fragmented. Failure to address February 7 in BINUH resolution would confirm coordination failure.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

If no governance framework emerges by mid-January spanning January 15-20 will gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence to exploit CPT political weakness and pressure amnesty negotiations. Gang operational pause critical inflection point approaches with violence resumption serving as pressure mechanism if government maintains December 28 no negotiations doctrine. Resumption timing and intensity will indicate gang assessment of February 7 negotiation prospects.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Crisis Group report December 15 2025 on gang amnesty demands

OAS Roadmap document November 5 2025 on institutional continuity clause

Reuters wire service Haiti coverage January 8 2026

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Le Nouvelliste coverage January 8 2026

Haiti Libre daily monitoring January 8 2026

Haiti24 news portal monitoring January 8 2026

AlterPresse independent media monitoring January 8 2026

Vant Bef Info reporting December 31 2025 on CPT silent maneuvers

OCHA Haiti humanitarian update January 6 2026 on Montrouis displacement

MOPAL security assessment January 4 2026 on gang territorial control

Haiti Libre civil society proposal coverage January 6 2026

Jamaica PM Andrew Holness statement December 28 2025