# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2025-12-20
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE AND GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE EXECUTE JOINT](#development-1-haitian-national-police-and-gang-suppression-force-execute-joint)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: EUROPEAN AID SHIPMENTS THREATENED BY PORT INFRASTRUCTURE STANDOFF](#development-2-european-aid-shipments-threatened-by-port-infrastructure-standoff)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL MAINTAINS OPACITY BEFORE CANDIDATE LIST](#development-3-provisional-electoral-council-maintains-opacity-before-candidate-list)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE FORMALIZED AT 18 COUNTRY COMMITMENT](#development-4-gang-suppression-force-formalized-at-18-country-commitment)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti Libre confirmed that the Haitian National Police supported by Gang Suppression Force units launched a
large-scale anti-gang operation with helicopter support the night of December 18 in Port-au-Prince coinciding
with United States Embassy security alerts documenting operations in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets.
European aid shipments face mounting risk as a port standoff deepens at key maritime facilities with the
Varreux-TVB terminal awaiting customs officer deployment since 2020 despite 60 million euro investment. The
Provisional Electoral Council maintains complete opacity two days before December 22 candidate list publication
with no interim updates on registration totals or contestation outcomes. Eighteen countries have now formally
pledged personnel and resources toward the 7,500 troop Gang Suppression Force ceiling announced December
19.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

PNH-GSF launched large-scale operation night of December 18 with helicopter support in Port-au-Prince
operational zones south of US Embassy.
European aid at risk as port standoff intensifies with Varreux-TVB terminal inoperative since 2020 awaiting
customs officers.
CEP provides zero public information two days before December 22 candidate list publication maintaining
electoral process opacity.
Eighteen countries formally pledged resources toward 7,500 GSF troop ceiling with January 2026 deployment of
first 1,000 personnel.
Gangs control over 80 percent of Port-au-Prince driving 1.4 million internally displaced persons and severe food
crisis.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE AND GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE EXECUTE JOINT

OPERATION
Haiti Libre confirmed December 20 that the Haitian National Police supported by Gang Suppression Force
personnel launched a large-scale anti-gang operation with helicopter support on the night of December 18 in
Port-au-Prince marking the first publicly documented joint PNH-GSF operational deployment with aviation assets.
The operation coincides precisely with the December 18 United States Embassy security alert warning of
ongoing security operations in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets south of the embassy with heavy gunfire
and explosions reported throughout the tactical zone and key arteries including Rue des Freres blocked by
Haitian National Police forces. The confirmation that Gang Suppression Force units participated in the operation
represents a significant escalation from previous Kenyan-led GSF activities which focused primarily on static
security missions protecting critical infrastructure rather than offensive combat operations against
gang-controlled territories.
The deployment of helicopter support during the December 18 operation indicates either United States provision
of aviation assets or Haitian government activation of remaining rotary-wing capabilities suggesting coordination
December 20, 2025

at senior command levels between PNH leadership, GSF force commanders, and potentially United States
military advisors embedded with the mission. Helicopter-supported operations enable rapid insertion of assault
forces, aerial reconnaissance of gang positions, and extraction of casualties creating tactical advantages that
ground-only operations cannot achieve in urban combat environments where gangs employ rooftop observation
posts and maintain prepared defensive positions across multiple buildings. The operational tempo of launching a
large-scale helicopter-supported operation within days of Secretary Rubio's December 19 announcement of
7,500 troop pledges suggests either the operation was pre-planned to demonstrate GSF offensive capacity to
international donors or United States diplomatic pressure accelerated operational timelines to show tangible
security progress before the critical December 22 candidate list publication.
The absence of official casualty data, arrest figures, or territorial control assessments following the December 18
operation creates analytical uncertainty about whether the mission achieved tactical objectives or represents
symbolic action designed to project government strength without substantive territorial gains. If the operation
successfully cleared gang positions and established PNH control over Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets
corridors the government would likely publicize tactical victories to demonstrate state capacity restoration and
justify continued international support for the Gang Suppression Force expansion. However the lack of public
reporting suggests either the operation remains ongoing with incomplete results, casualties were too high to
announce without triggering public criticism, or tactical gains proved temporary with gangs reoccupying positions
after PNH-GSF forces withdrew. The pattern of previous PNH operations including the December 15 Albert
Schweitzer Hospital defense demonstrates that even successful defensive actions rarely translate to sustained
territorial control without continuous force presence that Haiti's 9,000-person police force cannot maintain across
multiple operational zones simultaneously.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Gang Suppression Force deployment began with Kenyan-led contingents arriving in late 2024 focused on
static security missions protecting Toussaint Louverture Airport and critical government facilities but avoiding
offensive operations until sufficient force strength and logistics infrastructure could support sustained combat
operations against entrenched gang positions.



## TALKING POINTS

Haiti Libre confirmed PNH and GSF launched large-scale operation night of December 18 with helicopter support
marking first documented joint combat deployment.
Operation coincides with US Embassy December 18 security alert documenting heavy gunfire and explosions in
Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets.
Helicopter support indicates United States aviation asset provision or Haitian government activation suggesting
senior command coordination.
Absence of official casualty or territorial control data creates uncertainty whether operation achieved tactical
objectives or represents symbolic action.
Operational timing within days of Rubio 7,500 troop announcement suggests either pre-planned demonstration or
December 20, 2025

accelerated timeline for December 22 credibility.
Pattern of previous operations shows successful defensive actions rarely translate to sustained territorial control
without continuous force presence.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Obtain operational after-action reports from PNH or GSF command determining casualties, arrests, and territorial
control outcomes.
Assess whether helicopter assets remain deployed for follow-on operations or represent one-time mission
support.
Monitor Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets zones through weekend determining if PNH maintains presence
or gangs reoccupy positions.
Evaluate GSF transition from static security to offensive operations determining if force posture shift reflects
adequate personnel and logistics capacity.
Coordinate with United States Embassy security officials regarding aviation support continuation and future joint
operation planning.
Prepare assessment whether December 18 operation success or failure influences December 22 candidate list
credibility with opposition figures.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: EUROPEAN AID SHIPMENTS THREATENED BY PORT INFRASTRUCTURE STANDOFF

Miami Herald reporting amplified by Haitian-Truth on December 20 warns that European aid to Haiti faces
mounting risk as a port standoff deepens at key maritime facilities creating access and security constraints that
threaten humanitarian supply chains dependent on seaport cargo delivery. The port crisis centers on the
Varreux-TVB container terminal near Cite Soleil representing a 60 million euro European investment that has
remained inoperative awaiting customs officer deployment since 2020 according to French Ambassador Antoine
Michon's December 18 complaint documented by Haiti Libre. The five-year operational paralysis of a major port
facility designed to handle hundreds of containers daily and create hundreds of jobs exemplifies the state
capacity deficits that undermine both economic development and humanitarian logistics even when international
investment capital and infrastructure exist.
The Varreux-TVB terminal standoff demonstrates how bureaucratic dysfunction and personnel deployment
failures create cascading humanitarian consequences independent of gang violence or security threats since the
December 20, 2025

facility's proximity to Cite Soleil gang-controlled territory did not prevent its construction completion but Haitian
government failure to assign customs officers renders the infrastructure useless regardless of physical security
conditions. European donors including France face strategic decisions whether to continue investing in Haitian
port infrastructure when previous investments remain non-functional due to government administrative failures or
to redirect aid flows through Dominican Republic land corridors and alternative regional ports that bypass Haitian
institutional bottlenecks entirely. The timing of Ambassador Michon's public complaint coinciding with the
AmeriJet cargo suspension and December 22 electoral deadline suggests French diplomatic pressure to
demonstrate that infrastructure investments must become operational before additional European financial
commitments to electoral processes or post-election reconstruction programs can be justified to European Union
member state parliaments.
The broader port standoff narrative extends beyond Varreux-TVB to encompass ongoing gang extortion at
Port-au-Prince main seaport facilities where criminal organizations reportedly levy tolls on cargo movements and
conduct armed robberies targeting commercial shipments creating additional costs and delays that European
humanitarian organizations cannot absorb without reducing aid volumes or shifting resources from program
delivery to security premiums. If European donors determine that Haiti's combination of gang territorial control,
government administrative paralysis, and customs deployment failures creates insurmountable logistics barriers
the resulting aid reduction could trigger severe humanitarian deterioration during the critical pre-electoral period
when food security and medical supply continuity become essential for maintaining minimal population stability.
The Carnegie Endowment assessment noting that Haiti attracts cocaine trafficking because state weakness
creates permissive operating environments applies equally to humanitarian logistics where institutional failure
enables gang interference that functional customs and port security could prevent even amid broader security
crises.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's port infrastructure has historically suffered from corruption, inefficiency, and political interference with
customs officers frequently deployed based on patronage networks rather than operational requirements creating
persistent bottlenecks that predate the current gang crisis but intensify amid territorial control collapse.



## TALKING POINTS

Miami Herald reports European aid at mounting risk as port standoff deepens threatening humanitarian supply
chains dependent on maritime cargo.
Varreux-TVB terminal represents 60 million euro European investment inoperative since 2020 awaiting customs
officer deployment.
Five-year operational paralysis demonstrates state capacity deficits undermine development independent of
gang violence when bureaucratic dysfunction prevents infrastructure activation.
French Ambassador public complaint suggests European diplomatic pressure linking infrastructure functionality
to future financial commitments.
Gang extortion at main Port-au-Prince seaport creates additional costs forcing humanitarian organizations to
December 20, 2025

reduce aid volumes or shift resources to security premiums.
European donor decisions whether to continue Haitian port investment or redirect through Dominican Republic
corridors carries strategic humanitarian implications.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Assess European donor willingness to maintain Haiti aid flows amid port infrastructure paralysis or shift to
Dominican Republic land corridor alternatives.
Determine customs officer deployment barriers identifying whether personnel shortages, political interference, or
security concerns prevent Varreux-TVB activation.
Evaluate gang extortion impact on seaport cargo costs quantifying security premium increases that reduce
humanitarian purchasing power.
Monitor French diplomatic messaging post-December 22 candidate list determining if European support remains
contingent on infrastructure functionality.
Coordinate with UN humanitarian logistics cluster regarding alternative port facilities in northern Haiti or regional
transshipment options.
Prepare contingency assessment if European aid reduction triggers food security deterioration during
pre-electoral period requiring emergency intervention.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL MAINTAINS OPACITY BEFORE CANDIDATE LIST

PUBLICATION
The Provisional Electoral Council continues complete information opacity two days before the critical December
22 candidate list publication with no interim communique released regarding registration totals, contestation
challenges filed, or dispute resolution outcomes as of December 20. The CEP's December web updates focus
exclusively on mobilization, sensitization, and training of women around equitable and inclusive elections
signaling ongoing efforts to meet gender inclusion benchmarks but providing no party-by-party breakdown of
women candidacy levels to assess compliance with the 30 percent quota requirement. The absence of any public
electoral process updates during the three-week period encompassing December 1 through 15 registration,
December 16 through 19 contestation, and pre-publication review creates maximum uncertainty about whether
the August 30 2026 electoral timeline retains credibility among opposition political actors whose participation
remains essential for democratic legitimacy.
December 20, 2025

The strategic calculation underlying total electoral opacity may reflect Provisional Electoral Council deliberate risk
management to prevent premature opposition mobilization by delaying confirmation of candidate participation
until all procedural mechanisms close eliminating opportunities for last-minute withdrawal campaigns or boycott
coordination. However the opacity approach creates massive institutional credibility vulnerabilities if the
December 22 candidate list disappoints stakeholder expectations by revealing only government-aligned
candidates, unknown political newcomers, or minimal opposition representation since the lack of transparency
throughout preceding phases prevents the CEP from demonstrating procedural integrity when challenged by
skeptical international observers or civil society organizations. The publication represents the definitive
checkpoint determining whether Haiti's constitutional timeline remains viable with fourteen months to complete
electoral campaigning, voting operations, potential runoff elections, result certification, and power transfer before
the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires February 7 2027.
Political actors appear to be waiting for the candidate list before publicly committing to participation or opposition
according to December 20 reporting with no significant party rallies, coalition announcements, or boycott
declarations emerging in the 24-hour period reviewed. This silence suggests either opposition figures registered
privately and await list publication before mobilizing campaign infrastructure or major political actors coordinated
boycott strategies but delay public announcement until the empty or government-dominated candidate list
provides justification for withdrawal from a process they consider illegitimate. The December 22 publication will
instantly resolve this analytical uncertainty by revealing actual opposition participation levels creating either
retrospective validation of the private registration system if credible candidates appear or exposing the electoral
process as controlled exercise lacking democratic competition if the list confirms boycott patterns. The timing
coordination between Secretary Rubio's December 19 announcement of 7,500 Gang Suppression Force troop
pledges and the December 22 electoral deadline suggests United States diplomatic strategy links security
commitments to electoral legitimacy requirements creating pressure on opposition figures to participate rather
than boycott since American investment in Haiti's democratic transition depends on credible political competition
justifying continued international support.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council has historically operated with limited transparency during candidate
registration and contestation periods with previous electoral cycles in 1990, 2010, and 2015
demonstrating how opacity creates opportunities for manipulation while undermining public confidence
in process integrity regardless of actual procedural compliance.



## TALKING POINTS

CEP maintains complete opacity two days before December 22 candidate list publication with no updates on
registration totals or contestation outcomes.
December web updates focus on women mobilization and training but provide no party-by-party breakdown
assessing 30 percent quota compliance.
Opacity strategy may reflect deliberate risk management preventing premature opposition mobilization but
December 20, 2025

creates credibility vulnerabilities if list disappoints expectations.
Political actors remain publicly silent with no rallies, coalitions, or boycott declarations suggesting await list
publication before committing strategies.
December 22 publication represents definitive checkpoint determining constitutional timeline viability with
fourteen months to complete electoral processes before February 7 2027.
Timing coordination between Rubio 7,500 troop pledge and electoral deadline suggests US links security
commitments to opposition participation requirements.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Prepare rapid response assessment frameworks for multiple December 22 candidate list scenarios ranging from
robust opposition participation to complete boycott.
Coordinate with international observer missions establishing threshold criteria distinguishing acceptable from
unacceptable candidate list composition.
Monitor opposition political networks December 21 for preliminary positioning statements signaling anticipated
reactions to list publication.
Assess whether CEP opacity violated constitutional transparency requirements creating legal grounds for
opposition challenges to electoral process legitimacy.
Evaluate United States diplomatic pressure effectiveness determining if security commitment announcements
influenced opposition participation calculations.
Prepare contingency analysis if boycott confirmed requiring reconsideration of August 30 2026 electoral viability
and February 7 2027 mandate extension scenarios.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE FORMALIZED AT 18 COUNTRY COMMITMENT

Haiti Libre reported December 20 that eighteen participating states have now formally pledged personnel,
resources, and technical support toward the Gang Suppression Force following Secretary of State Marco Rubio's
December 19 announcement that the United States secured commitments for up to 7,500 security personnel
representing a 37 percent increase from the 5,500 troop ceiling announced December 12. The formalization of 18
country participation confirms the force generation diplomatic campaign succeeded in expanding beyond the
initial seven countries identified at the December 9 Force Generation Conference through intensive United States
December 20, 2025

bilateral engagement with potential troop-contributing nations during the ten-day period between conference and
Rubio's announcement. The deployment timeline previously indicated remains operational with approximately
1,000 personnel scheduled to arrive January 2026 and roughly half of the total force projected operational by
April 1 2026 aligned with the start of the new United Nations support office for Haiti.
The 18 country commitment structure creates complex command and control challenges requiring coordination
across multiple national contingents with varying rules of engagement, language barriers, equipment
standardization requirements, and operational doctrine differences that could undermine tactical effectiveness if
not managed through robust multinational headquarters structures. Previous multinational force deployments in
Haiti including the 2004 through 2017 MINUSTAH mission demonstrated that troop-contributing nations often
impose caveats limiting when and how their personnel can be employed in combat operations creating force
employment constraints that gang leadership can exploit by targeting contingents known to have restrictive
engagement rules. The question of which specific countries beyond the initial seven pledged the additional
personnel to reach 7,500 total commitments remains unanswered with strategic implications for force
composition since regional Latin American and Caribbean contributors bring cultural and linguistic advantages
while extra-regional African or Asian contingents may offer specialized counterinsurgency experience but face
adaptation challenges to Haitian operational environment.
The financial sustainability of maintaining 7,500 troops through the United Nations Multi-Donor Trust Fund
mechanism represents a critical vulnerability since the fund has historically suffered from pledge shortfalls with
donor nations committing resources rhetorically but failing to disburse funds according to operational timelines
creating equipment shortages, delayed rotations, and morale problems among deployed personnel. If the 7,500
force cannot be sustained beyond initial deployment phases due to funding constraints the tactical gains
achieved during early operations could be lost as personnel withdraw and gangs reoccupy cleared territories
replicating the pattern of previous international interventions where insufficient duration undermined initial
successes. The Haiti Libre reporting reiterating that gangs control more than 80 percent of Port-au-Prince driving
1.4 million internally displaced persons provides operational context for the 7,500 troop requirement
demonstrating that force sizing reflects assessment of territorial control challenges rather than arbitrary
diplomatic compromise since recovering and holding such extensive gang-controlled urban terrain requires
sustained combat operations beyond current Haitian National Police capacity.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United Nations MINUSTAH mission deployed approximately 9,000 military and police personnel at peak
strength between 2004 and 2017 providing historical precedent for multinational force requirements in Haiti but
operating under different mandate authorities and Rules of Engagement than the current Gang Suppression
Force structure.



## TALKING POINTS

Eighteen countries formally pledged personnel and resources toward 7,500 GSF troop ceiling announced
December 19 by Secretary Rubio.
Formalization confirms diplomatic campaign expanded beyond initial seven countries through intensive United
States bilateral engagement.
December 20, 2025

Deployment timeline remains 1,000 personnel January 2026 with half of force operational by April 1 2026 aligned
with UN support office start.
18 country structure creates command and control challenges requiring coordination across varying rules of
engagement and operational doctrine.
Financial sustainability through UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund represents critical vulnerability given historical donor
pledge shortfalls.
Gang control of 80 percent Port-au-Prince driving 1.4 million displaced provides operational context for 7,500
troop requirement assessment.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Identify which specific countries beyond initial seven pledged additional personnel determining regional versus
extra-regional force composition.
Assess multinational headquarters capacity to coordinate 18 country contingents managing rules of engagement
variations and equipment standardization.
Monitor UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund disbursement rates determining if donor pledges translate to actual
operational funding at required timelines.
Evaluate whether January deployment remains 1,000 personnel or scales proportionally to 7,500 ceiling
requiring revised planning assumptions.
Prepare force sustainability analysis projecting whether 7,500 troops can be maintained through 2026 electoral
period or funding constraints force reductions.
Coordinate with troop-contributing nations regarding caveats and employment restrictions identifying tactical
vulnerabilities gang leadership could exploit.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Provisional Electoral Council publishes final candidate list December 22 determining whether major opposition
figures registered or boycotted creating definitive electoral viability assessment. Political actors issue immediate
December 20, 2025

reactions to candidate list composition revealing acceptance versus rejection strategies. International observer
missions evaluate list against threshold criteria for credible democratic competition. AmeriJet announces cargo
suspension continuation or resumption timeline affecting humanitarian logistics contingency planning.



## THIS WEEK

Opposition political networks mobilize campaign infrastructure if December 22 list shows participation or
announce formal boycott declarations if list confirms anticipated government domination. Government diplomatic
communications shift to promoting electoral success narratives or conducting damage control operations
depending on candidate list outcomes. Civil society organizations coordinate response strategies ranging from
electoral support to constitutional crisis management. Humanitarian organizations finalize alternative logistics
arrangements if AmeriJet suspension extends indefinitely.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

Gang Suppression Force deployment accelerates January 2026 with first 1,000 troops arriving testing whether
multinational command structures function effectively and whether initial operations achieve territorial control
objectives. Constitutional timeline pressures intensify if December 22 candidate list reveals electoral legitimacy
deficits forcing transitional government decisions whether to extend mandate beyond February 7 2027 or accept
democratic restoration deadline failure. European donors reassess Haiti aid commitments based on port
infrastructure functionality and electoral process credibility determining continued investment levels. Drug
trafficking hub status triggers regional counter-narcotics escalation potentially disrupting humanitarian access
throughout 2026 campaign period.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre PNH GSF Large Scale Anti Gang Operation December 20 2025
Haitian Truth European Aid at Risk Port Standoff December 20 2025
Council on Foreign Relations Gang Suppression Force Relief Haiti December 2025
CEP Haiti December 2025 Web Updates Gender Inclusion Mobilization
US Embassy Port au Prince Security Alert December 18 2025
Crisis Group Undoing Haiti Deadly Gang Alliance Report December 2025
United Nations Haiti Drug Transshipment Hub Warning November 2025
Haiti Libre News Zapping Varreux TVB Terminal Report December 20 2025
Relief Web Rapid Response Mechanism Alert Verrette Attack December 18 2025
Carnegie Endowment Haiti Crisis State Capacity Assessment December 16 2025
Haiti Libre Countries Pledge Up to 7,500 Troops to GSF December 20 2025
Haiti24 Dominican Republic Deportations GARR Report December 2025
December 20, 2025



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*