# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2025-12-22
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

---

## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: CEP CANDIDATE LIST PUBLICATION FAILURE THREATENS](#development-1-cep-candidate-list-publication-failure-threatens)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: TWO-DAY SECURITY SILENCE SUGGESTS GANG STRATEGIC PAUSE](#development-2-two-day-security-silence-suggests-gang-strategic-pause)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: 47-DAY CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTDOWN APPROACHES WITHOUT](#development-3-47-day-constitutional-countdown-approaches-without)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

---


## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Provisional Electoral Council failed to publish the final candidate list on the scheduled date
of December 22 raising critical questions about the viability of the August 30 2026 electoral
timeline. Three scenarios explain the delay: technical finalization, insufficient candidate
registrations, or unresolved contestation disputes. Haiti experienced its second consecutive day
without reported security incidents suggesting either post-offensive disruption or gang strategic
observation of the electoral process. With 47 days remaining until the February 7 2027
Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration and no published candidate list the
constitutional succession framework is now in jeopardy. The international community remained
completely silent issuing no statements on the electoral crisis.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CEP failed to publish final candidate list on scheduled date of December 22 with zero
explanation or revised timeline issued.
Second consecutive day December 21-22 with no reported security incidents represents
unusual operational pause.
47 days remain until February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration with no viable electoral
succession plan.
Complete international diplomatic silence from CPT, CARICOM, OAS, UN, and bilateral partners
on candidate list delay.
No new economic data or humanitarian updates released creating information vacuum across
all sectors.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: CEP CANDIDATE LIST PUBLICATION FAILURE THREATENS

ELECTORAL TIMELINE
The Provisional Electoral Council failed to publish the final candidate list on the scheduled date
of December 22 2025 as of 4:44 PM EST representing the most significant breakdown in Haiti's
electoral transition process. The CEP website showed no announcement regarding candidate
list publication with the most recent content focusing on media training programs for online
journalists rather than electoral deliverables. The December 22 publication date was the
culminating event following the 15-day candidate registration period from December 1-15 and
the 4-day contestation period from December 16-19 making its absence a critical timeline
disruption. The failure to publish occurred without any official CEP statement explaining the
delay, revising the timeline, or providing stakeholders with transparency on the resolution
December 22, 2025

process.
Three distinct scenarios explain the publication failure. The first scenario involves technical
delays where the CEP is finalizing contestation period resolutions and will publish within 24-48
hours though the absence of any explanatory statement makes this optimistic interpretation
questionable. The second scenario centers on insufficient candidate registrations where the
15-day registration period yielded too few viable candidates or zero major opposition figures
forcing the CEP to negotiate calendar extensions or process revisions with political actors. The
third scenario involves a contestation crisis where the December 16-19 dispute period produced
unresolved challenges to candidate eligibility or documentation failures that prevent the CEP
from certifying the list without further adjudication. Each scenario carries distinct implications for
the August 30 2026 election timeline with technical delays representing the least damaging
outcome while registration or contestation crises suggest fundamental electoral process failures.
The cascading calendar impacts become severe if the list remains unpublished beyond
December 24. The official electoral calendar designated December 26 as the campaign period
start date which becomes operationally impossible without a published candidate list. If the
December 26 campaign launch is missed the entire electoral calendar shifts forward potentially
rendering the August 30 2026 election date unfeasible given the required campaign duration
and logistical preparation timelines. The CEP's complete opacity compounds the crisis as
stakeholders including political parties, international observers, and civil society organizations
have no visibility into whether the delay represents hours, days, or weeks of additional waiting.
The absence of transparency creates information vacuums that political actors and armed
groups can exploit to advance alternative narratives about electoral legitimacy.
The publication failure intersects dangerously with gang strategic calculations particularly given
the Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that armed groups are seeking amnesty as part of
the February 7 transition negotiations. A weak or non-existent candidate list validates gang
leverage by demonstrating that the formal political system cannot organize legitimate
succession mechanisms while a strong list with credible opposition participation threatens gang
negotiating positions by suggesting democratic alternatives remain viable. The two-day security
silence from December 21-22 may represent gang actors strategically observing the candidate
list outcome before determining their operational responses with publication or confirmed
indefinite delay likely to trigger immediate reactions across Port-au-Prince and Artibonite gang
territories.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

December 22, 2025

Haiti's previous electoral processes have experienced candidate list delays most notably during
the 2015-2016 electoral crisis when the CEP postponed publication multiple times amid fraud
allegations and political negotiations. The current delay occurs in a uniquely fragile context
where gang territorial control exceeds 80 percent of Port-au-Prince and the Transitional
Presidential Council faces constitutional mandate expiration in 47 days without a clear
succession mechanism.



## TALKING POINTS

The CEP candidate list publication failure on December 22 represents the most significant
electoral timeline breakdown since the transition process began threatening the August 30 2026
election viability.
Three scenarios explain the delay: technical finalization requiring 24-48 hours, insufficient
candidate registrations forcing calendar revision, or unresolved contestation disputes preventing
certification.
The December 26 campaign period start date becomes impossible without immediate list
publication cascading the entire electoral calendar forward and raising questions about August
30 feasibility.
Gang strategic calculations are directly tied to candidate list strength with weak participation
validating gang leverage while strong opposition presence threatens their February 7 amnesty
negotiating position.
International community silence suggests diplomatic actors are waiting for CEP resolution
before intervening but emergency mandate extension negotiations must begin immediately if
delay extends beyond December 24.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor CEP website and official channels continuously through December 24 for candidate list
publication or explanatory statement with any publication triggering immediate stakeholder
analysis of candidate diversity and opposition strength.
Prepare scenario-based contingency planning for December 26 campaign period cancellation
including revised electoral calendar modeling and August 30 election feasibility assessments if
list remains unpublished beyond December 24.
Initiate diplomatic engagement with CARICOM and OAS representatives this week regarding
February 7 2027 CPT mandate extension frameworks given the 47-day timeline and current
electoral process breakdown.
Activate enhanced security monitoring protocols for 24-48 hours following candidate list
publication or confirmed indefinite delay anticipating gang operational responses to electoral
December 22, 2025

developments.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: TWO-DAY SECURITY SILENCE SUGGESTS GANG STRATEGIC PAUSE

Haiti experienced its second consecutive day without reported major security incidents on
December 22 following a similar pattern on December 21 representing an unusual operational
pause given December's violence trajectory. No gang attacks, PNH operations, or armed
confrontations were reported by Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, or international wire
services throughout creating a 48-hour information vacuum in security reporting. The silence
follows the December 18 PNH offensive operations in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets
which represented the most significant police action since the Bel-Air massacre began on
December 8. The absence of incidents contrasts sharply with the December operational tempo
which included the Bel-Air massacre producing 60-plus fatalities from December 8-13, the
Verette hospital attack on December 16 killing six civilians, and continuous gang territorial
expansion across Port-au-Prince and Artibonite departments.
Two primary explanations account for the operational pause. The first centers on
post-offensive gang disruption where the December 18 PNH operations successfully
degraded gang command structures or logistical capabilities in the
Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets corridor creating temporary breathing room for
security forces and civilian populations. This interpretation suggests the PNH achieved
tactical success in disrupting gang coordination mechanisms though the absence of
official police statements about operational outcomes or arrested gang leaders limits
confidence in this assessment. The second explanation involves gang strategic
observation of the electoral process where armed groups are deliberately pausing
operations while monitoring the candidate list publication or non-publication before
determining their next moves. This interpretation aligns with the Crisis Group's
December 15 warning that gangs are seeking amnesty as part of the February 7
transition negotiations suggesting they view electoral developments as directly relevant
to their strategic positioning.
December 22, 2025

The strategic observation hypothesis carries significant implications for immediate-term security
trajectories. If gangs are deliberately pausing operations to assess candidate list strength a
weak or non-existent list publication would validate their leverage by demonstrating that formal
political institutions cannot organize legitimate succession mechanisms strengthening gang
negotiating positions for February 7 amnesty deals. Conversely a strong candidate list with
credible opposition participation would threaten gang strategic calculations by suggesting
democratic alternatives remain viable potentially triggering violent responses designed to disrupt
the electoral process and reassert gang territorial dominance. The two-day silence may
therefore represent the calm before a significant escalation with gang operational tempo
resuming within 24-48 hours of candidate list publication or confirmed indefinite delay.
The Christmas week timing adds complexity to the operational pause assessment as both
security forces and armed groups typically reduce activity levels during the December 24-26
holiday period for logistical and cultural reasons. Historical patterns from previous Haitian
Decembers show decreased violence during the immediate Christmas period followed by
operational resumption in late December or early January. However the current context differs
fundamentally from previous years given the unprecedented gang territorial control exceeding
80 percent of Port-au-Prince, the ongoing humanitarian crises in Bel-Air and Port-Sonde, and
the February 7 constitutional deadline creating time pressure for all actors. The Christmas week
effect may extend the operational pause through December 26 but gang strategic imperatives
linked to the electoral process and February 7 negotiations suggest violence will resume
regardless of holiday timing once key political decisions become clear.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous December operational patterns in Haiti have shown reduced gang activity during the
Christmas week period followed by resumption in late December or early January. However the
current context differs fundamentally with gang territorial control exceeding 80 percent of
Port-au-Prince and the February 7 2027 constitutional deadline creating strategic imperatives
that override traditional holiday pause patterns.



## TALKING POINTS

December 21-22 represents two consecutive days without reported security incidents creating
unusual operational pause following December 18 PNH offensive in
Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets.
December 22, 2025

Two explanations account for the silence: post-offensive gang disruption creating temporary
breathing room or gang strategic observation of candidate list publication before determining
next operational moves.
Gang strategic pause hypothesis aligns with Crisis Group December 15 assessment that armed
groups seek amnesty as part of February 7 transition negotiations making electoral
developments directly relevant to gang positioning.
Weak or non-existent candidate list validates gang leverage while strong opposition participation
threatens gang negotiating position potentially triggering violent electoral disruption responses.
Christmas week timing may extend operational pause through December 26 but gang strategic
imperatives suggest violence resumption within 24-48 hours of candidate list publication
regardless of holiday calendar.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Maintain enhanced security monitoring protocols through December 26 with particular focus on
24-48 hour period following candidate list publication or confirmed indefinite delay anticipating
gang operational responses.
Analyze December 18 PNH offensive outcomes by seeking official police statements about
operational successes, gang casualties, or territorial gains to assess whether post-offensive
disruption explains current pause.
Prepare contingency assessments for multiple gang response scenarios including violent
electoral disruption if strong candidate list threatens gang February 7 negotiating leverage or
accelerated territorial expansion if weak list validates gang strategic positioning.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: 47-DAY CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTDOWN APPROACHES WITHOUT

SUCCESSION FRAMEWORK
Haiti faces 47 days until the February 7 2027 Transitional Presidential Council mandate
expiration without a viable constitutional succession mechanism in place as the electoral
process breakdown threatens the August 30 2026 election timeline. The CPT was established
with a constitutional mandate running from April 2025 through February 7 2027 based on the
December 22, 2025

expectation that August 2026 elections would produce a legitimate government ready to assume
power by the mandate expiration date. The candidate list publication failure on December 22
fundamentally undermines this succession framework by calling into question whether the
August 30 election date remains operationally feasible given the cascading calendar delays. If
the December 26 campaign period start is missed due to continued list non-publication the
entire electoral calendar shifts forward potentially rendering August 30 2026 elections
impossible within the available timeline.
The constitutional implications of a February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration without elected
government succession are severe and unprecedented in Haiti's modern political history. Three
scenarios define the possible outcomes. The first scenario involves emergency mandate
extension where CARICOM, OAS, UN, and bilateral partners negotiate a constitutional
framework allowing the CPT to continue governing beyond February 7 until elections can be
organized and completed though this requires rapid diplomatic consensus and Haitian political
actor buy-in. The second scenario centers on interim government formation where the CPT
voluntarily dissolves on February 7 and transfers power to a caretaker mechanism designed by
international partners and domestic stakeholders to bridge the gap until elections though this
creates questions about constitutional legitimacy and succession authority. The third scenario
involves constitutional vacuum where the CPT mandate expires without any successor
mechanism producing a legitimacy crisis that armed groups and political spoilers can exploit to
advance alternative governance models or territorial control consolidation.
The international community's complete silence on the candidate list delay and February 7
deadline suggests diplomatic actors are waiting for the CEP to resolve the immediate crisis
before engaging on mandate extension frameworks. No statements were issued on December
22 by the CPT, Prime Minister Fils-Aime, CARICOM, OAS, UN/BINUH, US State Department, or
Canadian government regarding the electoral timeline breakdown or succession planning. This
silence may reflect diplomatic coordination behind closed doors where partners are assessing
scenarios and building consensus on intervention frameworks but the absence of public
transparency creates dangerous information vacuums that political and armed actors can
exploit. If the candidate list remains unpublished beyond December 24 international actors must
issue public statements clarifying their positions on mandate extension and succession
mechanisms to prevent rumor-driven instability.
The mandate expiration crisis intersects with gang strategic calculations regarding amnesty
negotiations and territorial consolidation timelines. Armed groups view February 7 2027 as a
critical negotiating checkpoint where they can leverage the constitutional vacuum to demand
amnesty provisions or territorial recognition in exchange for supporting transition stability. The
Crisis Group's December 15 assessment explicitly warned that gangs are positioning for
December 22, 2025

February 7 negotiations suggesting they have developed sophisticated understanding of
constitutional deadline implications. A weak or failed electoral process strengthens gang
negotiating leverage by demonstrating that formal political institutions cannot organize legitimate
succession while a strong electoral process with credible opposition participation threatens gang
positions by offering democratic alternatives to violence-based governance models.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2025 with a mandate running
through February 7 2027 based on expectations that August 2026 elections would produce
legitimate government succession. Previous Haitian transitions including the 2004-2006 and
2016-2017 periods experienced mandate extensions negotiated by international partners when
electoral timelines collapsed creating precedent for emergency constitutional frameworks.



## TALKING POINTS

Haiti faces 47 days until February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration without viable succession
mechanism as candidate list publication failure threatens August 30 2026 election timeline
feasibility.
Three scenarios define possible outcomes: emergency mandate extension negotiated by
international partners, interim caretaker government formation, or constitutional vacuum
exploitable by armed groups and political spoilers.
International community maintained complete silence on December 22 with no statements from
CPT, CARICOM, OAS, UN, or bilateral partners suggesting diplomatic coordination behind
closed doors or strategic waiting for CEP resolution.
Gang strategic calculations view February 7 as critical negotiating checkpoint for amnesty
provisions with weak electoral process strengthening gang leverage while strong process
threatens their positioning.
Diplomatic actors must issue public statements on mandate extension frameworks by December
24 if candidate list remains unpublished to prevent dangerous information vacuums and
rumor-driven instability.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Initiate confidential diplomatic engagement with CARICOM and OAS representatives this week
regarding February 7 2027 CPT mandate extension frameworks including constitutional
mechanisms and domestic stakeholder buy-in requirements.
December 22, 2025

Develop scenario-based contingency planning for all three succession outcomes including
mandate extension timelines, interim government formation structures, and constitutional
vacuum crisis management protocols.
Monitor international diplomatic communications channels for behind-the-scenes coordination
signals regarding mandate extension negotiations or succession planning consensus building
among multilateral and bilateral partners.
Prepare public messaging frameworks clarifying international community positions on February
7 deadline and succession mechanisms to deploy if candidate list remains unpublished beyond
December 24 preventing information vacuum exploitation.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor CEP website and official channels continuously for candidate list publication or
explanatory statement with any publication triggering immediate analysis of candidate diversity
and opposition strength. Track security incident reporting across Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, and
AlterPresse for signs of operational pause ending particularly in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite
departments. Watch for any CPT, Prime Minister, or international partner statements regarding
the candidate list delay or February 7 mandate extension frameworks.



## THIS WEEK

December 24 represents critical threshold where continued candidate list non-publication
confirms electoral timeline breakdown requiring international diplomatic intervention on
succession mechanisms. December 26 campaign period start date will be missed if list remains
unpublished forcing formal acknowledgment that August 30 2026 elections face feasibility
questions. Christmas week operational patterns may mask gang strategic responses to electoral
developments with violence resumption likely by December 27-28 regardless of holiday timing.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

December 22, 2025

The February 7 2027 constitutional deadline drives all strategic calculations with 47 days
remaining for electoral process completion or mandate extension negotiation. Gang strategic
positioning for February 7 amnesty negotiations will intensify as the deadline approaches with
armed groups calibrating operational tempo and territorial consolidation based on electoral
process strength or weakness. International community must begin public diplomacy on
succession frameworks by January 2026 if electoral timeline breakdown continues preventing
constitutional vacuum scenarios.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Info Project Twitter: Electoral Timeline Update
Haiti Libre: CEP Official Calendar of Upcoming Elections
CEP Official Website (cephaiti.ht)
UN News: Haiti Focus Topic Coverage
US Embassy Haiti: News and Official Statements
Crisis Group: Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance Report December 15
Human Rights Watch: Haiti Country Report 2025
Reuters: Kenyan Police Deployment December 9 Report
Le Nouvelliste: Security and Political Coverage December 21-22
AlterPresse: Haiti Humanitarian and Security Reporting December 22
Haiti Government Communications Portal
Council on Foreign Relations: Gang Suppression Force Analysis
December 22, 2025



---

*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*