# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-28
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: PNH TABARRE OFFENSIVE: HIGH-TEMPO OPERATIONS ACROSS](#development-1-pnh-tabarre-offensive-high-tempo-operations-across)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: ELECTORAL FEASIBILITY CRISIS: EXPERT ANALYSIS CONTRADICTS](#development-2-electoral-feasibility-crisis-expert-analysis-contradicts)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DEPORTATION SURGE: 35,026 IN JANUARY](#development-3-dominican-republic-deportation-surge-35,026-in-january)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: GSF FINANCING, GOVERNANCE TRANSITION, AND DIASPORA:](#development-4-gsf-financing,-governance-transition,-and-diaspora)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Haitian National Police launched a major anti-gang offensive in Tabarre on February 27,
continuing a high-tempo operational pattern across Port-au-Prince's eastern zones with multiple
gang members killed and a weapons cache destroyed. A France24 analysis published today
consolidated expert assessments that cast serious doubt on electoral feasibility, directly
contradicting official optimism from PM Fils-Aime and Secretary Rubio. The Dominican Republic
deported 35,026 Haitians in January alone, exceeding domestic absorption capacity. France's
confirmed EUR 40 million Haiti engagement and EUR 3.5 million GSF contribution provide financial
clarity as the April deployment window approaches.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

PNH conducted a large-scale anti-gang operation in Tabarre on February 27; multiple gang
members killed, fortified trenches filled, and a large Molotov cocktail cache destroyed.
Dominican Republic deported 35,026 Haitians in January 2026 at a pace exceeding 1,000 persons
per day into a country with 1.45 million internally displaced persons.
France committed EUR 40 million total to Haiti in 2025 and EUR 3.5 million specifically to the GSF
trust fund; April deployment projection of 6,000 police plus 5,500 soldiers now publicly confirmed.
HOPE/HELP Senate Finance Committee markup remains unscheduled; 10,000-plus textile sector
jobs remain in legislative limbo pending a must-pass vehicle.
TPS termination for 350,000 Haitians took effect February 2, 2026; court challenge by prior
litigation teams is ongoing.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: PNH TABARRE OFFENSIVE: HIGH-TEMPO OPERATIONS ACROSS

EASTERN PORT-AU-PRINCE
The Haitian National Police launched a large-scale offensive against armed gangs in the commune
of Tabarre at approximately 7:30 AM on February 27, 2026. Several gang members were killed in
the opening engagements. Specialized PNH units filled trenches that criminal networks had
excavated to obstruct armored vehicle movement. Searches of structures in the operational zone
produced a significant cache of Molotov cocktails, which were destroyed on site. No PNH casualties
were reported in initial dispatches from HaitiLibre and Le Nouvelliste.
This operation follows a January 31 Tabarre assault that killed eight gang members and cleared the
Pont de Tabarre to Carrefour Marassa corridor using armored vehicles and engineering equipment.
The recurring trench-filling requirement indicates that armed groups are systematically deploying
anti-vehicular earthworks, forcing the PNH to conduct combined-arms operations rather than
standard law enforcement actions. The tactical pattern has now appeared in at least two Tabarre
engagements within thirty days.
February 28, 2026

The Tabarre operation must be read in conjunction with the February 20-21 Kenscoff operation that
killed sixteen gang members using snipers and drones, and the February 23 Delmas kidnapping
intervention that killed six kidnappers while losing two PNH officers. The PNH received new
armored combat vehicles at Port-au-Prince customs on February 5, the first acquisition of this class
for the institution. Across these four engagements, the PNH is now conducting near-daily
operations across Tabarre, Kenscoff, Delmas, and Carrefour-Aeroport simultaneously.
Sustainability is the central operational risk. The February 23 Delmas action cost two PNH lives
against six gang members killed, a ratio that signals lethal resistance rather than collapsing gang
capacity. Without the Gang Suppression Force reinforcement projected for April, the current
operational tempo places attrition pressure on a police corps already operating at institutional limits.
The June-July rainy season will further complicate armored mobility in low-lying zones.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Tabarre has been a contested operational zone in the eastern Port-au-Prince metropolitan area for
multiple years, sitting astride critical access routes to Toussaint Louverture International Airport.
Prior international security missions, including MINUSTAH, documented the same pattern of gang
territorial consolidation in peri-urban corridors that current PNH operations are now attempting to
reverse through force.



## TALKING POINTS

PNH conducted at least four major offensive operations between February 20 and February 27
across geographically distinct zones.
The trench-filling tactic now appears as a standardized gang counter-mobility measure requiring
engineering response.
Two PNH officers killed on February 23 confirm gangs are maintaining lethal resistance capacity
despite sustained pressure.
New armored vehicles received February 5 are enabling operations that were previously not
feasible for the PNH.
GSF reinforcement in April remains the critical variable for sustaining current operational tempo
past mid-year.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should update security perimeter assessments for Tabarre, Delmas, and
Kenscoff zones given active but not resolved operational status.
Business security managers should note that operations indicate contested rather than cleared
February 28, 2026

status; convoy routing through eastern Port-au-Prince requires current intelligence.
Donor governments should accelerate GSF financial commitment finalization before the February
2026 deadline closes with gaps unresolved.
Political actors should calibrate public communications regarding security improvement with the
caveat that PNH attrition rates are not yet sustainable without reinforcement.
NGO logistics planners should prepare contingency routing protocols if Tabarre operations
temporarily close the Pont de Tabarre corridor.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: ELECTORAL FEASIBILITY CRISIS: EXPERT ANALYSIS CONTRADICTS

OFFICIAL POSTURE
A France24 analysis published February 28, 2026, consolidated assessments from three
independent academic experts that collectively challenge the viability of Haiti's electoral calendar.
Alex Dupuy of Wesleyan University assessed that the Haitian National Police lack the firepower and
resources for military-scale operations, and characterized the Kenyan-led multinational mission as
having achieved limited pacification with personnel who lack Haitian context and language capacity.
Eduardo Gamarra of Florida International University identified the absence of a trustworthy
electoral registry, a non-operational political party system, and no genuine organizational capability
to conduct a vote. Gamarra also identified a growing sense of donor fatigue toward Haiti among
contributing governments.
This expert consensus stands in direct contradiction with official public postures. PM Alix
Didier Fils-Aime stated on February 26 that he is confident elections will be held by
year-end. Secretary Rubio, at the CARICOM meeting, endorsed progress on the anti-gang
force. Neither statement engaged the structural prerequisites that experts identify as absent.
The gap between official confidence and expert assessment is not a matter of interpretation;
it reflects the difference between political messaging and operational ground conditions.
February 28, 2026

The Provisional Electoral Council has itself acknowledged that twenty-three communes
remain under gang control and that security is a prerequisite for the August 30 target vote
date. This internal CEP acknowledgment aligns with the expert critique rather than with PM
Fils-Aime's public confidence. The National Pact's Article 12, which envisions constitutional
modifications through an electoral mechanism the CEP considers outside its legal authority,
adds a procedural dimension to the operational and security concerns already documented.
Gamarra identified two structural pathways: sustained military action sufficient to dismantle gang
territorial control, or negotiated political integration of armed faction leadership. Neither pathway has
a defined timeline consistent with an August 30 vote. The France24 analysis noted that the National
Pact does not specify a clear timeline for the Prime Minister's departure, leaving the end-state of
the current governance arrangement formally undefined.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has not held a contested national election since 2016, and prior international efforts including
MINUSTAH's fourteen-year presence failed to produce durable security conditions for democratic
consolidation. The 2015-2016 electoral cycle was annulled under fraud allegations, establishing a
precedent for disputed processes that current governance actors must actively counteract.



## TALKING POINTS

Three independent academic experts with Haiti specialization have published coordinated
skepticism about electoral feasibility under current conditions.
The CEP itself acknowledges twenty-three gang-controlled communes as a security prerequisite
challenge, internally validating expert concerns.
PM Fils-Aime's year-end confidence statement and expert structural assessments describe
incompatible ground conditions.
The National Pact's undefined timeline for PM departure creates legitimacy exposure as unaffiliated
political actors monitor the mandate's open-ended structure.
Article 12 constitutional modification procedures face a legal authority challenge from the CEP that
remains unresolved.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should request the CEP's specific security threshold metrics for the
August 30 vote date to calibrate contingency planning.
February 28, 2026

Diplomatic missions should distinguish between public electoral support language and private
operational planning assumptions in internal reporting.
Business community should note that electoral uncertainty extending past August 30 represents a
baseline planning scenario, not a worst case.
Political actors engaged in the Pact should move to define a clear PM departure timeline before
legitimacy challenges from excluded actors intensify.
Donor governments funding electoral preparation should condition disbursements on measurable
security benchmarks in gang-controlled communes.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DEPORTATION SURGE: 35,026 IN JANUARY

ALONE
The Dominican Republic General Directorate of Migration reported that 35,026 Haitians were
deported in January 2026 alone, with 38,392 individuals apprehended during the same period.
Deportations were processed through the border crossings of Dajabón, Elias Piña, Jimaní, and
Pedernales. The gap between apprehensions and deportations suggests a processing backlog that
will sustain elevated return flows into February and March.
For full-year 2025, the Dominican Republic deported 379,553 Haitians through 6,535 migration
control operations coordinated by the Dominican Armed Forces and National Police. IOM data
covering all deportation sources showed 270,214 total returns to Haiti in 2025, a thirty-six percent
increase over 2024, with the Dominican Republic accounting for ninety-eight percent of all forced
returns globally. The January 2026 rate of 35,026 in one month, if sustained, would project to over
420,000 annual returns, exceeding even the 2025 record.
Haiti is absorbing these returns against a baseline of 1.45 million internally displaced persons, 5.7
million food-insecure individuals, and gang control over most of the capital. The majority of
returnees are processed through border departments that have limited municipal reception capacity
and no formal reintegration infrastructure at scale. Border communities in the Northwest, Artibonite,
and Sud-Est departments are absorbing secondary displacement pressure from returnees who
cannot access their areas of origin due to gang territorial control or flood damage.
The operational implication for humanitarian actors is a compounding displacement cascade.
Forced returnees entering a country where internal movement is restricted by gang checkpoints,
where 1.45 million people are already displaced, and where food insecurity affects forty-eight
February 28, 2026

percent of the population creates a humanitarian pressure multiplier with no visible absorption
mechanism. IOM reception points at key border crossings represent the primary documented
support infrastructure.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Dominican-Haitian migration relations have been structurally asymmetric since the 2013
Constitutional Tribunal ruling that retroactively stripped citizenship from Dominicans of Haitian
descent, triggering mass statelessness and accelerating return migration. The 2025-2026
deportation acceleration represents a quantitative escalation of a pattern that has been
operationally significant since 2015.



## TALKING POINTS

35,026 Haitians deported in January 2026 represents a pace of over 1,000 forced returns per day.
The Dominican Republic accounted for ninety-eight percent of all global forced returns to Haiti in
2025 per IOM data.
Haiti's existing displacement baseline of 1.45 million IDPs has no capacity to absorb additional
large-scale forced return flows.
Border departments lack formal reintegration infrastructure at the scale required by current return
volumes.
The thirty-six percent year-over-year increase in 2025 suggests structural escalation rather than
temporary enforcement surge.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should expand border reception capacity at Dajabón, Jimaní, and
Malpasse crossings ahead of projected continued high return volumes.
International organizations should commission formal absorption capacity assessments for border
departments with current IDP and food security data overlaid.
Diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo should seek DGM clarity on whether the January volume
reflects a policy acceleration or seasonal enforcement pattern.
Business community with supply chain exposure in Artibonite and border departments should
assess labor market disruption from forced returnee concentrations.
Political actors engaged with the diaspora should address the DR deportation trajectory directly in
community communications given the volume's visibility in diaspora media.
CONFIDENCE
February 28, 2026

High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: GSF FINANCING, GOVERNANCE TRANSITION, AND DIASPORA:

CONSOLIDATED UPDATE
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot's February 18 address to the French Senate provided the
most detailed public accounting of an international contributor's Haiti engagement. France
committed approximately EUR 40 million total in 2025 across security, humanitarian, and
development categories: EUR 17 million in humanitarian aid including school canteens, EUR 17
million in AFD development projects covering health, education, governance, and agriculture, EUR
4 million in support to the Forces Armees d'Haiti and security forces, and a new EUR 3.5 million
contribution to the GSF trust fund. Barrot projected progressive GSF deployment of 6,000 police
officers and 5,500 soldiers across April and September 2026 windows, the most concrete public
timeline available from any contributing government.
The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie issued a statement in early February
expressing concern that persistent fragmentation of Haiti's national political class had not produced
a sufficiently broad consensus. The OIF formally noted that power has been held since February 7,
2026, by the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister following the expiration of the
Transitional Presidential Council's original mandate. The OIF called on political leaders to prioritize
national interest over partisan positioning. This multilateral acknowledgment of the governance gap
is significant as it comes from a body with observer credibility distinct from direct bilateral partners.
The HOPE/HELP trade preference extension passed the House 345-45 on January 12 but
faces Senate stalling with no Finance Committee markup scheduled. The most viable vehicle
for passage remains a must-pass government funding package, but Senate negotiations are
blocked by DHS and immigration policy disputes unrelated to Haiti. Senator Warnock called
for immediate Senate action; Representative Salazar emphasized the 10,000-plus Haitian
jobs at stake and the program's role in reducing migration pressure. Without Senate
passage, the retroactive extension from September 2025 provides legal cover but investor
confidence in long-term textile sector viability remains structurally impaired.
On diaspora developments, media personality Carel Pedre was released from Krome Service
Processing Center in Florida on February 27 after more than two months in immigration detention.
Criminal charges of misdemeanor domestic battery, which prompted his December 21, 2025,
arrest, were subsequently dropped, and a Florida judge approved bail. His case drew sustained
diaspora attention given his profile as host of the Chokarella platform. Separately, the DHS
termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians, effective February 2, 2026, affects an
estimated 350,000 Haitians. Court litigation by attorneys who previously defeated the prior TPS
February 28, 2026

termination attempt is ongoing with no ruling timeline confirmed.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

France's historical engagement with Haiti carries colonial legacy dimensions that make public
financial disclosures politically sensitive in both countries. The HOPE/HELP program, first enacted
in 2006 following the devastating 2004-2006 political crisis period, has been the primary US
legislative mechanism for Haiti economic integration and has required periodic reauthorization
through bipartisan coalition-building.



## TALKING POINTS

France's EUR 3.5 million GSF contribution and Barrot's 6,000-plus-5,500 deployment projection
provide the clearest international commitment timeline now on public record.
OIF's formal acknowledgment of the Council of Ministers governance arrangement validates the
post-CPT transition as an internationally recognized, if not ideally structured, governance
framework.
HOPE/HELP Senate stalling in a must-pass vehicle scenario creates investor uncertainty in a
sector employing more than 10,000 Haitian workers.
Carel Pedre's release resolves a high-profile diaspora case but illustrates the legal exposure facing
prominent Haitians in the US immigration system.
TPS termination for 350,000 Haitians is the single largest unresolved diaspora policy threat with
active litigation as the only near-term relief mechanism.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Donor governments should use France's public EUR 40 million breakdown as a transparency
benchmark and publish comparable contribution accounting.
International organizations monitoring governance legitimacy should track OIF positioning as a
leading indicator of multilateral consensus on Haiti's Council of Ministers arrangement.
Business community with Haiti textile sector exposure should scenario-plan for HOPE/HELP
passage in a government funding vehicle versus a standalone bill on different timescales.
Diaspora legal services organizations should increase outreach to TPS-affected Haitians regarding
court proceedings and status maintenance requirements during litigation.
Diplomatic missions should assess whether Bachelet UN SG candidacy engagement by Chile,
Mexico, and Brazil creates a leverage window for Haiti in multilateral forums before year-end.
CONFIDENCE
February 28, 2026

Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor PNH communications for Tabarre operational follow-up. If PNH announces consolidation
and permanent deployment in cleared zones, trajectory is toward sustained security gain; if silence
follows, gang re-entrenchment is the risk. GSF financial commitment finalization, which the
February 2026 window was targeting, should produce confirmatory statements or reveal
contribution gaps in the immediate period.



## THIS WEEK

Track whether the Senate Finance Committee schedules any action on HOPE/HELP in the context
of government funding negotiations; any markup date or confirmed vehicle inclusion changes the
textile sector risk calculus significantly. CEP response to the unresolved Article 12 constitutional
authority question from February 25 reporting is a governance watchpoint. TPS litigation
developments at the court level, including any emergency stay or scheduling order, will determine
near-term status security for 350,000 Haitians. Cap-Haïtien flood and landslide impact should be
monitored if seasonal rains continue; the December 2024 environmental emergency declaration
indicates structural vulnerability.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

The April GSF deployment window is the single most consequential near-term variable for electoral
feasibility. If 6,000 police officers deploy as France's Barrot projected, the security prerequisites for
expanding voter registration into currently gang-controlled communes become measurable. If
deployment slips or falls below projected numbers, the August 30 vote date faces structural
impossibility rather than operational challenge. The DR deportation trajectory at over 35,000 per
month is unsustainable for Haitian domestic absorption and will require either diplomatic
engagement or humanitarian emergency classification before mid-year. PM Fils-Aime's open-ended
mandate under the National Pact will face increasing legitimacy pressure from excluded political
actors as the electoral calendar uncertainty extends.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

2. Le Nouvelliste, Operation anti-gang de la PNH a Tabarre, February 27, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264672/operation-anti-gang-de-la-pnh-a-tabarre
3. Le National, La PNH poursuit son offensive contre les gangs armes.
https://www.lenational.org/post_article.php?pol=7543
February 28, 2026

7. Canada-Haiti, Inside Haiti's road to 2026 elections: CEP revises calendar, keeps August 30 vote
date.
https://canada-haiti.ca/content/inside-haitis-road-2026-elections-cep-revises-calendar-keeps-aug-30-vote-date
9. ReliefWeb / IOM, Haiti: Key information on forced returns in Haiti in 2025.
https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-information-forced-returns-haiti-2025
10. Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Haiti: l'OIF appelle a un consensus national en
faveur de la stabilite, February 10, 2026.
https://www.francophonie.org/haiti-loif-appelle-a-un-consensus-national-en-faveur-de-la-stabilite-et-de-la-tenue-d
11. Vie-Publique, Discours de Jean-Noel Barrot, ministere de l'Europe et des affaires etrangeres,
February 18, 2026.
https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/302165-jean-noel-barrot-18022026-france-haiti
16. IJDH, DHS Redesignates Haiti for Temporary Protected Status.
https://www.ijdh.org/our-work/immigration-and-asylum/temporary-protected-status/
17. Le Nouvelliste, CEP Lacks Authority to Change the Constitution as Intended by the National
Pact, February 25, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264647/cep-lacks-authority-to-change-the-constitution-as-intended-by-the-nati
1. HaitiLibre, Haiti News Zapping, February 27, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46957-haiti-news-zapping.html
5. HaitiLibre, Haiti Security: Kidnapping foiled, 8 dead including 2 police officers, February 23, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46921-haiti-security-kidnapping-foiled-8-dead-including-2-police-officers.html
15. Juno7, Update: Carel Pedre Released After Judge Approved Bail, February 27, 2026.
https://www.juno7.ht/carel-pedre-release-bail-approved-florida/
6. HaitiLibre, Haiti Kenscoff: Large-scale operation, at least 16 bandits killed, February 21, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46905-haiti-kenscoff-large-scale-operation-at-least-16-bandits-killed.html
February 28, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*