# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-26
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: FILS-AIME SECURES US ENDORSEMENT AT CARICOM SUMMIT](#development-1-fils-aime-secures-us-endorsement-at-caricom-summit)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: CARREFOUR-AEROPORT RECAPTURE AND GSF DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE](#development-2-carrefour-aeroport-recapture-and-gsf-deployment-timeline)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: BORDER SECURITY CONTRACT AND ELECTORAL CALENDAR STATUS](#development-3-border-security-contract-and-electoral-calendar-status)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY: CHILD TRAFFICKING REPORT AND](#development-4-humanitarian-emergency-child-trafficking-report-and)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's post-CPT governance framework solidified on February 26 as Prime Minister Alix Didier
Fils-Aime secured US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's endorsement of the National Pact for
Stability and Elections at the 50th CARICOM summit in Basseterre. The Pact, signed by over 200
political parties and civil society organizations on February 21-22, establishes the legal foundation for
the interim period through the February 7, 2027 presidential inauguration target. Security forces
recaptured the strategic Carrefour-Aeroport junction in Port-au-Prince, the first significant territorial
recovery in the capital. A 10-year $542 million border security contract received judicial approval. The
GSF deployment timeline targeting April 2026 remains the decisive variable for the August 30
first-round election.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

PM Fils-Aime received direct US endorsement of the National Pact from Secretary Rubio at the
CARICOM summit, consolidating international legitimacy for the post-CPT interim government.
Haitian security forces recaptured Carrefour-Aeroport from Viv Ansanm gang control, the first
tangible territorial recovery in Port-au-Prince after months of sustained operations.
The $542 million border security contract with the Evergreen-Alex Stewart consortium received
CSCCA judicial approval, committing Haiti to a 10-year border modernization program.
GSF deployment is on track for April 2026, with up to 7,500 pledged personnel from six countries, but
force generation pace remains uncertain against the August 30 electoral deadline.
Haiti's humanitarian situation remains critical with 1.45 million displaced, 5.7 million food insecure,
and a February 20 BINUH-OHCHR report documenting systematic gang trafficking of children.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: FILS-AIME SECURES US ENDORSEMENT AT CARICOM SUMMIT

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on February 25 on
the margins of the 50th CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Basseterre, St. Kitts and
Nevis. Rubio characterized the National Pact as a strong signal of hope and collective responsibility
essential for restoring national and international trust. Discussions covered the security situation,
GSF deployment support including specialized personnel and logistics, and the conditions necessary
for credible elections. The bilateral meeting represents the highest-level US-Haiti diplomatic
engagement since the CPT's dissolution.
The National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was officially presented on February
23 at the Villa d'Accueil in Port-au-Prince, drawing ambassadors from the US, Mexico, Canada, and
France alongside the BINUH Special Representative, over 200 political parties, the private sector,
and civil society. The 30-article document establishes the legal framework for the post-CPT interim
period from February 7, 2026, through the installation of elected officials. Key provisions vest
February 26, 2026

executive power in the Council of Ministers under PM leadership per the May 23, 2024 decree,
mandate a non-partisan technical cabinet, bar government members from using public resources for
partisan purposes, and explicitly prohibit Fils-Aime from running as a candidate.
Critics have characterized the February 7 transfer of full executive authority to Fils-Aime as a soft
coup, with HaitiLibre noting the Pact grants the Prime Minister and his government full powers
without a clearly defined term limit. The Pact is Haiti's fourth power-sharing agreement since
President Moise's 2021 assassination. Its durability rests on sustained international backing, security
progress, and voluntary compliance by over 200 signatories who have signed without an enforcement
mechanism. The EU, France, and Canada have each endorsed Fils-Aime's continued tenure,
providing the multilateral legitimacy buffer that insulates the arrangement from domestic opposition.
At CARICOM, Fils-Aime outlined a three-phase security strategy: combined PNH, FAd'H, and
GSF operations against gangs; arrests and judicial prosecution; and youth reinsertion
programs with UNICEF support. He expressed confidence that elections would be held by
year-end and cited the Carrefour-Aeroport recapture as evidence that state authority can be
restored. Finland pledged over $2 million specifically for Haiti's humanitarian response, and
discussions were reported as underway with the UAE on security and investment
partnerships.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has operated without an elected parliament since January 2020 and without a president since
President Jovenel Moise's assassination in July 2021. The CPT itself was established in April 2024
as a provisional structure following a prior power-sharing agreement, completing its mandate on
February 7, 2026, exactly as scheduled. No elections have been held in Haiti since 2016.



## TALKING POINTS

The Rubio bilateral endorsement represents the strongest explicit US backing for Fils-Aime since the
CPT's dissolution and reduces the risk of a US policy reversal that could destabilize the interim
arrangement.
The National Pact's prohibition on Fils-Aime running for office is the Pact's most important credibility
mechanism and its most visible point of vulnerability if political pressure mounts in the pre-election
period.
Over 200 signatories creates broad nominal legitimacy but also distributes compliance risk across
actors with divergent interests who face no penalty for withdrawal.
The Advisory Committee of political, union, private sector, and civil society representatives remains
unformed and its operationalization will be the first institutional test of Pact implementation.
February 26, 2026

International recognition from the US, France, EU, Canada, and CARICOM insulates Fils-Aime
against attempts by sanctioned CPT members or opposition actors to contest his authority.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should condition programming commitments on Advisory Committee
formation as the earliest verifiable indicator of Pact implementation capacity.
Diplomatic missions should track the cabinet reshuffle timeline as the first concrete test of whether
Fils-Aime will honor the Pact's non-partisan technical cabinet requirement.
Private sector stakeholders should note that Fils-Aime's ineligibility to run creates a structural
incentive for him to deliver on electoral timelines to protect his post-office political legacy.
Political actors and diaspora organizations should seek representation in the Advisory Committee
formation process before membership is finalized.
Intelligence watch should be maintained on any new US visa revocations or Treasury sanctions
against political figures seeking to leverage the post-CPT moment for personal positioning.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: CARREFOUR-AEROPORT RECAPTURE AND GSF DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE

Haitian national police recaptured the Carrefour-Aeroport junction in central Port-au-Prince following
a sustained offensive launched in December 2025, supported by a private security firm and Kenyan
police officers from the UN-backed mission. The police substation burned by Viv Ansanm gang
members in March 2024 was renovated and formally reopened on February 7. As of February 26,
armored police vehicles and heavily armed officers patrol the area, and small businesses, street
vendors, and tap-tap buses are returning to the junction. Romain Le Cour of the Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime described the recapture as probably one of the very first
tangible messages that state forces can retake territory.
The recovery is significant in symbolic terms but must be contextualized against the broader security
map. Gangs still control approximately 90% of Port-au-Prince. Surrounding areas of
Carrefour-Aeroport remain devastated, with charred homes in ruins, businesses and schools
shuttered, and residents expressing fear that the peace is temporary. The PNH has conducted
intensified operations since late December 2025, including kamikaze drone strikes against gang
positions. On January 17, a drone strike demolished the residence of Jimmy Cherizier, known as
February 26, 2026

Barbecue, head of the Viv Ansanm coalition.
The Gang Suppression Force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 on September 30,
2025, is transitioning from the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission. Authorized strength
stands at 5,550 personnel with pledges of up to 7,500 from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Sierra
Leone, The Gambia, and Bangladesh. First arrivals are expected in April 2026 with full deployment
targeted by October 2026. Kenya's Godfrey Otunge remains Acting Commander. The current Kenyan
contingent stands at approximately 1,000 officers following the fifth rotation, which arrived in
December 2025. The United States is providing no troops but is funding a substantial portion of
mission costs plus $5 million in non-lethal assistance to the FAd'H, the first such assistance since the
1990s.
Three US warships, the USS Stockdale guided-missile destroyer, the USCGC Stone, and the
USCGC Diligence, were deployed to the Bay of Port-au-Prince on February 3 under Operation
Southern Spear directed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. The deployment coincided with the
final days of the CPT and served simultaneously as a counter-narcotics operation and a political
signal backing Fils-Aime's consolidation. The naval presence has since become a persistent feature
of the security environment and signals sustained US commitment to the transition.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Kenya-led MSS mission launched operations in June 2024 but was consistently hampered by
funding gaps, force generation shortfalls, and gang adaptation to its tactics. The GSF replaces the
MSS with a larger mandate, a formal UN command structure, and broader contributing country
participation intended to overcome the MSS's chronic limitations.



## TALKING POINTS

The Carrefour-Aeroport recapture is operationally modest but politically essential as the first visible
evidence that the PNH-GSF combined strategy can produce territorial results.
The April 2026 GSF arrival target must be met to maintain the August 30 first-round election timeline;
a three-month delay in GSF deployment would arithmetically foreclose the current electoral calendar.
The drone strike campaign against gang leadership represents a tactical evolution that is producing
results but also escalating gang retaliatory pressure against civilian populations.
US naval presence in Port-au-Prince Bay is a coercive signal directed as much at Haitian political
actors contemplating destabilization as at narcotrafficking networks.
The 90% gang territorial control figure in Port-au-Prince means all current security gains remain
reversible and contingent on sustained operational tempo.
February 26, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should plan operational timelines on the assumption that GSF April
arrival is the optimistic scenario and build contingency capacity for a June-July effective deployment
date.
Businesses operating in Port-au-Prince should treat Carrefour-Aeroport as an indicator zone:
sustained commercial normalization there over 60 days would signal a durable shift; renewed gang
pressure would signal continued vulnerability.
Security planners should assess whether the drone strike campaign against gang leadership is
accelerating Viv Ansanm fragmentation or triggering internal consolidation under successor
commanders.
International mission coordinators should press contributing countries for firm troop deployment
schedules ahead of the April window to prevent last-minute force generation failures.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: BORDER SECURITY CONTRACT AND ELECTORAL CALENDAR STATUS

The Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes approved a 10-year $542,634,238
border security contract between four Haitian government ministries and a consortium led by
Evergreen Trading System Limited and Alex Stewart International. The contract covers satellite
surveillance equipment, drones, scanners, and helicopters; cargo and container scanners at the
maritime ports of Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and Saint-Louis-du-Sud; vehicle scanners at the
Malpasse, Belladere, and Ouanaminthe border crossings; and reconstruction of customs and
migration infrastructure. PM Fils-Aime stated that controlling Haiti's border is the government's first
responsibility and signaled openness to normalized relations with the Dominican Republic, noting
that the two nations share an island and cannot remain estranged.
The CEP's revised electoral calendar, published in Le Moniteur in December 2025, establishes the
following timeline: campaign period opens May 19, 2026; electoral lists published July 31, 2026;
first-round elections for legislative and presidential offices August 30, 2026; first-round results
October 3, 2026; second round December 6, 2026; and presidential inauguration February 7, 2027.
The CEP has identified 23 communes under armed gang control across the West, Artibonite, Centre,
and Northwest departments, which presents major implications for electoral logistics. No elections
have been held in Haiti since 2016. The total cost of the electoral process is estimated at $120
million.
February 26, 2026

An institutional friction point exists in the electoral framework. Two major additions were made to the
electoral decree published in Le Moniteur on December 1, 2025, without the CEP's consent or
approval. This unilateral modification of the electoral legal framework creates a basis for legal
challenges and signals that the interim government has not fully delineated its authority from the
CEP's technical independence. The CEP must also still publish diaspora voting procedures, a
commitment reflected in the National Pact but without a published implementation timeline.
The HOPE/HELP textile trade preference program represents the most immediate economic
stabilization lever. The US House of Representatives passed HR 6504 on January 12, 2026, by
a bipartisan vote of 345 to 45, extending duty-free treatment for Haitian textiles retroactively
from September 2025 through December 2026 with potential extension to December 2028
pending Senate action. The program accounts for approximately 90% of Haiti's exports. The
Association of Industries of Haiti has called for a 10-year extension to generate the
investment confidence that a single-year renewal cannot provide.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's last electoral cycle in 2015-2016 was marred by fraud allegations that led to the annulment of
the first round and the eventual election of Jovenel Moise in 2017. The subsequent collapse of the
parliament in January 2020 left Moise governing by decree until his assassination, eliminating the
institutional infrastructure that any credible 2026 election must reconstruct from near-zero capacity.



## TALKING POINTS

The $542 million border contract signals government intent to formalize trade flows and assert
territorial sovereignty, but the feasibility of implementation over a 10-year period in the current
security environment requires independent assessment.
The August 30 first-round target requires that the CEP establish operational capacity in all 23
gang-controlled communes before the May 19 campaign opening, a three-month window that is
operationally compressed.
The unauthorized modification of the electoral decree without CEP consent is a structural
vulnerability that opposition actors or disqualified parties could use to challenge electoral results
post-election.
Senate inaction on HOPE/HELP would remove duty-free status for Haiti's dominant export sector,
triggering immediate plant closure risk in an industry employing tens of thousands of the most
vulnerable workers.
Fils-Aime's framing of DR border relations as a shared responsibility rather than a bilateral grievance
represents a measurable shift from the CPT-era posture and opens a diplomatic window that was
February 26, 2026

previously closed.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Textile sector investors should model both scenarios for Senate HOPE/HELP action and request
specific Senate timeline clarity from their Washington representatives before making capital
allocation decisions.
CEP-monitoring stakeholders should treat the May 19 campaign opening date as the first hard
deadline that will reveal whether electoral preparations are on track or sliding.
Trade policy analysts should assess the new maritime-only import routing requirement for goods
transshipped through the DR, which creates immediate cost and logistics burdens for US agricultural
exporters and Haitian consumers alike.
International observers planning August 30 election monitoring missions should begin contingency
planning for scenarios in which the vote is postponed to the December 6 slot or deferred beyond
2026.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY: CHILD TRAFFICKING REPORT AND

DISPLACEMENT CRISIS
A joint BINUH-OHCHR report released February 20 documented systematic trafficking of children by
Haitian gangs. Most of the 26 gangs operating in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas maintain
child recruitment schemes ranging from errand running and extortion collection to kidnappings,
targeted killings, and sexual violence against girls. Over 500,000 children were estimated to live in
gang-controlled areas in 2024. Between January 2022 and December 2025, at least 806 children,
including 536 boys and 270 girls, were among the 26,188 people killed or injured. UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stated that children in Haiti are being robbed of their
childhoods and their futures.
The displacement situation has reached 1,450,254 internally displaced persons according to the
latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, distributed across 272 displacement sites including 149 in
provincial departments and 97 in Port-au-Prince. The food security picture is equally severe: 5.7
million people, approximately 50% of Haiti's population, are food insecure according to WFP. FEWS
NET projects 3.49 million people will require food assistance between October 2025 and May 2026,
with peak needs in the February-May lean season that is now underway. Inflation stands at 31.9%
overall with food inflation exceeding 35%, and food commodity prices run 30 to 77% above the Latin
February 26, 2026

America and Caribbean regional average. An estimated 277,000 children are in acute malnutrition.
The gourde exchange rate has remained broadly stable at approximately 131.1 HTG per USD as of
February 26, representing a marginal depreciation of approximately 0.2% from January levels. The
rate has not triggered a devaluation alert. This relative stability is significant given the governance
transition and security uncertainty, but it coexists with structural inflation driven by supply chain
disruption, import dependency, and fuel price pressures that no monetary stability can address
alone. Remittances remain a critical economic lifeline, particularly as humanitarian needs peak
during the current lean season.
The BINUH child trafficking report has immediate operational implications for international
organizations. The seven-pillar strategy recommended by OHCHR prioritizes social protection,
education as safe spaces, rehabilitation over criminalization of recruited children, and enforcement of
the UN arms embargo. For security-focused donors and missions, the report creates advocacy
pressure to ensure rights-compliant procedures in all anti-gang operations and to prevent child
survivors of gang exploitation from being processed through punitive rather than rehabilitative
channels. Sunrise Airways has suspended all flights to and from Port-au-Prince citing security
concerns, further isolating the capital from regional aviation networks.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's child protection crisis predates the current gang expansion. BINUH has documented
systematic killing, injury, and displacement of children since 2022, but the February 2026 report is
the most comprehensive documentation to date and the first to quantify the scale of gang-organized
child trafficking across all 26 major gang structures simultaneously.



## TALKING POINTS

The BINUH-OHCHR child trafficking report shifts the international advocacy baseline: all security
operations in Port-au-Prince must now be evaluated against a rights-compliance framework that
explicitly addresses child survivors of gang recruitment.
1.45 million displaced persons represents a protection and logistics challenge that will intensify, not
diminish, during the pre-election security operations required to open gang-controlled communes to
the electoral process.
Inflation at 31.9% with food inflation above 35% means that nominal gourde stability provides no
relief to the majority of the population whose purchasing power continues to erode in real terms.
The Sunrise Airways suspension of Port-au-Prince flights is a commercial signal that private aviation
operators have reassessed the risk threshold, creating pressure on the FAA flight ban review
scheduled for March 2026.
Finland's $2 million Haiti humanitarian pledge and ongoing WFP pipeline represent positive but
February 26, 2026

insufficient financing against a $120 million electoral budget and a multi-year humanitarian gap.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

NGO protection clusters should immediately convene a working group to translate the OHCHR
seven-pillar framework into operational SOPs for child protection during GSF-led anti-gang
operations expected beginning April 2026.
Humanitarian funding managers should prioritize the February-May lean season window in current
disbursement timelines, as this is the peak need period for the 3.49 million requiring food assistance.
Aviation stakeholders should monitor the FAA flight ban review in March 2026 as the key regulatory
signal that will determine whether international airline reentry into Port-au-Prince becomes feasible
before the August election cycle.
Private sector intelligence officers should incorporate the Sunrise Airways suspension as an indicator
of the gap between official security assessments and commercial operator risk perception.
Diaspora organizations should mobilize remittance support specifically calibrated to the
February-May lean season peak, coordinating with WFP and local distribution networks to maximize
food access efficiency.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The 50th CARICOM summit concludes on February 27. Monitor for a joint communique language on
Haiti that either strengthens or qualifies the Fils-Aime endorsement; any softening of CARICOM
language would signal regional diplomatic reservation not visible in bilateral meetings. Watch for
CPT-era sanctioned officials to issue public statements attempting to contest the National Pact's
legitimacy while international attention is focused on Basseterre. Monitor Port-au-Prince security
incident reporting for any gang countermoves against Carrefour-Aeroport designed to test whether
the recapture is defensible.



## THIS WEEK

The Advisory Committee formation process under the National Pact should begin within days of
Fils-Aime's return from Basseterre; failure to initiate that process within one week would be a
February 26, 2026

significant implementation indicator to flag. The cabinet reshuffle timeline should become clearer as
the PM returns and faces pressure to demonstrate the Pact's non-partisan technical cabinet
requirement is being honored. The FAA flight ban review for Port-au-Prince, scheduled for March, is
now within the immediate planning horizon. Monitor the HOPE/HELP Senate calendar for any
scheduled committee action.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

GSF troop generation ahead of the April 2026 arrival window is the single most consequential
variable in Haiti's near-term trajectory. If pledged forces from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Sierra
Leone, The Gambia, and Bangladesh begin pre-deployment confirmation, the August 30 electoral
timeline remains viable. If force generation stalls, the CEP will face an impossible logistics problem in
23 gang-controlled communes. The CEP's ability to establish operational presence in those
communes before the May 19 campaign opening is the leading indicator of electoral feasibility. The
Senate HOPE/HELP vote before the September 2025 retroactive cutoff becomes commercially
critical for the textile sector. Dominican Republic diplomatic normalization, if Fils-Aime proceeds with
the outreach he signaled at CARICOM, could materially shift border trade dynamics and bilateral
security coordination within 60 to 90 days.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre -- PM Fils-Aime bilateral meeting with Secretary Rubio, February 25, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46937-haiti-politic-pm-alix-didier-fils-aime-met-with-secretary-of-state-marco-ru
Jamaica Gleaner / Caribbean Media Corporation -- PM Fils-Aime CARICOM press statements on
elections and security, February 26, 2026.
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/world-news/20260226/haitian-prime-minister-confident-country-will-hold-election
Le Nouvelliste (EN) -- National Pact official launch and stakeholder attendance, February 23, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264507/fils-aime-secures-political-agreement-through-national-stability-pact
AP News -- Carrefour-Aeroport gang recapture and security situation, February 25, 2026.
https://apnews.com/article/haiti-control-gangs-carrefour-aeroport-9e248bf212c16bf5f35bceb7770667b4
Le Monde -- CPT dissolution and transfer of power to Fils-Aime, February 8, 2026.
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/02/08/in-haiti-the-transitional-presidential-council-hands-over-
CSIS -- Haiti political transition analysis and GSF deployment parameters, 2026.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/haiti-embarks-another-rocky-political-transition
BINUH / OHCHR -- Child trafficking by gangs in Haiti joint report, February 20, 2026.
https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/communiques-de-presse/la-traite-denfants-par-les-gangs-met-en-peril-lavenir-dha
FEWS NET -- Haiti food security outlook October 2025 through May 2026.
https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-food-security-outlook-october-2025-may-2026-persistent-insecurity-and-effects
Le Nouvelliste (EN) -- $542 million border security contract CSCCA approval.
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264541/la-cour-des-comptes-approuve-le-contrat-de-500-millions-de-dollars-po
Haiti Libre (EN) -- CEP revised electoral calendar publication, December 2025.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46492-haiti-flash-the-cep-has-just-published-the-revised-electoral-calendar-in-
IOM / ReliefWeb -- Haiti internal displacement situation report, February 26, 2026.
https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-internal-displacement-situation-amid-increasing-insecurity-dg-echo-iom-echo-d
Gazette Haiti -- National Pact full provisions and 30-article structure analysis.
https://www.gazettehaiti.com/node/13439
February 26, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*