# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-25
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: POLICE IMPOSTOR NETWORK OPERATES IN DOWNTOWN](#development-1-police-impostor-network-operates-in-downtown)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S. EMBASSY SECURITY ALERT FORMALIZES KIDNAPPING RISK IN](#development-2-u.s.-embassy-security-alert-formalizes-kidnapping-risk-in)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: GOVERNANCE CYCLE QUIET BUT ONI LAUNCHES KAT OU LA](#development-3-governance-cycle-quiet-but-oni-launches-kat-ou-la)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE INDICATORS ABSENT; SECURITY](#development-4-economic-and-infrastructure-indicators-absent;-security)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A downtown Port-au-Prince shootout involving suspected kidnappers reportedly wearing police
uniforms and operating a government vehicle marks a critical escalation in Haiti's security
environment. The incident, which left an unconfirmed toll of two police officers and two alleged
kidnappers dead, converges with a U.S. Embassy security alert warning of rising kidnappings for
ransom in Delmas involving law enforcement impersonators. On the governance front, no new
CPT decrees emerged in the February 23-24 window, and the CEP electoral calendar remains
unchanged. The dominant operational risk for the near term is the use of fake checkpoints to
target civilian and commercial movement, which directly threatens humanitarian corridors and
business continuity across the metropolitan area.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

A downtown Port-au-Prince armed confrontation involving suspected police impostors signals
possible infiltration or uniform diversion within security forces.
The U.S. Embassy has issued an active security alert specifically naming Delmas as a high-risk
kidnapping zone with law enforcement impersonation tactics in use.
No new CPT governance actions or CEP electoral calendar changes were recorded in the
February 23-24 reporting cycle.
ONI launched a new national ID card distribution phase targeting Gressier residents under the
Kat Ou La operation, beginning February 24, 2026.
No confirmed BRH exchange rate data or fuel pricing update was retrieved; security-driven
supply chain disruption remains the primary economic risk indicator.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: POLICE IMPOSTOR NETWORK OPERATES IN DOWNTOWN

PORT-AU-PRINCE
Port-au-Prince witnessed a live-fire engagement on between PNH officers and a suspected
kidnapping cell operating in broad daylight in the downtown corridor. Witnesses reported to AP
that the suspects were wearing police uniforms and had access to a government-registered
vehicle, indicating either active infiltration of the PNH or a systematic diversion of state uniforms
and equipment to criminal networks. The provisional casualty count stands at two police officers
February 25, 2026

and two alleged kidnappers killed, though PNH and DICOP have not issued formal confirmation.
The operational profile of this cell is consistent with a broader pattern documented across the
metropolitan area: the establishment of fake checkpoints on urban arterial routes to intercept
vehicles, with drivers and passengers taken for ransom. This tactic has been documented in
Delmas, and its appearance in the downtown core represents a geographic expansion of the
threat. The use of state symbols -- uniforms and vehicles -- as cover complicates the PNH's
ability to signal legitimate authority to civilian populations, which degrades compliance with
security force instructions and increases the risk of misidentification in contested zones.
The convergence of this incident with the existing U.S. Embassy security alert underscores that
the kidnapping ecosystem is not a localized phenomenon but an organized, multi-vector
operation with deliberate mimicry of state functions. Whether the implicated individuals were
serving officers acting criminally, former officers, or civilians who acquired state equipment
through illicit channels has direct implications for the PNH's institutional integrity. Each scenario
demands a different remediation response from PNH leadership and the MSS mission.
The failure to obtain official PNH or DICOP confirmation within 24 hours of a downtown incident
of this magnitude is itself an indicator. It points either to institutional reluctance to acknowledge
force infiltration or to a communications breakdown within the security apparatus at a moment
when operational transparency is essential for civilian compliance and international mission
coordination.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The PNH has faced documented infiltration by criminal networks since at least 2019, with
multiple high-profile cases of officers identified as gang affiliates or active participants in
kidnapping operations. The Delmas corridor has historically been among the most active
kidnapping zones in the metropolitan area, predating the post-2021 political instability.



## TALKING POINTS

A government vehicle and police uniforms were used by suspected kidnappers in a downtown
Port-au-Prince armed engagement on .
Provisional casualty count is two police officers and two suspected kidnappers killed; PNH has
not confirmed.
February 25, 2026

The fake checkpoint tactic has migrated from Delmas into the downtown core, marking a
geographic escalation.
Institutional integrity of the PNH cannot be assessed without official clarification on whether
implicated individuals were serving officers.
MSS mission coordination must account for civilian inability to distinguish legitimate from
counterfeit law enforcement presence.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations and NGO security focal points must immediately update movement
protocols to treat all checkpoint encounters -- including those staffed by uniformed personnel --
as requiring verification before compliance.
PNH leadership should issue a public statement within 48 hours confirming or denying officer
involvement; silence on this point accelerates institutional credibility erosion.
MSS mission commanders should request a joint PNH-MSS review of uniform and equipment
inventory controls to assess the diversion risk vector.
Diplomatic missions should factor the fake law enforcement tactic into updated travel advisories
and internal staff movement guidelines.
CONFIDENCE
Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S. EMBASSY SECURITY ALERT FORMALIZES KIDNAPPING RISK IN

DELMAS CORRIDOR
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued a security alert, referenced in USA Today reporting
dated February 19, 2026, specifically warning American citizens and residents of an increase in
kidnappings for ransom concentrated in the Delmas area. The alert explicitly identified the use of
February 25, 2026

individuals posing as law enforcement as a key operational method, mirroring the profile of the
downtown incident. Haiti's Level 4 "Do Not Travel" designation was reiterated. The State
Department's country information page for Haiti was updated in parallel to reflect the current
advisory status.
The formal issuance of a named-corridor security alert by the Embassy carries operational
weight beyond its advisory function. It signals that U.S. intelligence and diplomatic assessment
has moved from general country-level risk to specific geographic and tactical characterization.
This level of specificity -- naming Delmas, naming the police impersonation tactic -- reflects
confirmed pattern data rather than precautionary language, and aligns with the ground-level
incident reported on .
For the business and NGO community, the Embassy alert functions as a force-majeure trigger in
many organizational security protocols. Operations with standing requirements to suspend
activities upon Embassy Level 4 alert issuance or upgrade must review whether the new alert
language constitutes a qualifying event. Legal and compliance teams in international
organizations with Haiti operations should be engaged immediately.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The U.S. Embassy has maintained a Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory for Haiti continuously
since October 2022. Previous corridor-specific alerts have been issued for Martissant, the Route
Nationale 2 corridor, and Cite Soleil, but Delmas-specific alerts with law enforcement
impersonation language represent an escalation in tactical specificity.



## TALKING POINTS

U.S. Embassy security alert specifically names Delmas and police impersonation as active
kidnapping risk factors.
Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory remains in force and was reinforced by the February 19 alert.
The Embassy's tactical specificity -- naming location and method -- indicates confirmed pattern
data rather than precautionary language.
Organizations with security protocols tied to Embassy advisory levels must assess whether
current conditions constitute a qualifying suspension trigger.
February 25, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

All international organizations and NGOs with Haiti operations should circulate the Embassy
alert internally and confirm receipt by security focal points within 24 hours.
Operations using road vehicles in the Delmas corridor should require two-person teams and
mandatory check-in protocols until the PNH confirms resolution of the identified network.
Organizations should review force-majeure and suspension clauses in Haiti programming
contracts in light of the current advisory language.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: GOVERNANCE CYCLE QUIET BUT ONI LAUNCHES KAT OU LA

DISTRIBUTION IN GRESSIER
The February 23-24 reporting window produced no new CPT decrees, press conferences, or
authoritative communiques related to post-February 21 National Pact follow-on activity. The CEP
electoral calendar remains unchanged with no postponement or new compliance deadlines
announced. While the absence of governance action during a 24-hour cycle is not itself a
significant indicator, the sustained silence on National Pact implementation represents an
emerging gap between the political momentum of the February 21 signing and any observable
institutional follow-through.
The ONI launched a new distribution phase of the Carte d'Identification Nationale under its Kat
Ou La operation, targeting Gressier residents beginning February 24, 2026. Distribution is
conducted at the ONI office housed within the Leogane city hall, requiring presentation of a
registration receipt and supporting identification documents. This operation represents a
continuing effort to extend civil documentation coverage to peri-urban and rural populations that
have historically been underserved by national ID infrastructure.
The operational significance of the ONI distribution goes beyond administrative routine. National
February 25, 2026

ID card coverage is a structural prerequisite for voter registration and electoral participation.
Expansion of CIN distribution into areas such as Gressier -- which lies in the Ouest department
but outside the Port-au-Prince urban core -- reflects an attempt to build the civil registry
infrastructure that any credible electoral process will require. The timing relative to the CEP's
electoral calendar warrants tracking to assess whether documentation expansion is keeping
pace with voter registration timelines.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's civil documentation system has been chronically underfunded and geographically
uneven, with large portions of the rural and peri-urban population lacking valid CINs. This
structural gap has historically suppressed voter registration rates and created access barriers in
previous electoral cycles.



## TALKING POINTS

No CPT decrees or press conferences were recorded in the February 23-24 cycle; National Pact
implementation follow-through remains unverified.
CEP electoral calendar is unchanged; no postponement announced.
ONI launched CIN distribution in Gressier under Kat Ou La starting February 24, using the
Leogane city hall as distribution point.
Civil documentation expansion is a prerequisite for voter registration; the pace of ONI operations
relative to CEP timelines requires monitoring.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Analysts tracking the transition timeline should flag the absence of CPT post-National Pact
implementation actions as a monitoring indicator; a second 24-48 hour cycle without
communiques warrants escalation to a governance-stall assessment.
International organizations supporting electoral infrastructure should map ONI distribution
coverage against CEP voter registration zones to identify documentation gaps that could
suppress eligible voter participation.
February 25, 2026

CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE INDICATORS ABSENT; SECURITY

RISK PROXIES DOMINATE
No BRH exchange rate bulletin, confirmed HTG/USD daily closing rate, or fuel pricing update
was captured in the February 23-24 reporting cycle. The Haiti Libre front page reviewed for this
cycle showed no new airport or port closure notices. The primary economic stress signal in this
cycle is not a formal macroeconomic indicator but the operational security environment itself:
fake checkpoints and kidnapping networks operating on urban arterial routes function as a de
facto supply chain disruption mechanism, taxing the cost of movement for commercial and
humanitarian actors alike even in the absence of formal infrastructure closure.
The inability to retrieve a BRH daily rate in a given cycle is itself a data-quality flag. In a context
where the gourde has experienced periodic acute devaluation events, a missing closing price
should not be treated as evidence of stability. Analysts and financial officers working in Haiti
should maintain direct BRH channel subscriptions rather than relying on secondary source
aggregation for exchange rate data.
The Toussaint Louverture International Airport and Port-au-Prince seaport showed no formal
closure indicators, but the security perimeter conditions affecting ground transport to and from
both facilities remain a persistent operational constraint. Fuel depot access, which has been
disrupted in previous security escalations, must be monitored as the kidnapping network activity
in the metropolitan zone increases.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's informal economy and remittance-dependent household sector are acutely sensitive to
gourde fluctuation. The HTG/USD rate has depreciated from approximately 110 per dollar in
2021 to ranges exceeding 130 in recent periods, compressing purchasing power and elevating
food insecurity among the urban poor.
February 25, 2026



## TALKING POINTS

No BRH exchange rate data was retrieved in this cycle; absence should not be read as stability
confirmation.
Airport and seaport remain operational with no formal closure notices in the February 23-24
window.
Fake checkpoint activity on urban routes constitutes a de facto supply chain disruption even
without formal infrastructure shutdown.
Fuel depot access requires monitoring as metropolitan security deterioration continues.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Financial officers in Haiti-based organizations should establish direct BRH bulletin subscriptions
to avoid data gaps from secondary source failures.
Logistics planners should build route-risk premiums into supply chain cost modeling for the
metropolitan area, accounting for the time and risk cost of fake checkpoint exposure.
Fuel stockpiling protocols should be reviewed in light of the escalating security environment and
prior patterns of depot access disruption during PNH-gang engagement cycles.
CONFIDENCE
Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

PNH or DICOP official statement on the downtown shooting: trigger is any formal communique;
direction of travel is confirmation or denial of officer involvement; risk is that continued silence
hardens public perception of institutional compromise and degrades civilian cooperation with
February 25, 2026

security forces.
U.S. Embassy follow-on advisory: trigger is any update to the February 19 alert; direction of
travel is potential geographic expansion of named high-risk zones; risk is additional operational
suspension triggers for international organizations.
CPT post-National Pact activity: trigger is any decree, press conference, or public statement;
direction of travel is implementation momentum or stall; risk is that a second full cycle without
action signals governance paralysis at a structurally critical moment.



## THIS WEEK

CEP compliance deadlines: trigger is any party registration or documentation deadline passing;
direction of travel is either compliance consolidation or disqualification proceedings; risk is that
electoral calendar integrity is undermined before the process gains traction.
ONI Kat Ou La distribution continuity: trigger is any report of disruption to the Gressier
operation; direction of travel is CIN coverage expansion or stall; risk is that insecurity prevents
document pickup, creating a suppression effect on future voter registration.
MSS operational posture: trigger is any public update from the Kenya-led mission on
deployment numbers or zone coverage; direction of travel is expanded metropolitan presence or
continued holding pattern; risk is that PNH capacity erosion outpaces MSS deployment
timelines.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

PNH institutional integrity assessment: the incident opens a structural question about uniform
and equipment control that cannot be answered within a single news cycle. If PNH leadership
does not address it formally, the credibility cost compounds over weeks and degrades both
civilian compliance and international mission coordination trust.
Transition timeline pressure: the CPT mandate extends to February 7, 2027. The absence of
visible National Pact follow-through in the immediate post-signing period is an early indicator of
whether the February 21 agreement will produce durable institutional momentum or replicate
prior patterns of political declaration without implementation.
Electoral infrastructure readiness: the gap between CEP calendar ambitions and the
documented state of voter registration, civil documentation coverage, and security corridor
February 25, 2026

access for electoral operations will determine whether any credible electoral process is
achievable within the current transition framework.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

AP via Africanews. Shooting involving suspected police impostors in downtown Port-au-Prince.
February 24, 2026.
USA Today. U.S. State Department warns of kidnapping increase in Haiti; Delmas corridor
named. February 19, 2026.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2026/02/19/kidnappings-haiti-state-department/88766370007/
U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince. Security Alert: Kidnapping for Ransom in Haiti.
https://ht.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-haiti/
VantBefInfo. ONI lance une nouvelle phase de distribution des cartes d'identification nationale
pour Gressier. February 2026.
https://vantbefinfo.com/gressier-loni-lance-une-nouvelle-phase-de-distribution-des-cartes-didentification-nationa
OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council). Haiti security report.
https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/48bee788-0714-4b65-8523-1d59d967d4b6
HaitiLibre. Daily news zapping -- electoral calendar reference.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46919-haiti-news-zapping.html
HaitiLibre. Haiti news zapping -- governance and transition monitoring.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/
U.S. Department of State. Haiti Travel Advisory -- Level 4: Do Not Travel.
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/haiti-travel-advisory.html
U.S. Department of State. Haiti International Travel Information.
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Hait
ONI (Office National d'Identification). Official site. https://oni.gouv.ht
ISLG Haiti. ONI en action -- civil documentation operations update. February 16, 2026.
https://islghaiti.org/site/2026/02/16/loni-en-action/
February 25, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*