# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-22
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections Signed](#development-1-national-pact-for-stability-and-the-organization-of-elections-signed)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: Infrastructure Targeting Escalates in Kenscoff Following PNH Tactical Operation](#development-2-infrastructure-targeting-escalates-in-kenscoff-following-pnh-tactical-operation)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: PNH Institutional Reforms Signal Accountability Shift](#development-3-pnh-institutional-reforms-signal-accountability-shift)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: Economic Distress Signal: Inflation Without Devaluation](#development-4-economic-distress-signal-inflation-without-devaluation)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime secured his first major governance achievement on February
21 when dozens of political parties and civil society organizations signed the National Pact for
Stability and the Organization of Elections in Petion-Ville. Legal analysts immediately challenged
the document, arguing it eliminates the 90-to-120-day constitutional limit on Fils-Aime's mandate
and replaces binding oversight with an advisory body possessing no enforcement authority. In
parallel, two Natcom telecommunications employees were killed in Kenscoff hours after a PNH
operation neutralized 16 gang members, signaling that gangs are retaliating against civilian
infrastructure workers in active combat zones. TPS litigation at the D.C. Circuit continues without
ruling.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

The National Pact signed February 21 establishes the governance framework for the post-CPT
transition but faces immediate constitutional legitimacy challenges that international actors must
assess before committing electoral support.
Gang retaliation in Kenscoff killed two Natcom telecom workers within hours of a successful PNH
tactical operation, confirming that infrastructure targeting escalates in proportion to security force
activity in contested zones.
PNH intelligence operations in Delmas 30 foiled an active kidnapping and killed two suspects,
demonstrating improved counter-kidnapping capability in the zone most affected by the recent
surge.
The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling can arrive at any time and represents the most consequential near-term
overhang for the Haitian diaspora community.
Exchange rate remains stable at approximately 131 HTG per USD, but a Le Nouvelliste economic
analysis raises questions about whether BRH interventions are masking deeper domestic price
distress.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections Signed

Prime Minister Fils-Aime convened dozens of political parties and civil society organizations at the
Ritz Hotel on Rue Panamericaine in Petion-Ville on February 21, where signatories endorsed the
30-article, 9-section National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections. The document
establishes the governance framework for the post-CPT transition period, creating an institutional
architecture that includes a Consultative Committee, provisions for constitutional amendments, and
February 22, 2026

a mandate framework conditioned on the organization of elections. The signing occurred in an
orderly atmosphere inside the venue while uninvited militants protested outside, a detail Le
Nouvelliste recorded as evidence of incomplete political consensus.
The Primature framed the Pact as an effort to re-establish dialogue fifteen days after the CPT
mandate expired on February 7, positioning Fils-Aime as the architect of Haiti's path to elected
governance. The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie issued a statement acknowledging
the power transfer to the Council of Ministers under Fils-Aime's presidency and reaffirming its
commitment to supporting the Gang Suppression Force and facilitating dialogue efforts. The
Initiative de la Societe Civile issued a parallel call for a non-partisan governance accord, signaling
that civil society expects additional safeguards beyond what the Pact currently provides.
However, legal analyst La Loi de Ma Bouche published a detailed constitutional critique on the day
of signing, arguing the Pact systematically eliminates the mechanisms that would constrain
executive power. The critique identifies five structural defects: the Pact omits the February 7
decree's reference to Article 149 of the amended Constitution, which limits transitional mandates to
90 to 120 days, effectively conditioning Fils-Aime's tenure on elections that he himself organizes;
the Consultative Committee can support, give opinions, and accompany but possesses no power to
block, constrain, or censure, making it institutional decor rather than a counter-power; Articles 13
through 16 allow the government to propose constitutional changes, determine modalities in
consultation, and submit them to ratification in a first round of elections, a process the Constitution
prohibits as referenda; Article 6 grants executive powers derived from both the Constitution and the
Pact, creating an unprecedented dual-source authority framework; and Article 25 assigns sanction
authority for violations to the Council of Ministers itself, creating self-enforcement.
For operational consumers, the Pact represents Fils-Aime's answer to the governance vacuum that
opened February 7, but the immediate legal contestation and the presence of protesters outside
the venue indicate the framework lacks the consensus required to function without continued
challenge. International actors will need to determine whether the document provides sufficient
legitimacy to justify electoral funding and programming before April's projected GSF deployment
creates new operational dependencies on political stability.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's transitional governance mechanisms have repeatedly failed to establish durable legitimacy
since the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. Each successive authority,
including the Ariel Henry government and the Transitional Presidential Council, operated under
contested legitimacy frameworks that complicated both international engagement and domestic
political buy-in.
February 22, 2026



## TALKING POINTS

The National Pact eliminates the 90-to-120-day constitutional limit on Fils-Aime's mandate without
replacing it with a binding alternative.
The Consultative Committee established by the Pact has no enforcement authority over the
government it is designed to check.
Protesters gathered outside the signing venue while the ceremony proceeded, indicating
incomplete political consensus.
The OIF acknowledged the power transfer and reaffirmed GSF support without explicitly endorsing
the Pact's constitutional framework.
The ISC called for non-partisan governance alongside the Pact, signaling civil society expects
additional safeguards.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should commission immediate legal assessment of the Pact's
constitutional standing before committing electoral funding or programming support.
Donor governments should communicate to Fils-Aime's government that binding oversight
mechanisms are a precondition for sustained international legitimacy.
Political actors outside the Pact should engage the legal critique rather than the symbolism of the
signing ceremony as the terrain for contestation.
NGO program managers should track Consultative Committee membership appointments as an
early indicator of whether the body will carry substantive or purely ceremonial weight.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: Infrastructure Targeting Escalates in Kenscoff Following PNH Tactical Operation

PNH forces conducted an overnight operation in Kenscoff on February 20 to 21 using snipers and
two drones, with Task Force and private military company support, killing 16 gang members.
Weapons could not be immediately recovered due to operational distance. Kenscoff Mayor
Massillon Jean confirmed on Magik9 radio on February 22 that two Natcom telecommunications
employees were killed and a third wounded on February 21 as they traveled to Kenscoff in a
company vehicle. The attacks occurred within hours of the security operation, establishing a direct
temporal link between tactical successes and gang retaliation against civilian workers.
This incident fits a documented pattern of escalating infrastructure targeting in gang-contested
February 22, 2026

areas. An EDH electrical cable was sabotaged in Petion-Ville on February 19, killing one person
and injuring five. Gang actors severed telecom fiber optic cables in Port-au-Prince in August 2023.
Armed groups attacked and destroyed EDH substations and the Varreux power plant in March
2024. The targeting has now shifted from infrastructure to the workers who maintain it, creating a
deterrence effect against essential services crews in operational zones.
For telecommunications specifically, the killing of Natcom maintenance workers signals that
Viettel-owned operations in contested zones face personnel security risks that infrastructure
hardening alone cannot address. If telecommunications companies respond by halting maintenance
operations in gang-adjacent areas, service degradation in zones that include humanitarian
coordination infrastructure becomes an operational risk requiring immediate contingency planning
by NGO operations managers.
The PNH's Kenscoff manhunt continues to fully secure the area, but the Natcom killings occurring
hours after 16 gang members were neutralized confirm that tactical clearance operations do not
produce immediate operational security for civilian workers in the same zone. The security
threshold required to maintain essential services in gang-contested areas exceeds what current
force levels can sustain.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang targeting of telecommunications infrastructure began in 2023 when fiber optic cables were
severed in Port-au-Prince during a period of territorial expansion. The 2024 attacks on EDH
electrical substations established that armed groups understand the leverage that infrastructure
disruption provides. The February 2026 shift to killing maintenance workers represents an
escalation in methodology.



## TALKING POINTS

Two Natcom employees were killed in Kenscoff on February 21 within hours of a PNH operation
that killed 16 gang members in the same zone.
The killing of maintenance workers, not just infrastructure, signals gang intent to deter essential
services in operational areas.
PNH intelligence operations in Delmas 30 foiled an active kidnapping and killed two suspects on
February 21.
The FAd'H training pipeline continues to expand, with 25 soldiers departing for Martinique under the
France-Haiti SABRE program as the 5th cohort.
PNH forces are conducting a continuing manhunt in Kenscoff to fully secure the area.
February 22, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

NGO telecommunications coordinators should establish backup communication protocols for
Kenscoff and adjacent zones pending resumption of Natcom maintenance operations.
Business security teams should assess whether Natcom service degradation in Kenscoff affects
humanitarian and commercial operations before the gap becomes critical.
Telecom sector operators should evaluate personnel security frameworks for maintenance crews in
gang-adjacent areas and consider suspension of routine work pending tactical clearance.
Security planners should track the Delmas 30 counter-kidnapping success as an indicator of PNH
intelligence-led operational capability improvement.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: PNH Institutional Reforms Signal Accountability Shift

The PNH Directorate issued new disciplinary measures on February 21, banning the wearing of
balaclava masks and hoods outside designated special operations contexts and reinforcing
regulatory compliance requirements across the force. The ban addresses a documented
accountability problem: balaclava-wearing by individual officers has been associated with
extrajudicial operations and has complicated the identification of officers implicated in abuses. A
recent BINUH-OHCHR report found that some police officers have summarily executed children
accused of gang association, making individual officer identification a human rights monitoring
priority.
The Ministry of Defense issued a parallel advisory warning the public that all FAd'H
communications are disseminated exclusively through certified Ministry channels and that
recruitment calls for applications will be issued only through High Command messages. The
advisory attributes the caution to the current high level of attention surrounding recruitment,
suggesting that the FAd'H's visible training activity and fifth SABRE cohort departure have
generated unofficial recruitment interest that the institution cannot verify or control.
Taken together, the PNH balaclava ban and the MoD communications advisory indicate that both
security institutions are managing the public-facing dimensions of reform. The balaclava ban, if
enforced, directly addresses a visibility gap that OHCHR monitors have flagged as a structural
obstacle to accountability. The MoD advisory signals institutional awareness that the FAd'H's rising
public profile carries information environment risks that require active management.
February 22, 2026

For international observers, the institutional reform signals matter because BINUH's refocused
mandate emphasizes governance strengthening and human rights monitoring. The new BANUH
mission and UNSOH standup both carry institutional interest in whether Haitian security forces are
building accountable operational frameworks, not just tactical capacity. The balaclava ban gives
BINUH a concrete reform measure to track in its monitoring reporting.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

PNH accountability has been a persistent concern in BINUH and OHCHR reporting since 2021,
with documented cases of extrajudicial killings and excessive force in gang-contested areas. The
2024 UN report on gang child trafficking and the 2025 OHCHR findings on summary executions of
children created sustained international pressure for visible accountability reforms within the force.



## TALKING POINTS

The PNH balaclava ban outside special operations directly addresses an accountability gap that
BINUH-OHCHR monitoring has identified.
The FAd'H Ministry of Defense communications advisory reflects institutional awareness of
information environment risks during the current high-profile recruitment period.
BINUH Chief Ruiz Massieu confirmed the mandate is refocused with certain priorities
strengthened, with a transition to the renamed BANUH mission underway.
The balaclava ban provides BINUH with a concrete, measurable reform indicator for inclusion in
forthcoming mandate reporting.
PNH discipline reforms occurring simultaneously with the National Pact signing may be coordinated
elements of a broader Fils-Aime governance legitimacy strategy.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International human rights organizations should establish a monitoring protocol specifically tracking
PNH balaclava ban enforcement at documented extrajudicial incident sites.
BINUH should formally record the balaclava ban in the next mandate report as a measurable
accountability benchmark with a six-month enforcement review.
NGO legal teams should assess whether the MoD communications advisory creates additional due
diligence requirements for FAd'H-adjacent programming.
CONFIDENCE
February 22, 2026

Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: Economic Distress Signal: Inflation Without Devaluation

Le Nouvelliste published an economic analysis on February 22 identifying three structural
anomalies in Haiti's current macroeconomic condition: why inflation remains elevated when the
gourde-dollar exchange rate is relatively stable at approximately 131 HTG per USD; what role the
Banque de la Republique d'Haiti may be playing in sustaining this inflation through reserve
interventions or monetary tightening; and why the exchange rate has not adjusted to reflect the
purchasing power loss that 31.9 percent annual inflation implies. The analysis further notes that the
FAO global food price index declined 2.1 percent between September 2025 and January 2026, but
Haitian consumers have not experienced equivalent price relief.
The implicit critique of the BRH is significant. Exchange rate stability at current levels may be
maintained through BRH interventions that consume foreign reserves while simultaneously
suppressing the price signal that would otherwise attract import competition or trigger demand
adjustment. If BRH reserves are being drawn down to maintain exchange rate optics, the
sustainability horizon for current stability is finite and undisclosed. The Le Nouvelliste analysis does
not provide reserve data, but the question it raises is the operationally relevant one for planning
purposes.
For the Fils-Aime government, an inflationary environment that coexists with nominal exchange rate
stability creates a political economy problem: the constituency that monitors the gourde rate sees
stability, while the population that buys food and fuel experiences continued price pressure that no
governance pact addresses. The FAO disconnect, in which global food prices are falling but Haitian
prices are not, suggests structural supply chain fragmentation or market concentration that
prevents global commodity price relief from reaching domestic consumers.
For operational consumers, the gourde's 131 HTG stability at the exchange window should not be
read as macroeconomic normalization. The Le Nouvelliste analysis marks the first major economic
investigative piece of the Fils-Aime era and signals that the Haitian business press is beginning to
scrutinize the BRH's management choices with the same rigor that has been applied to political
governance since February 7.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's gourde has experienced sustained depreciation since 2018, losing more than two-thirds of
its value against the dollar between 2018 and 2024. The BRH has periodically intervened to slow
depreciation during politically sensitive periods, including the immediate post-Moise transition.
February 22, 2026

Inflation rates above 30 percent have been documented since 2022, sustained by fuel price
volatility, supply chain disruption, and import dependency across all major consumer categories.



## TALKING POINTS

Le Nouvelliste's inflation analysis raises the first major economic accountability question of the
Fils-Aime era, targeting BRH management choices rather than political actors.
Gourde stability at 131 HTG per USD may mask reserve depletion rather than reflect genuine
macroeconomic improvement.
The 31.9 percent inflation rate coexisting with a stable exchange rate is structurally anomalous and
requires BRH clarification.
Global food prices fell 2.1 percent between September 2025 and January 2026 but did not produce
equivalent consumer relief in Haiti.
The economic environment the National Pact does not address may be as destabilizing as the
governance environment it attempts to structure.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Business executives should request updated BRH reserve position data before making investment
or import financing decisions premised on continued exchange rate stability.
NGO budget planners should build inflation buffer assumptions into 2026 second-quarter
programming budgets regardless of exchange rate optics.
International financial institutions with Haiti programming should assess whether BRH reserve
management is sustainable for the duration of the electoral timeline.
Diaspora remittance senders should monitor the gap between exchange window rates and parallel
market rates as an early warning indicator of reserve pressure.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling can arrive at any time. A ruling against TPS would trigger immediate
deportation threat signals for more than 300,000 Haitian nationals and produce cascading diaspora
and remittance implications within hours of publication. A ruling in favor would relieve near-term
pressure but leave the underlying policy vulnerability intact. Direction of travel: binary outcome, high
February 22, 2026

consequence.
International reaction to the National Pact from BINUH, the United States, Canada, and the OAS
will begin to crystallize within 48 hours. If key actors endorse the framework, Fils-Aime gains
governance legitimacy. If they express constitutional concerns, the Pact's contestation becomes an
international as well as a domestic problem. Direction of travel: watch for State Department and
BINUH public statements. Risk: ambiguous international response that neither validates nor
delegitimizes the framework, prolonging uncertainty.
Natcom service assessment in Kenscoff: whether the company halts maintenance operations in the
zone following the killings of its workers will determine whether the infrastructure targeting
deterrence effect is operating as gangs intend. Direction of travel: likely temporary service
disruption; risk of extended outage if maintenance suspension persists.



## THIS WEEK

The BRH has not yet responded to the Le Nouvelliste economic analysis. A BRH public statement
on reserve management or inflation methodology would either clarify the anomaly or confirm
institutional defensiveness. Direction of travel: silence or deflection is the more probable outcome,
sustaining the analytical gap.
Consultative Committee formation under the National Pact will begin signaling whether the body is
designed for substance or optics. Who is appointed and under what selection mechanism will
determine whether civil society organizations treat it as a legitimate check or an institutional facade.
Direction of travel: watch for composition announcement within the next 5 to 10 days.
The PNH balaclava ban enforcement will either produce documented compliance in the field or
demonstrate that the directive is aspirational rather than operational. Direction of travel: field
enforcement in Kenscoff and Delmas 30 within the next week will provide the first compliance data.
Risk: documented violations that undermine the reform signal.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

The April GSF deployment timeline remains the structural organizing event for Haiti's security
trajectory. Whether the National Pact provides sufficient governance legitimacy to sustain
international political will for the GSF's operational mandate will be tested by the constitutional
legitimacy debate now underway. A Pact that international actors cannot endorse without
reservations creates a governance gap precisely at the moment when GSF deployment requires
maximum political coherence. Direction of travel: the Pact's legitimacy trajectory over the next 30
days will directly condition the April deployment environment.
The February 7, 2027 CPT mandate expiration remains the authoritative institutional deadline for
February 22, 2026

Haiti's transitional governance period. The National Pact's effective replacement of the
90-to-120-day Article 149 constitutional limit with a mandate conditioned on elections means that
whether Fils-Aime reaches February 7, 2027, will depend on electoral progress he controls. Risk:
absence of binding external timeline creates structural incentive for electoral delay. Expected
outcome: international actors will increasingly attach timeline conditionality to electoral support
commitments during the March to June window.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Le Nouvelliste. "Kenscoff: 16 bandits tues lors d'une operation de la PNH." February 21, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264455/kenscoff-16-bandits-tues-lors-dune-operation-de-la-pnh
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. "Haiti: l'OIF appelle a un consensus national en
faveur de la stabilite et de la tenue d'elections." February 22, 2026.
https://www.francophonie.org/haiti-loif-appelle-a-un-consensus-national-en-faveur-de-la-stabilite-et-de-la-tenue-d
La Loi de Ma Bouche. "Un Pacte National pour neutraliser la Constitution." February 21, 2026.
https://laloidemabouche.ht/2026/02/21/un-pacte-national-pour-neutraliser-la-constitution/
Le Nouvelliste. "New UN Mandate, Sanctions, and Haitian Accountability: Carlos Ruiz Massieu
Speaks Out." February 19, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264403/new-un-mandate-sanctions-and-haitian-accountability-carlos-ruiz-mas
Miragenews. "UN Report: Gangs' Child Trafficking Threatens Haiti's Future." 2026.
https://www.miragenews.com/un-report-gangs-child-trafficking-threatens-1623712/
Organisation of American States. "H-TAC: Improving the Haitian National Police's Learning and
Training." https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/h-tac
Haiti Press Network. "Pacte National: 30 articles, 9 sections; ISC appel a la gouvernance
non-partisane." February 21, 2026. https://www.hpninfo.com
Haiti Libre. "Haiti - News: Zapping." February 22, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46912-haiti-news-zapping.html
Haiti Libre. "Haiti - News: Zapping." February 21, 2026.
https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46904-haiti-news-zapping.html
Le Nouvelliste. "Pacte National pour la Stabilite et l'Organisation des Elections." February 21-22,
2026. https://lenouvelliste.com
Le Nouvelliste. "Deux employes de la Natcom tues a Kenscoff." February 22, 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264462/deux-employes-de-la-natcom-tues-a-kenscoff
El Pais in English. "Haiti braces for the possible end of TPS for more than 300,000 citizens in the
United States." February 19, 2026.
https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-02-19/haiti-braces-for-the-possible-end-of-tps-for-more-than-300000-citizens-
February 22, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*