# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-19
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: US ESCALATION: FEDERAL BOUNTY ON IZO AND SECURITY FORCE](#development-1-us-escalation-federal-bounty-on-izo-and-security-force)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: TPS DELIBERATIONS BEGIN: D.C. CIRCUIT PANEL ACTIVE WITH NO](#development-2-tps-deliberations-begin-d.c.-circuit-panel-active-with-no)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: FISCAL RESTART: AMENDING BUDGET SIGNALS AND GONAVE HEALTH](#development-3-fiscal-restart-amending-budget-signals-and-gonave-health)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: CARIBBEAN-EU ASSEMBLY AND INFRASTRUCTURE RISK:](#development-4-caribbean-eu-assembly-and-infrastructure-risk)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States escalated direct pressure on Haiti's gang leadership on February 18-19, 2026,
announcing a one-million-dollar Rewards for Justice bounty on 5 Segond gang leader Johnson
Andre, alias Izo, days after he publicly financed Carnival activities with no government response. A
second forward operating base for the GSF-MSS mission became operational, expanding the
international security footprint ahead of the April deployment. The D.C. Circuit panel began
deliberations on the TPS appeal with no ruling deadline, placing 300,000 Haitians in legal
uncertainty. Post-Carnival governance resumed with the Fils-Aime government signaling an
amending budget prioritizing security and elections. Stakeholders must treat the next 72 hours as a
critical window across all four risk domains simultaneously.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

US places one-million-dollar federal bounty on gang leader Izo effective February 18.
Second GSF-MSS forward operating base now operational as of February 19.
D.C. Circuit TPS deliberations active with no deadline; ruling may arrive at any moment.
PNH armored vehicle readiness at only 65.5 percent despite recent fleet additions.
Fils-Aime government considering amending budget with security and elections as stated priorities.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: US ESCALATION: FEDERAL BOUNTY ON IZO AND SECURITY FORCE

READINESS GAP
The United States State Department Rewards for Justice program announced on February 18,
2026, a reward of up to one million dollars for information leading to the arrest or conviction of
Johnson Andre, alias Izo, leader of the 5 Segond gang. The announcement came within days of
video evidence showing Izo openly financing Carnival activities in Village de Dieu with no Haitian
government interdiction. The bounty also covers information related to the March 2023 kidnapping
of a US citizen, for whom a ransom was paid and whose vehicle and father's firearms were seized
by the gang. The program includes relocation protection for informants, indicating the US
anticipates serious personal risk to any source.
The timing is operationally deliberate. Izo is the same gang leader responsible for the December
24, 2024, General Hospital drone massacre. His public Carnival appearance represented a
calculated demonstration of impunity. The US transition from passive observation to active federal
incentivization marks the first time a named Haitian gang leader has been formally targeted by an
RFJ bounty, representing a structural shift in US gang suppression posture rather than a tactical
adjustment. The PNH is simultaneously seeking Izo for murder, kidnapping for ransom, and illegal
February 19, 2026

firearms possession.
The same reporting cycle revealed that only 65.5 percent of PNH armored vehicles are operational,
meaning approximately 12 of 35 vehicles are non-functional despite recent deliveries of 10
Canadian armored vehicles on February 16 and 3 South Korean tracked vehicles on February 5. A
second forward operating base for the GSF-MSS mission became operational on February 19, with
location details pending. Guatemala rotated its 150-strong specialized military police contingent,
confirming continued partner commitment.
A North Carnival incident compounded institutional credibility concerns: PNH officer Smith Bien
Aime of the 31st graduating class is the prime suspect in the killing of Ronelson Mon Coeur, with 14
total arrests and 5 firearms seized. This follows the Ministry of Defense's February 16 statement
threatening prosecution of FAd'H union activity. Haiti's security institutions face simultaneous
external pressure from gang leaders demonstrating impunity and internal discipline failures at the
moment of maximum GSF transition stress.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Rewards for Justice program previously offered similar bounties for leaders of designated
narco-terrorist organizations across Latin America, but this marks its application to a Haitian gang
leader. The 5 Segond gang controls critical Port-au-Prince territory and has demonstrated air and
ground assault capability, including the December 2024 General Hospital attack. PNH armored
vehicle maintenance deficits have been a recurring systemic issue predating the current fleet
expansion.



## TALKING POINTS

The one-million-dollar Izo bounty represents a qualitative escalation in US anti-gang posture
beyond diplomatic statements.
The 65.5 percent vehicle readiness rate means expanded fleet size does not translate
proportionally into expanded operational capability.
A PNH officer as a prime suspect in a Carnival killing directly undermines community trust during a
critical trust-building phase.
The second FOB becoming operational ahead of the April GSF arrival is a positive sequencing
indicator for the mission.
The bounty includes relocation protection, signaling US assessment that informant safety inside
Haiti cannot be guaranteed.
Internal FAd'H union suppression and PNH officer misconduct point to compounding institutional
discipline failures across both security pillars.
February 19, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should request full details of the February 19 US Embassy security alert
and adjust staff movement protocols immediately.
GSF mission planners should publicly account for the 65.5 percent vehicle readiness rate in
capability timelines communicated to donors and partner governments.
Businesses operating in Port-au-Prince should treat the Izo bounty as a potential trigger for gang
retaliation activity in adjacent zones and adjust security protocols for the 72 hours following the
announcement.
Diaspora organizations should brief community networks that the TPS ruling may arrive at any
moment and ensure legal referral infrastructure is activated.
BINUH and OAS should formally document the North Carnival PNH officer incident as part of
ongoing institutional accountability assessments.
The Haitian government should publicly address the vehicle readiness gap before the April GSF
arrival to avoid a credibility deficit on security reform commitments.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: TPS DELIBERATIONS BEGIN: D.C. CIRCUIT PANEL ACTIVE WITH NO

RULING DEADLINE
The February 19, 2026, deadline for brief submissions to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals expired,
and the three-judge panel is now in active deliberations on the Temporary Protected Status appeal
covering more than 300,000 Haitians in the United States. There is no statutory or procedural
deadline for the panel to issue its ruling; the decision can be released at any moment from
February 19 forward. The deliberation phase is by nature non-public, and no signals regarding
timing or direction have been disclosed.
The legal landscape is adversarial. A recent D.C. Circuit ruling permitted TPS termination for
Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Nepali nationals, establishing a precedent that the current
administration has cited as applicable to the Haitian TPS population. The 18-state attorney general
coalition led by New York AG Letitia James has argued that termination would separate families,
damage state economies, deplete healthcare and educational workforces, and harm public health
infrastructure. IRC Haiti Director Mwiti Mungania provided operational grounding: deportees would
face an overlap of violence, displacement, and hunger, and would be especially attractive targets
for gangs due to perceived wealth upon return.
February 19, 2026

The macroeconomic stakes for Haiti are direct. Diaspora remittances constitute approximately 25
percent of Haiti's GDP. A mass deportation event layered onto the 525,000 Dominicans already
expelled from the Dominican Republic since October 2025 would create a simultaneous collapse of
remittance inflows and surge of return migration into a country where 90 percent of the capital is
under gang control and food inflation exceeds 35 percent. One in 10 of Haiti's 11 million inhabitants
is already displaced internally.
For operational planning purposes, stakeholders should treat the TPS ruling as an asymmetric risk
event: low daily probability but extreme consequence magnitude. The ruling can appear in legal
notification systems without advance warning. Organizations serving Haitian diaspora communities
or dependent on Haitian labor networks should have response protocols activated now rather than
upon ruling issuance.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

TPS for Haiti was originally designated following the January 2010 earthquake and has been
renewed and contested through multiple administrations. The current legal battle traces to the
Trump administration's 2018 termination announcement, which has been in continuous litigation
since. The precedent set by Nicaragua, Honduras, and Nepal rulings in the current D.C. Circuit
represents the most direct legal threat to Haitian TPS in the program's history.



## TALKING POINTS

The ruling can arrive at any time with no advance notice; organizations must have response
infrastructure in place today.
The Nicaragua-Honduras-Nepal TPS termination precedent is the most significant legal risk factor
for the Haitian case.
Mass deportation would compound the DR deportation surge, creating a dual-source return
migration crisis.
Remittance collapse risk from TPS termination represents an existential macroeconomic threat to
Haiti's already fragile economy.
The 18-state AG coalition provides political cover but has no procedural mechanism to delay a
panel ruling.
IRC operational assessment confirms deportees face immediate gang targeting risk upon return.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Haitian diaspora legal aid organizations should activate emergency intake protocols now to handle
immediate post-ruling demand regardless of outcome direction.
February 19, 2026

International organizations should begin modeling dual-scenario humanitarian response plans for
both TPS continuation and TPS termination outcomes.
Private sector entities employing Haitian TPS holders should consult legal counsel on employment
authorization implications of each ruling scenario.
The Haitian government and CPT should formally communicate to the D.C. Circuit through
diplomatic channels the operational conditions awaiting any deportee population.
Diaspora remittance monitoring should be elevated to weekly tracking frequency given the ruling's
proximity.
CARICOM and Caribbean-EU Assembly stakeholders should formally incorporate TPS ruling risk
into their Haiti transition support frameworks.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: FISCAL RESTART: AMENDING BUDGET SIGNALS AND GONAVE HEALTH

INFRASTRUCTURE
Government operations resumed on February 19, 2026, following the Carnival break of February
16-18. The Fils-Aime government is actively considering adoption of an amending budget, with
security and elections identified as the two primary priorities. This represents the first substantive
fiscal policy signal since Fils-Aime assumed the prime ministership and directly addresses the
structural gap in Haiti's electoral financing, estimated at 137 million dollars. No specific allocation
figures or timeline for the amending budget's adoption have been disclosed.
The amending budget signal is strategically significant for three reasons. First, it acknowledges that
the current budget is structurally incapable of absorbing both GSF transition support costs and the
full electoral calendar. Second, by naming security and elections as co-equal priorities, the
government signals to international partners that it is operationally aligned with the conditionality
frameworks attached to multilateral support. Third, the timing immediately after Carnival positions
the amending budget as the Fils-Aime government's first governance test: its passage and content
will reveal whether the administration has the legislative relationships and technical capacity to
execute a complex fiscal instrument under political pressure.
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Public Health announced the reopening of seven public health
centers, one community referral hospital, and one blood transfusion center on Gonave Island,
following the January-February visit of Health Minister Dr. Bertrand Sinal. The facilities will become
operational in phases, with full capacity projected in coming weeks. Medical equipment shipments
February 19, 2026

continue and staff recruitment is active. Gonave Island has a population of approximately 100,000
and has been chronically underserved by public health infrastructure.
The Gonave Island reopenings are the first significant health service expansion reported during the
Fils-Aime government period and serve as a proof-of-concept for governance delivery outside
Port-au-Prince. For international organizations evaluating whether the transitional government can
execute basic functions beyond the capital, this is a positive data point. It also aligns with the
Caribbean-EU Parliamentary Assembly's call for multidimensional security, which explicitly included
health security as a component of Haiti stabilization.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Amending budgets in Haiti have historically required executive-legislative negotiation and have
often stalled in periods of political instability. The last major amending budget exercise occurred
under conditions of comparable institutional stress. Gonave Island's health deficit predates the
current crisis by decades; the island lacks permanent specialist care and has relied almost entirely
on NGO medical missions for advanced procedures.



## TALKING POINTS

The amending budget is the first fiscal test of the Fils-Aime government's governance capacity and
coalition management.
Naming elections as a co-equal budget priority alongside security signals alignment with
international conditionality frameworks.
Gonave Island health reopenings demonstrate the government's ability to deliver services in
populations outside Port-au-Prince, a critical legitimacy signal.
The 137-million-dollar electoral budget gap remains the central constraint on the CEP's operational
timeline.
International donors should treat amending budget passage as a key governance benchmark and
adjust support frameworks accordingly.
The phased reopening model in Gonave provides a replicable template for health service
restoration in other underserved regions.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International donors should formally link amending budget adoption and allocation transparency to
next-tranche disbursement decisions.
The CEP should use the amending budget process as the moment to publicly specify minimum
viable electoral funding requirements.
NGOs operating on Gonave Island should coordinate with the Ministry of Public Health on phased
February 19, 2026

facility activation to avoid duplication and service gaps.
BINUH and OCHA should incorporate the Gonave health reopenings into their public reporting as
evidence of governance capacity outside the capital.
Business intelligence teams should monitor the amending budget's specific security allocation to
assess whether PNH and FAd'H funding is sufficient to support the GSF transition.
The Haitian government should publish the amending budget framework publicly before
submission to maximize international donor confidence.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: CARIBBEAN-EU ASSEMBLY AND INFRASTRUCTURE RISK:

MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK AND CIVILIAN HAZARD
The first plenary session of the Caribbean-EU Parliamentary Assembly concluded in Antigua and
Barbuda on February 18, 2026, adopting formal recommendations on Haiti addressed to the
Caribbean-EU Council of Ministers. Members renewed strong support for a Haitian-led political
solution and emphasized urgent need to address insecurity and the humanitarian crisis. The
Assembly adopted five strategic priority areas, of which Haiti was named explicitly alongside
climate resilience, trade and investment, transnational organized crime, and territorial integrity.
Antiguan Prime Minister Gaston Browne stated that controlling the security situation is a
prerequisite for free and fair elections and called for EU support to extend to food, energy, health,
and transnational crime dimensions. The Assembly proposed a permanent consultative mechanism
meeting at minimum twice per year for coordinated Caribbean-EU positions on shared priorities.
The Caribbean-EU recommendations provide a new multilateral advocacy instrument at a moment
when the existing UN framework faces renewal pressures and the US is shifting from multilateral to
bilateral intervention tools. The proposal for a permanent consultative mechanism is structurally
significant: if adopted by the Council of Ministers, it would institutionalize Caribbean-EU
coordination on Haiti beyond the current ad hoc crisis response mode. For Haiti's transitional
government, Caribbean-EU recognition of its reform agenda provides external legitimacy that
reduces dependence on any single bilateral patron.
On February 19, a high-voltage electrical cable snapped in a public marketplace in Petion-Ville,
killing one person and hospitalizing five. Local judicial officer Eno Rene Louis confirmed the incident
February 19, 2026

to Reuters. The incident directly parallels the 2015 Carnival electrocution that killed 16 people, also
caused by Electricite d'Haiti infrastructure failure. EDH's power grid in Port-au-Prince operates
without adequate maintenance funding, and high-voltage cables in commercial and public spaces
represent an active and recurring civilian hazard.
The Dominican Republic reported rising export volumes to Haiti in January 2026, indicating that
cross-border trade flows continue to expand even as the humanitarian and deportation crisis at the
bilateral frontier intensifies. This apparent paradox, deteriorating human rights conditions coexisting
with increasing commercial flows, reflects the structural economic interdependence between the
two countries that operates independently of political conditions.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Caribbean-EU Parliamentary Assembly is a relatively recent institutional mechanism; its
adoption of formal Haiti recommendations marks a qualitative expansion of its operational scope.
EDH has faced chronic underfunding since the post-earthquake period, and electrical infrastructure
deterioration has accelerated as gang control of Port-au-Prince has disrupted maintenance
operations. Dominican-Haitian trade has historically proven resilient to bilateral political stress,
dating to the period of the Duvalier era border closures.



## TALKING POINTS

Caribbean-EU Parliamentary Assembly recommendations elevate Haiti to formal priority status
within a multilateral framework that includes EU institutional resources.
The permanent consultative mechanism proposal, if adopted, would institutionalize Caribbean-EU
Haiti engagement beyond crisis response.
The Petion-Ville electrocution is not an isolated incident but a symptom of systemic EDH
infrastructure failure that constitutes an ongoing civilian risk.
Dominican export growth to Haiti in January 2026 confirms trade-political decoupling at the bilateral
level.
The 2015 Carnival electrocution precedent demonstrates that EDH infrastructure failures are
predictable and recurring without structural investment.
Caribbean-EU engagement provides the Haitian government an additional multilateral legitimacy
channel distinct from the US-UN framework.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Haitian government and EDH should commission an emergency audit of high-voltage cable
conditions in public markets and commercial areas in Port-au-Prince and major urban centers.
International donors engaged in infrastructure support should evaluate EDH electrical safety as a
February 19, 2026

humanitarian protection priority, not solely an economic development concern.
Caribbean-EU Council of Ministers should formally adopt the permanent consultative mechanism
proposal at its next session to lock in institutional continuity on Haiti.
Businesses with Haitian operations should add electrical infrastructure failure to site risk
assessments for market-based and outdoor commercial facilities.
CARICOM secretariat should formally incorporate Caribbean-EU Assembly Haiti recommendations
into its next bilateral engagement with the CPT.
Trade intelligence teams tracking Dominican-Haitian commerce should expand monitoring to
include cross-border informal sector flows, which typically exceed formal trade volumes.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling can arrive at any moment; trigger is panel consensus; direction is binary
and consequence is immediate for 300,000 Haitians and Haiti's remittance economy. The US
Embassy security alert issued February 19 requires full content review; trigger is any staff
movement restriction; risk is escalation of post-Carnival gang activity. The Izo bounty
announcement may trigger gang retaliation in 5 Segond-controlled zones; trigger is any armed
incident in Village de Dieu or adjacent areas; risk is targeted attacks on perceived informant
networks.



## THIS WEEK

The amending budget framework is expected to take shape in the first post-Carnival
government sessions; trigger is any executive submission to the legislative body; direction
is toward either a credible electoral financing package or a delay that accelerates CEP
calendar slippage. The second FOB location and capability details should become available;
trigger is official MSS or BINUH disclosure; risk is that operational opacity undermines
donor confidence. PNH vehicle readiness gap must be addressed before April GSF arrival;
trigger is any Ministry of Interior or PNH statement on maintenance contracts; risk is that
fleet expansion metrics conceal a capability plateau.
February 19, 2026



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

The Caribbean-EU Council of Ministers response to the Parliamentary Assembly's Haiti
recommendations will determine whether the multilateral framework expands or stagnates; trigger
is the next scheduled Council session; direction is toward either institutionalized engagement or
reversion to ad hoc crisis response. The GSF April deployment remains the dominant security
calendar anchor; trigger is any deviation from the April timeline announced by Kenya or the BINUH;
risk is that a delay collapses the current security reform momentum before it consolidates. The CPT
mandate expiration on February 7, 2027, remains the hard political deadline governing all transition
planning; any electoral slippage that extends beyond that date triggers a constitutional legitimacy
crisis with no established resolution mechanism.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Haiti Libre -- Zapping fevrier 19, 2026: gouvernement post-Carnaval, budget modificatif, violence
nord, Gonave sante -- haitilibre.com
8. El Pais -- Analyse complete des deliberations du circuit D.C. sur le TPS: implications pour Haiti
(19 fevrier 2026) -- elpais.com
9. JD Supra -- Chronologie du contentieux TPS: echeance du 19 fevrier; panel maintenant en
deliberation -- jdsupra.com
3. Haiti24 -- Programme Rewards for Justice: recompense d'un million pour Izo -- haiti24.com
6. The Star (Kenya) -- Confirmation de la prime US d'un million sur Izo -- the-star.co.ke
13. Ambassade des Etats-Unis en Haiti -- Archive des alertes de securite; conseils de voyage
niveau 4 -- ht.usembassy.gov
14. iciHaiti -- Taux de disponibilite des vehicules blindes de la PNH: 65,5 pour cent operationnels --
icihaiti.com
7. Reuters -- Electrocution au marche de Petion-Ville: 1 mort, 5 hospitalises, confirmation judiciaire
-- reuters.com
12. Haiti Libre -- Couverture de l'assemblee parlementaire Caraibe-UE et recommandations sur
Haiti -- haitilibre.com
2. iciHaiti -- US Rewards for Justice: 1 million USD pour Izo, 2e base operationnelle FOB, alerte
ambassade americaine -- icihaiti.com
4. Vant Bef Info -- Annonce US de recompense contre Johnson Andre alias Izo -- vantbefinfo.com
5. Diario ECO (Republique Dominicaine) -- Details complets de la prime Izo incluant l'affaire
d'enlevement de 2023 -- diarioeco.com.do
February 19, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*