# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2025-12-15
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 7

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The candidate registration deadline expired today after a 15-day period with zero public declarations from major
political figures. The December 22 candidate list publication will determine whether the August 30, 2026 election is
viable or boycotted. Security reporting confirms the Gang Suppression Force is operational, with an 80 percent
surge in anti-gang confrontations in November concentrated in Port-au-Prince suburbs, not central gang
strongholds. The Bel-Air massacre enters day eight and Port-Sondé occupation enters day sixteen with no
government response. The United States terminated the Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti today,
completing a triple restriction on Haitian migration alongside the December 2 application freeze and February 3
TPS expiration.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Candidate registration closed today with no public declarations. December 22 candidate list will reveal boycott or
private participation. Gang Suppression Force operational but focused on peripheral suburbs, not central crisis
zones. Bel-Air and Port-Sondé remain unaddressed after eight and sixteen days respectively. United States FRP
termination today creates immediate legal crisis for Haitian nationals.
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
Development 1: The Silent Registration Period Ends Without Public Candidates
The 15-day candidate registration window for Haiti's August 30, 2026 presidential and legislative elections closed
today at midnight with no major candidate announcements reported in Haitian or international media. This
represents an unprecedented situation in Haitian electoral history. The registration period began December 1
following publication of the electoral decree and concluded December 15 as mandated by the Provisional
Electoral Council calendar.
The absence of public declarations during the entire registration period creates two possible scenarios. First,
candidates may have registered privately to avoid gang threats or media scrutiny during the submission process.
Second, major opposition figures may have coordinated a boycott to delegitimize the electoral process. The
December 22 final candidate list publication by the Provisional Electoral Council will resolve this uncertainty and
determine the viability of the August 2026 election timeline.
The electoral calendar submitted by the Provisional Electoral Council on November 14 explicitly conditioned the
timeline on three prerequisites: publication of the electoral decree within the allotted timeframe, acceptable
security conditions, and availability of necessary financial resources. The first condition has been met with the
December 1 decree publication. The second condition remains unfulfilled given ongoing gang occupation of
Port-Sondé and the Bel-Air massacre. The third condition regarding financial resources remains unclear with no
public budget announcement.
The contestation period for challenging candidacies runs December 16 through 19. If no candidates registered,
this period becomes procedurally meaningless. If candidates did register privately, this period may reveal
opposition challenges or attempts to disqualify specific individuals. The December 22 publication date represents
the single most critical moment of the transition period to date.
Monday, December 15, 2025

Confidence: HIGH. Electoral calendar dates and registration deadline are confirmed through official
Provisional Electoral Council publications and multiple independent media sources. The absence of
public candidate declarations is verifiable through comprehensive media monitoring during the 15-day
period.
Development 2: Gang Suppression Force Operational But Geographically Limited
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project released its December 2025 Latin America regional overview
providing the most detailed assessment of Haiti security operations in November. The report confirms that police
conducted anti-gang operations with assistance from the Gang Suppression Force, leading to an 80 percent
surge in confrontations between gangs and security personnel during November. These operations concentrated
in communes around Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets in the Port-au-Prince periphery.
This data confirms three critical operational realities. First, the Gang Suppression Force is deployed and
conducting joint operations with Haitian National Police forces, despite the December 9 conference seeking
additional international troop commitments. Second, the geographic focus remains suburban Port-au-Prince rather
than central gang strongholds such as Bel-Air or Cité Soleil. Third, the 80 percent surge in confrontations
indicates intensified combat activity but does not specify territorial gains, losses, or whether operations
successfully disrupted gang control in target areas.
The December 9 conference secured commitments for 1,500 troops from Chad and 1,500 from Bangladesh for
Gang Suppression Force expansion. However, deployment timelines remain unspecified. The current operational
pattern suggests a defensive containment strategy focused on preventing gang expansion into remaining
government-controlled Port-au-Prince suburbs rather than offensive operations to reclaim gang-held territories.
The absence of Gang Suppression Force operations in Artibonite department, where Port-Sondé remains under
Gran Grif gang occupation since November 30, indicates either insufficient troop strength for multi-front operations
or strategic prioritization of the capital region over rural areas. This geographic limitation undermines the feasibility
of nationwide elections requiring security coverage across all ten departments.
Confidence: HIGH. ACLED methodology uses verified incident reports from multiple sources. The 80
percent surge statistic and geographic concentration in Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets are directly
stated in the published report. Gang Suppression Force operational status is confirmed through
institutional reporting.
Development 3: Bel-Air Massacre Enters Eighth Day With No Official Response
The gang conflict in Bel-Air that began December 8 reached its eighth consecutive day today with no updates
from official sources or media since December 13. The last confirmed casualty count reported 60 killed, with 49
deaths verified by human rights organizations and the number expected to rise as bodies are recovered. The
violence reportedly stems from territorial conflict between armed groups operating in the Bel-Air commune of
Port-au-Prince.
The government response pattern mirrors the Port-Sondé occupation strategy: no official statements, no police
operations, no humanitarian access, and no public acknowledgment of the crisis. This non-intervention approach
creates a functional cede of state authority in affected areas. The complete absence of media updates since
Monday, December 15, 2025

December 13 suggests either journalistic access restrictions due to ongoing violence or a media blackout
following the initial casualty reports.
Bel-Air's strategic location in central Port-au-Prince makes the government's non-response particularly significant.
Unlike Port-Sondé in rural Artibonite, Bel-Air borders key government and commercial zones. The continuation of
gang violence in this location for eight days without security force intervention demonstrates either operational
incapacity or strategic calculation that intervention costs exceed non-intervention costs in terms of potential
casualties and resource expenditure.
The pattern of multi-day gang violence without government response has now occurred in three separate
incidents within 16 days: Port-Sondé beginning November 30, Bel-Air beginning December 8, and the broader
campaign period violence throughout November documented in the ACLED report. This establishes
non-intervention as the default government security posture rather than an isolated incident response.
Confidence: MODERATE-HIGH. Initial casualty figures and December 8 start date are confirmed through
multiple media sources and human rights organizations. The absence of updates since December 13 is
verifiable through media monitoring but does not confirm whether violence continues, has subsided, or
access restrictions prevent reporting. Government non-response is confirmed through absence of official
statements or reported operations.
Development 4: United States Completes Migration Restriction Triple Lock
The United States officially terminated the Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti today through publication
in the Federal Register. This termination becomes effective immediately and applies to all pending applications,
which are now closed without processing. The program previously allowed Haitian family members of United
States citizens and lawful permanent residents to be paroled into the United States while awaiting immigrant visa
processing.
The Family Reunification Parole termination represents the third and final component of a comprehensive
restriction architecture targeting Haitian migration. The sequence began December 2 with the freeze on new
immigration applications, continued today with Family Reunification Parole termination, and will complete
February 3, 2026 when Temporary Protected Status expires. This creates a 50-day countdown to legal limbo for
348,000 to 500,000 Haitian nationals currently in the United States under Temporary Protected Status.
The timing of these restrictions during Haiti's candidate registration period and electoral transition creates
apparent coordination between United States immigration policy and pressure on Haiti's political process. The
triple restriction removes legal pathways while Haiti faces its most severe governance and security crisis in
modern history. This policy architecture forces Haitian nationals into three options: voluntary departure,
deportation to a country with no functioning government, or remaining in the United States without legal status.
The policy also eliminates family-based relief mechanisms previously available to Haitian nationals. With Family
Reunification Parole terminated and standard immigration applications frozen, Haitian families have no legal
process to reunify relatives or adjust status regardless of United States citizen or permanent resident family
relationships. This represents the most restrictive policy framework toward Haitian nationals in recent decades.
Monday, December 15, 2025

Confidence: HIGH. Federal Register publication provides definitive legal authority for Family Reunification
Parole termination effective December 15, 2025. Temporary Protected Status February 3 expiration date is
confirmed through Department of Homeland Security notices. The affected population estimates of
348,000 to 500,000 are reported by advocacy organizations citing government data.
IMPACT RATING
10 out of 10. CRITICAL. IMMEDIATE DECISION POINTS.
The December 22 candidate list publication will determine whether Haiti's constitutional transition proceeds or
collapses. A boycott or minimal participation delegitimizes the August 30 election and triggers renewed
constitutional crisis as the February 7, 2027 Presidential Council mandate expiration approaches with no
succession mechanism. The Gang Suppression Force operational confirmation is positive but geographic
limitations to Port-au-Prince suburbs indicate insufficient capacity for nationwide election security. The eight-day
Bel-Air crisis and sixteen-day Port-Sondé occupation without government response demonstrate effective state
absence in crisis zones. The United States triple migration restriction creates immediate legal emergency for half
a million Haitian nationals.
IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER
Haitian Government and Presidential Council
The December 22 candidate list will determine your political legitimacy. An empty or minimal list proves opposition
boycott and eliminates credibility for the August 30 election timeline. Your February 7, 2027 mandate expiration is
419 days away with no constitutional succession plan if elections fail. The continued non-response to Bel-Air and
Port-Sondé after eight and sixteen days establishes non-intervention as your default security posture, which
opposition forces will cite as evidence of state failure. You must decide within one week whether to acknowledge
the boycott scenario and negotiate new political arrangements or maintain the fiction of a viable election timeline.
Opposition Political Actors
If you coordinated a registration boycott, December 22 will reveal your leverage. However, boycott strategy only
succeeds if paired with alternative governance proposals. The Presidential Council mandate expires February 7,
2027, creating a constitutional vacuum. You must present a credible succession mechanism before mandate
expiration or accept responsibility for institutional collapse. If major figures did register privately, December 22 will
reveal who defected from boycott coordination and created competitive dynamics within opposition ranks.
International Community and Donor States
Your December 9 conference secured Gang Suppression Force troop commitments from Chad and Bangladesh
but provided no deployment timeline. The ACLED data shows current operations are geographically limited to
Port-au-Prince suburbs. You must determine whether to fund nationwide Gang Suppression Force expansion or
acknowledge that August 30 elections cannot proceed in current security conditions. The December 22 candidate
list will force a decision point: continue supporting a potentially boycotted election or negotiate a new political
transition framework. Your credibility depends on matching security commitments to electoral timeline
requirements.
Haitian Diaspora and Temporary Protected Status Holders
You face immediate legal crisis. Family Reunification Parole terminated today, eliminating your last family-based
relief mechanism. Temporary Protected Status expires February 3, 50 days from today, affecting up to 500,000
Haitian nationals. You must make deportation contingency plans, pursue legal challenges to the triple restriction
Monday, December 15, 2025

architecture, or accept undocumented status in the United States. The coordination of these restrictions during
Haiti's electoral registration period suggests intentional pressure but provides no legal recourse. Organize legal
resources and community support networks before the February 3 deadline.
Security and Humanitarian Actors
The eight-day Bel-Air crisis and sixteen-day Port-Sondé occupation without humanitarian access demonstrate you
cannot operate in active conflict zones without government security support. The government non-response
pattern means you must develop access strategies that do not depend on security force escorts or government
coordination. Pre-position medical supplies and emergency resources in accessible border areas of conflict
zones. The Gang Suppression Force's suburban focus means central Port-au-Prince slum areas and rural
Artibonite will remain unsecured for humanitarian operations.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

72-hour priority: December 16 through 19 contestation period
Monitor whether any candidacy challenges are filed during the official contestation period. Challenge filings would
confirm that candidates registered even without public declarations, providing the first signal of electoral viability
before December 22 publication.
One-week critical event: Sunday, December 22, final candidate list publication
The single most important event of the entire transition period. The Provisional Electoral Council will publish the
official list of registered candidates for August 30, 2026 elections. This list will definitively reveal whether major
opposition figures registered privately or coordinated a boycott. An empty or minimal list with unknown candidates
collapses the August 2026 election timeline and triggers constitutional crisis planning.
Ongoing security monitoring: Bel-Air and Port-Sondé status
Track whether government security forces respond to the now eight-day Bel-Air massacre or sixteen-day
Port-Sondé occupation. Any operational response would indicate a shift from the current non-intervention posture.
Continued absence of response confirms permanent state withdrawal from these territories.
Countdown tracking: 50 days to Temporary Protected Status expiration
Monitor legal challenges to the triple restriction architecture and Department of Homeland Security
implementation planning for February 3 Temporary Protected Status expiration. Track whether advocacy
organizations secure court intervention or congressional action before the deadline.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

HaitiLibre, official calendar of upcoming elections, November 2025
Haiti Info Project social media, candidate registration deadline announcement, December 2025
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Regional Overview for Latin America and Caribbean, published
December 2025, covering November 2025 security operations
ABC News wire service, Bel-Air gang violence casualty report, December 13, 2025
Latin Times, gang conflict in Port-au-Prince including Viv Ansanm leader death, December 13, 2025
CNN, Gran Grif gang attack on Port-Sondé in Artibonite region, December 1, 2025
Federal Register volume 90 number 241, termination of Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti, December
15, 2025
Forum Together advocacy organization, fact sheet on Temporary Protected Status termination impact, 2025
Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker, Haiti instability entry, updated December 2025
Provisional Electoral Council official website, electoral calendar and registration procedures, November-December
2025
Monday, December 15, 2025

Haiti Info Project social media, December 9 Gang Suppression Force conference troop commitments from Chad
and Bangladesh
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025 Haiti country chapter, gang violence documentation
AYITI INTEL, a service of KreyolGenius Intelligence Services
Confidence Ratings Explained: HIGH indicates multiple institutional sources with converging data.
MODERATE-HIGH indicates institutional sources with some gaps in coverage or verification. MODERATE
indicates partial institutional confirmation requiring additional verification. These ratings reflect analytical
certainty based on source quality, corroboration, and information gaps, not subjective probability
assessments.
Monday, December 15, 2025



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*