# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-09
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

---

## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1](#development-1)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2](#development-2)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3](#development-3)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4](#development-4)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

---


## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti entered a critical dual-authority crisis within 48 hours of the February 7 CPT dissolution.
Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime holds executive power with explicit US and French backing,
but a rival Collège Presidentiel led partly by US-sanctioned former CPT members issued its first
official communique establishing parallel governance structures. The US authorized historic
military financing for the Forces Armees d'Haiti marking the first such funding since the 1990s.
France formally endorsed the transition while three US warships remain deployed off
Port-au-Prince. The PNH launched training for 1,200 new recruits under the P4000+ program.
This 48-hour window has produced the most significant governance instability since the April
2024 political accord.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Rival Collège Presidentiel issued first communique creating two commissions challenging PM
Fils-Aime authority despite lacking US recognition.
US Congress authorized up to 5 million dollars in military financing for FAd'H through Foreign
Military Financing Program first such funding since 1990s.
France officially endorsed orderly transition to Fils-Aime government and pledged continued
support for GSF deployment and security operations.
PNH 36th class began training with 1,200 recruits including 239 women representing 40 percent
force expansion over 16 months.
US deportation flights continue with 268 Haitians repatriated to Cap-Haitien between February
5-7 following TPS termination effective February 3.



## DEVELOPMENT 1

The emergence of a parallel governance structure represents the most acute political crisis
since the April 2024 accord. On February 9, 2026, the self-declared Collège Presidentiel de la
Republique issued its first official communique designated CPR-001 announcing the creation of
two institutional commissions and asserting executive authority in direct competition with Prime
Minister Fils-Aime. The communique acknowledged the February 3 resolution from inter-Haitian
dialogue sessions held at Hotel Montana defining a bicephalous governance structure
combining the Collège with the Prime Minister but noted strong social polarization and
recognized the need to broaden political consensus beyond current participants.
The Collège established a Communication Commission for liaison with the population and
February 09, 2026

political actors plus a Political Accord Commission tasked with drafting a 15-month transition
program focused on governance security IDP returns and elections. Coordination of both
commissions was assigned to Me Alexandre Joseph Dieunor a retired major of the FAd'H. The
Collège originated from February 1-3 deliberation sessions initiated by three CPT members
Leslie Voltaire Edgard Leblanc Fils and Louis Gerald Gilles with the latter two under US
sanctions. The proposed structure calls for one representative from the former CPT one from the
Cour de Cassation and one from civil society.
PM Fils-Aime delivered a national address on February 7 outlining security priorities electoral
commitments and a humanitarian emergency plan while flanked by police and army officials
signaling security sector backing. He committed to hunting down gang leaders retaking
occupied territories organizing free elections and uniting all sectors around a Republican Pact
with a roadmap of Security Elections Economic Recovery. France issued a formal statement on
February 9 saluting the orderly transfer of executive power and calling on all actors to work with
interim authorities toward stability and elections. The US had previously endorsed Fils-Aime and
sanctioned five CPT members including two Collège initiators.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 3, 2024 political accord established the CPT as a transitional executive body with a
mandate expiring February 7, 2026. The accord did not authorize successor governance
structures beyond transfer to the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister creating a
constitutional vacuum that rival political factions have moved to fill through competing
institutional frameworks.



## TALKING POINTS

Dual authority scenario creates immediate governance instability with two competing executive
structures claiming legitimacy.
Collège includes US-sanctioned members making international recognition highly unlikely under
current conditions.
Fils-Aime holds backing from US France and security forces but lacks constitutional legitimacy
or legislative oversight.
February 1-3 dialogue sessions described as marked by vives contestations with political actors
denouncing process as waste of time.
Collège acknowledgment of polarization and need for broader consensus reveals internal
recognition of weak political foundation.
February 09, 2026

Critical question is whether Collège can attract wider support or will be marginalized by
international community.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International stakeholders should issue coordinated statements clarifying which governance
structure receives recognition to prevent dual-authority legitimacy crisis.
Monitor for official arrete from Fils-Aime government establishing legal basis for post-CPT
authority and compare with Collège proposed framework.
Track composition announcements for both Collège commissions to assess political coalition
building and institutional capacity.
Private sector should maintain operational continuity while monitoring for policy divergence
between competing structures.
Humanitarian actors should establish clear communication channels with recognized authority
to ensure coordination on emergency response.
Diaspora organizations should pressure for unified governance structure to prevent electoral
process fragmentation.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2

The United States authorized military financing for Haiti's Forces Armees d'Haiti for the first time
since the 1990s marking a historic shift in security cooperation. Congressional authorization
came through H.R. 7148 the consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2026 signed by
President Trump on February 3, 2026. The legislation provides up to 5 million dollars through the
Foreign Military Financing Program and Peacekeeping Operations for purchase of defense
equipment and services for the Haitian Coast Guard under the Arms Export Control Act plus
non-lethal assistance and operational support for FAd'H subject to Congressional consultation.
Defense Minister Jean-Michel Moise described the funding as opening the way to a lasting
military partnership noting the FAd'H had never before received American military aid. US
Embassy defense attaches recently met with Moise to consolidate joint efforts. The funding
February 09, 2026

authorization coincides with US Coast Guard warnings that Haitian ports fail to meet
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code standards with a 90-day compliance
inspection timeline imposed in November 2025 creating potential sanctions on port operations
by approximately February-March 2026.
The military financing comes amid continued US naval presence under Operation Southern
Spear with three warships deployed in the Bay of Port-au-Prince. USS Stockdale an Arleigh
Burke-class guided-missile destroyer plus Coast Guard cutters Stone and Diligence remain on
station. Defense One confirmed the vessels arrived under Operation Southern Spear and their
images circulated widely on social media February 3 prompting widespread reaction. The US
has conducted 37 deadly strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in Caribbean and Eastern
Pacific waters since the operation began. International Crisis Group analyst Diego Da Rin
assessed the naval presence as providing the latest proof of Washington's willingness to use the
threat of force to shape politics in the Western Hemisphere.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The US suspended military assistance to Haiti in the 1990s following political instability and
human rights concerns. The FAd'H was disbanded in 1995 and reconstituted in 2017 but
remained excluded from US military financing programs until this authorization representing a
three-decade policy reversal.



## TALKING POINTS

First US military financing for FAd'H since 1990s represents major policy shift and long-term
security partnership commitment.
Five million dollar authorization split between Foreign Military Financing Program and
Peacekeeping Operations with Congressional oversight.
Funding restricted to Haitian Coast Guard equipment under Arms Export Control Act plus
non-lethal FAd'H assistance.
Authorization coincides with USCG port security compliance warnings creating potential trade
disruption if standards not met by March 2026.
Three US warships remain deployed off Port-au-Prince under Operation Southern Spear with 37
narcotics strikes conducted regionally.
ICG analysis frames naval presence as gunboat diplomacy to shape political outcomes in
Western Hemisphere.
February 09, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Defense sector stakeholders should track Congressional consultation process for FAd'H
assistance to identify scope limitations and oversight requirements.
Port operators must accelerate ISPS Code compliance measures to avoid sanctions on
maritime trade operations by March 2026 deadline.
International partners should coordinate with US on FAd'H capacity building to prevent
duplication and ensure professional standards.
Business intelligence units should assess implications of enhanced coast guard capabilities for
commercial shipping security.
Civil society should monitor non-lethal assistance implementation to ensure accountability and
human rights compliance.
Haitian government must publish transparency reports on military financing utilization to
maintain international donor confidence.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3

The Police Nationale d'Haiti launched training for its 36th class of 1,200 recruits including 239
women on February 8 at the National Police Academy in Petion-Ville representing the most
aggressive force expansion in recent history. The cohort is the second under the P4000+
program which aims to train 4,000 new officers between 2026 and early 2027 with support from
the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Canada and BINUH. The
previous 35th class designated Aurore graduated 877 officers on January 23, 2026. Prime
Minister Fils-Aime described P4000 as a strategic response to the national security emergency.
The recruitment drive occurs as PNH intensifies anti-gang operations following January 2026
drone strikes against Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier's properties in Delmas 6 Port-au-Prince. The
operation involved PNH FAd'H GSF elements the PM's task force and a private military
company destroying three houses and reportedly dislodging Cherizier from his stronghold
according to Le Monde reporting February 7. Current status and location of Cherizier remain
February 09, 2026

unconfirmed. The US maintains a 5 million dollar reward for information leading to his capture.
Le Nouvelliste reported February 6 that a well-placed source summarized the operational
posture of security forces with one word intensifier suggesting continued aggressive operations
in Port-au-Prince and potentially expanding to Artibonite.
Infrastructure improvements accompany force expansion. HaitiLibre reported February 9 the
reopening of the Port-au-Prince Airport crossroads sub-police station improving security
coverage around Toussaint Louverture Airport. Construction progress was reported on a new
Nippes departmental police station in Miragoane supported by UNDP and Japan. The
1,200-recruit class represents approximately 40 percent force expansion over 16 months when
combined with previous graduations creating significant operational capacity increase but
requiring sustained training quality and institutional absorption capability.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The PNH has struggled with chronic understaffing and equipment shortages while facing
unprecedented gang territorial control. Previous recruitment efforts achieved modest gains but
the P4000+ program represents the first systematic attempt to achieve rapid force expansion
matching the scale of the security emergency.



## TALKING POINTS

1,200 recruits in 36th class represents largest single cohort in recent PNH history with 239
women comprising 19.9 percent.
P4000+ program targets 4,000 new officers by early 2027 representing 40 percent force
expansion if fully implemented.
Training supported by US INL Canada and BINUH indicating sustained international
commitment to PNH capacity building.
Expansion coincides with intensifier operational posture against gangs following January drone
strikes on Barbecue properties.
Infrastructure improvements at Airport crossroads and Nippes signal institutional development
beyond personnel expansion.
Success depends on training quality institutional absorption and ability to prevent corruption
infiltration of new recruits.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

February 09, 2026

International partners should ensure training quality standards maintained despite accelerated
recruitment pace through embedded monitors.
PNH leadership must establish clear deployment plans for graduating classes to prevent
institutional bottlenecks and ensure operational readiness.
Security stakeholders should track Barbecue location and status as indicator of operational
effectiveness following January strikes.
Private sector should anticipate security coverage improvements in targeted areas but plan for
continued gang territorial control in unaddressed zones.
Humanitarian actors must prepare for potential displacement events if intensification extends to
Artibonite and other gang-controlled regions.
Civil society should monitor recruitment vetting processes to prevent gang infiltration and
maintain professional standards.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4

France issued a formal endorsement of Haiti's post-CPT transition on February 9, 2026
becoming the second major Western power after the US to recognize Prime Minister Fils-Aime's
authority. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement acknowledged the end of the CPT
mandate in accordance with the April 3, 2024 political accord and saluted the orderly transfer of
executive power by Laurent Saint-Cyr to the Council of Ministers. France encouraged the
government to scale up PNH and FAd'H capabilities and intensify anti-gang operations including
by mobilizing the Haitian judicial apparatus. The statement pledged continued support for
Haitian security forces and Global Security Force deployment under UNSCR 2793.
The endorsement comes as GSF deployment timelines crystallize. Special Representative Jack
Christofides assumes his post in Haiti in February 2026 with first GSF contingents expected
April 2026 and full deployment completion by October 2026. The force maintains an authorized
personnel ceiling of 5,550 with one-year initial funding approved by the Standing Group of
Partners. A critical capacity gap exists between Kenya MSS drawdown announced February 7
and GSF full operational capacity in October creating a six to eight month vulnerability window
during which security capacity will be transitioning.
February 09, 2026

Accelerating US deportation operations compound humanitarian pressures. The US repatriated
132 Haitians to Cap-Haitien on February 5 followed by 136 additional deportees on February 7
including TPS and Green Card holders with children. Haiti TPS was terminated effective
February 3, 2026 placing over 350,000 Haitian nationals at risk despite the State Department's
active Level 4 Do Not Travel advisory. DHS Secretary Noem concluded Haiti no longer meets
statutory requirements for TPS. Deportees arrive into a country where 90 percent of the capital
remains under gang control, 5.7 million face food insecurity and 1.4 million are internally
displaced.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

France maintained colonial control over Haiti until 1804 and subsequently imposed a massive
indemnity debt that shaped Haiti's economic trajectory. Contemporary French engagement
focuses on security cooperation humanitarian assistance and diplomatic coordination with the
international community on transition support.



## TALKING POINTS

France becomes second major Western power after US to formally endorse Fils-Aime
government following CPT dissolution.
French statement explicitly calls for mobilizing judicial apparatus against gang supporters
signaling expectation of legal accountability beyond military operations.
GSF deployment timeline shows April 2026 first contingents and October 2026 full deployment
creating six to eight month capacity gap.
Kenya MSS drawdown and GSF arrival not synchronized creating vulnerability window during
transition period.
268 Haitians deported February 5-7 into crisis environment with 90 percent capital gang control
and 5.7 million food insecure.
TPS termination effective February 3 places 350,000 plus at risk despite active State
Department Level 4 Do Not Travel advisory.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International community should accelerate GSF force generation to minimize capacity gap
between Kenya withdrawal and full deployment.
BINUH must serve as key coordination node between GSF PNH and international partners
February 09, 2026

during transitional security period.
Humanitarian organizations should establish reception protocols for deportees arriving at
Cap-Haitien to prevent acute distress.
Diaspora advocacy groups should document TPS termination impacts and deportation incidents
for policy pressure on US administration.
Private sector should assess workforce impacts from accelerating deportations particularly in
northern departments receiving flights.
French diplomatic channels should clarify judicial mobilization expectations and provide
technical assistance for anti-corruption prosecutions.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for US CARICOM or OAS reactions to Collège Presidentiel CPR-001 communique to
determine international recognition trajectory. Official arrete from Fils-Aime government
establishing legal basis for post-CPT authority expected with content defining executive power
framework. Security operations likely to intensify per Le Nouvelliste reporting with potential for
civilian casualties displacement events and Barbecue location confirmation. Additional US
deportation flights to Cap-Haitien probable following established pattern with public reaction
monitoring essential.



## THIS WEEK

GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides formal assumption of post in Haiti with first public
statements and coordination meetings indicating operational timeline. USCG port inspection
compliance deadline approaching with potential trade restrictions if ISPS Code standards not
met by March 2026. ULCC asset declaration enforcement for departing CPT members with
publication revealing financial accountability. Collège Presidentiel commission composition
announcements indicating political coalition strength and institutional viability. Security forces
may expand operations beyond Port-au-Prince into Artibonite based on intensification signals.
February 09, 2026



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

GSF first contingents arrive April 2026 creating initial capacity increase but full deployment
delayed until October 2026. Kenya MSS withdrawal timing unclear creating risk of security gap if
not coordinated with GSF buildup. Electoral calendar shows campaign period beginning May 19,
2026 with first round August 30, 2026 but competing governance structures create uncertainty
about which authority oversees process. France judicial mobilization call may trigger
prosecutions of gang supporters and corrupt officials altering political landscape. US military
financing implementation for FAd'H will establish partnership precedent affecting long-term
security cooperation architecture.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Government Communication Office  PM Fils-Aime national address full text February 7,
2026
France Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Official statement on CPT end and transition February 9,
2026
Vant Bef Info  Collège Presidentiel CPR-001 communique February 9, 2026
Le National  Inter-Haitian dialogue triumvirate proposal February 3, 2026
Le Nouvelliste  ULCC FAd'H dialogue and Saint-Cyr coverage February 9, 2026
Le Nouvelliste English Edition  US military financing for FAd'H February 6, 2026
GPL Media Libre  Detailed FAd'H funding report February 7, 2026
Vant Bef Info  PNH 36th promotion details 1,200 recruits February 8, 2026
HaitiLibre  Daily headlines roundup February 8-9, 2026
FANM YO DESIDE  Gender parity demands statement February 7-8, 2026
Reuters  CPT dissolution and political limbo February 7, 2026
Dominican Today  GSF April deployment timeline January 22, 2026
International Crisis Group  Gunboat diplomacy analysis February 5, 2026
Le Nouvelliste  132 deportees at Cap-Haitien February 5, 2026
HaitiLibre  PNH 35th class graduation 877 officers January 23, 2026
February 09, 2026



---

*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*