# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-06
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1](#development-1)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2](#development-2)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3](#development-3)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4](#development-4)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti enters its final 24 hours before the CPT mandate expires with no succession
framework agreed. RFI confirmed February 6 that uncertainty dominates as the CPT
contradicts its January pledge to leave and seeks continued influence. EDE party, the
seventy-plus party coalition, and multiple civil society groups categorically reject any
CPT role after tomorrow. Chatham House warns of serious doubt whether Haiti will
have a government after February 7 and identifies a vicious circle where violence
deters the international funding needed to end it. The exchange rate holds at
approximately 131 HTG per USD. No major security incidents in the last 24 hours.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT mandate expires February 7 with no agreed transition framework
Multiple domestic actors reject any CPT involvement after tomorrow
International community backs PM Fils-Aime continuing as caretaker
Chatham House warns of vicious circle blocking security funding
Exchange rate stable at 131 HTG per USD despite political crisis



## DEVELOPMENT 1

The CPT mandate expires February 7 2026 with no binding succession framework and
broad domestic rejection of continued CPT influence. RFI published a major
assessment February 6 confirming that after 22 months governing during deep crisis
the mandate arrives at its term with uncertainty dominating the post-transition
landscape. Gazette Haiti reported February 5 that with only two days remaining the
CPT actively seeks to retain a role in the new interim period. This directly contradicts
CPT co-president Leslie Voltaire's January 10 declaration in Jacmel stating the council
signed to leave and would no longer be legitimate from February 8.
Les Engages pour le Developpement issued a communique February 3 categorically
rejecting any CPT involvement after February 7 and accusing the council of having
gravely compromised the political transition by serving personal ambitions at the
expense of the people. As a signatory of the Consensus Politique pour le
Redressement National, EDE insists on a bicephalous executive with a transitional
president and prime minister excluding all CPT members. The Kongre Patriyotik pou
yon Sovtaj Nasyonal published a report February 6 proposing a concerted and
February 06, 2026

pragmatic exit. The Fanm Yo Deside women's coalition demanded an inclusive
transition before February 7 rejecting any vague prolongation of the CPT.
The international community has converged on PM Fils-Aime continuing as caretaker.
US Secretary Rubio stated January 23 the CPT must be disbanded by February 7
without corrupt actors and Fils-Aime must continue. The Atlantic Council identified
Fils-Aime as Washington's preferred pick to run the government after February 7. UN
Special Representative Ruiz Massieu stated January 20 that the Constitution allows the
PM to remain if no successor is designated. The OAS confirmed January 22 that the
mandate ends February 7 per the April 3 2024 Agreement and Article 13 prohibits
extension. CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group stated January 9 it is vital that
stakeholders reach consensus before February 7.
The fundamental impasse between the CPT seeking continued influence and broad
domestic rejection of any CPT role creates maximum political tension with less than 24
hours remaining. An RHI News editorial declared February 7 2026 marks the Great
Resignation representing the failure of the transition and capitulation of elites. The
trajectory leads to what the editorial describes as exploitation of Haitian resources to
meet strategic needs of foreign powers particularly in advanced technologies. The
window for negotiated consensus has effectively closed.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The CPT was established through the April 3 2024 Agreement following the collapse of
governance after President Moise's July 2021 assassination. The council's mandate
was explicitly time-bound to February 7 2026 with electoral preparations as the primary
objective. Article 13 of the agreement prohibits mandate extension. The current crisis
reflects the CPT's failure to organize elections or establish a viable succession
framework despite 22 months in power.



## TALKING POINTS

CPT mandate legally expires February 7 2026 per April 3 2024 Agreement
CPT seeks continued influence contradicting January pledge to leave office
EDE party seventy-plus coalition and multiple civil society groups reject CPT role
International community backs PM Fils-Aime continuing under constitutional provisions
No negotiated consensus achieved with less than 24 hours remaining
February 06, 2026

Domestic opposition challenges legitimacy of international-backed arrangement



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should issue coordinated statements February 7
recognizing PM continuation and establishing clear engagement framework
Private sector should maintain operational continuity plans assuming PM caretaker
arrangement prevails
Political actors should prioritize electoral preparation over contesting transition
mechanics
Humanitarian organizations should position resources for potential displacement if
security deteriorates during transition
Monitor for CPT member holdouts or last-minute maneuvers February 7
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2

Chatham House published a policy paper February 4 identifying Haiti's vicious circle
where funding needed to end violence does not come because of the violence itself.
The analysis expresses serious doubt on whether Haiti will have a government after
February 7 and confirms internecine battles have broken out over what should follow
the CPT specifically who can remain in power. The paper references the armada
floating just outside Port-au-Prince alongside diplomatic pressure. The core thesis
argues that beyond security restoration a push to rebuild Haiti's society and create jobs
is vital to any lasting solution.
The analysis was published alongside a January 18 Chatham House roadmap for
security and governance reform in Haiti recommending establishment of a national
strategic vision interim regulations and clarification of police army and intelligence
mandates. The vicious circle concept highlights how insecurity deters the international
investment and institutional support required to address the root causes of violence.
This creates a self-reinforcing cycle where deteriorating security prevents the economic
February 06, 2026

development and governance capacity building necessary to improve security.
The reference to an armada outside Port-au-Prince suggests significant international
military assets positioned for contingency operations. This aligns with the GSF
deployment timeline and indicates preparations for potential security escalation during
the February 7 transition. The diplomatic pressure component reflects the coordinated
US UN OAS and CARICOM position backing PM continuation and CPT dissolution.
The combination of military positioning and diplomatic coordination demonstrates
international determination to prevent governance collapse.
The emphasis on societal rebuilding and job creation represents a significant analytical
shift from pure security operations to structural development requirements. Chatham
House argues that even successful anti-gang operations will not produce lasting
stability without addressing unemployment economic opportunity and social cohesion.
This challenges the current international approach focused primarily on GSF
deployment and PNH capacity building.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Chatham House is a leading UK-based policy institute with established Haiti expertise.
The February 4 analysis builds on decades of scholarship regarding fragile states and
post-conflict reconstruction. The vicious circle concept has been applied to multiple
contexts where insecurity prevents the investment required to address insecurity
causes. The Haiti application is particularly acute given gang control of approximately
90 percent of Port-au-Prince and the collapse of basic service delivery.



## TALKING POINTS

Chatham House identifies vicious circle where violence deters funding needed to end
violence
Serious doubt expressed whether Haiti will have government after February 7
International military assets positioned outside Port-au-Prince for contingencies
Security restoration alone insufficient without economic development and job creation
Current approach focused on GSF deployment may miss structural requirements
Diplomatic pressure and military positioning demonstrate international commitment
February 06, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International financial institutions should develop economic recovery frameworks
parallel to security operations
Donor governments should commit reconstruction funding contingent on governance
stabilization
Private sector should engage with reconstruction planning to ensure commercial
viability
Political actors should integrate economic development into transition planning beyond
elections
GSF mandate should expand to include protection of economic infrastructure and job
sites
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3

Security conditions show relative stability in the last 24 hours with no major gang
attacks or incidents reported. This extends the calm since the January 31 US Embassy
alert despite Port-au-Prince remaining approximately 90 percent under gang control.
PNH conducted a January 17 drone strike targeting Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier's
residence with police spokesperson Frantz Lerebours confirming the operation
demolished his house and reduced chances of his faction re-establishing presence.
Police express hope of regaining control of the capital in the near future through
intensive operations since late December.
The GSF deployment stands at approximately 950 to 1000 personnel against an
authorized strength of 5550 with UNSOH operational deadline of April 1. The UN envoy
stated full GSF deployment should occur by summer at the latest by autumn. Eighteen
nations have committed security personnel for the force. The March through September
2025 drone operation toll reached 547 deaths including 527 suspected gang members
and 20 civilians including 11 children. UN assessment determined these operations
were likely unlawful under international human rights law.
February 06, 2026

The Artibonite region experienced a 210 percent increase in intentional homicides
between January and August 2025 with 1303 victims compared to 419 in the same
period 2024. This indicates gang expansion beyond Port-au-Prince into previously
stable agricultural zones. The Atlantic Council warned that the February 7 transition
creates a security coordination vulnerability. Since President Moise's assassination in
July 2021 Haiti has found itself mired in turmoil with largely nonfunctional government
effectively paralyzed economy and collapsing basic services.
The risk of gangs exploiting the political vacuum is elevated over the next 72 hours. The
absence of security incidents in the last 24 hours may reflect gang leadership
calculations regarding transition timing rather than improved PNH control. The GSF
deployment timeline and UNSOH operational deadline create pressure for visible
security gains during the transition period. However the force remains significantly
under strength and command structures remain unclear.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang territorial control in Port-au-Prince accelerated following President Moise's
assassination and the subsequent political vacuum. The G9 federation led by Jimmy
Cherizier consolidated control over strategic neighborhoods and critical infrastructure
including the port and fuel terminals. International security assistance collapsed after
the October 2022 UN Security Council resolution failed to authorize a multinational
force. The Kenya-led GSF represents a delayed and under-resourced response to a
security crisis that has metastasized over three years.



## TALKING POINTS

No major security incidents in last 24 hours but underlying conditions unchanged
Port-au-Prince remains 90 percent under gang control despite PNH operations
GSF deployment at 950 to 1000 personnel against authorized 5550
UNSOH operational deadline April 1 creates timeline pressure
Artibonite homicides increased 210 percent indicating regional gang expansion
February 7 transition creates elevated security coordination vulnerability



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

February 06, 2026

Security personnel should maintain maximum readiness February 7 through February
9
Businesses should implement restricted movement protocols during transition period
Humanitarian organizations should pre-position supplies assuming disrupted access
GSF command should accelerate deployment timeline ahead of April 1 deadline
Political transition actors should establish clear security coordination framework
February 7
Monitor gang activity patterns for exploitation of political vacuum
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4

TPS protections remain in place following Judge Reyes' February 2 injunction against
the Trump administration's revocation order. The Trump administration has indicated
intent to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Atlantic Council warned that US deportation
flights arriving in Cap-Haitien could overwhelm local capacity risking destabilization of
one of the country's most stable regions particularly given the vital textile sector based
there. The House passed H.R. 6504 extending HOPE and HELP programs on January
11 with Senate action still pending.
The exchange rate demonstrates remarkable stability at approximately 131 HTG per
USD despite the political crisis. The seven-day range is 130.69 to 131.21 with
twelve-month depreciation of only 0.53 percent. Trading Economics forecasts first
quarter end rate of 130.73 and twelve-month rate of 128.86. This stability persists
despite political turmoil likely supported by stable remittance flows of 4.1 billion USD
annually and BRH intervention.
Humanitarian indicators show 1.4 to 1.5 million displaced persons and approximately 2
million facing acute food insecurity. The electoral budget requires 137 million USD with
only half funded. The Atlantic Council noted that Cap-Haitien is home to Haiti's vital
textile sector which the US Congress recently voted to continue supporting. Diaspora
voting procedures remain unpublished despite CEP authorization making electoral
February 06, 2026

timelines increasingly uncertain.
The combination of TPS protection currency stability and pending HOPE HELP
extension provides relative economic continuity during political transition. However the
humanitarian crisis continues to deteriorate with displacement and food insecurity
reaching critical levels. The funding gap for electoral operations creates practical
constraints on transition timelines regardless of political agreements. The textile sector
concentration in Cap-Haitien makes that region vulnerable to deportation impacts.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

TPS was originally designated for Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake and has
been extended through successive administrations. The Trump administration's January
2026 revocation represents the first attempt to terminate protections despite ongoing
crisis conditions. HOPE and HELP trade preference programs were established to
support Haitian textile manufacturing and job creation with requirements for periodic
Congressional renewal. The gourde's stability reflects Haiti's heavy dependence on
remittances which constitute approximately 30 percent of GDP.



## TALKING POINTS

TPS injunction holds but Trump administration appealing to Supreme Court
Exchange rate stable at 131 HTG per USD despite political crisis
HOPE HELP extension passed House awaiting Senate action
Cap-Haitien textile sector vulnerable to deportation impacts
1.4 to 1.5 million displaced persons with 2 million food insecure
Electoral budget half funded creating timeline constraints



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Diaspora communities should monitor Supreme Court TPS appeal developments
Textile sector should prepare contingency plans for potential worker deportations
Private sector should maintain exchange rate hedging despite current stability
Humanitarian organizations should scale food security operations ahead of planting
season
International donors should address electoral funding gap to enable credible timeline
Political transition framework should account for resource constraints
February 06, 2026

CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

CPT formal dissolution or member holdouts on February 7 determining whether
transition occurs smoothly or contentiously. PM Fils-Aime statement declaring caretaker
status and constitutional framework establishing legal basis for ongoing governance.
Immediate international recognition from US UN OAS and CARICOM conditioning
post-transition legitimacy. Gang response to political vacuum and PNH operational
continuity during transition period. Any protest movements for or against transition
outcome indicating domestic acceptance levels. Supreme Court TPS emergency stay
application timeline affecting diaspora planning.



## THIS WEEK

Post-transition governance structure clarifying whether PM-only arrangement prevails
or new executive formation emerges. GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides
assuming post mid-February establishing international security coordination. Cabinet
continuity or reshuffling indicating political compromises reached. Security incidents or
gang exploitation attempts during transition vulnerability window. Senate HOPE HELP
action determining textile sector stability. Any CPT member statements or actions
contradicting transition outcome.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

CEP statement on feasibility of August 30 first round elections given political
uncertainty and funding constraints. GSF deployment acceleration toward April 1
UNSOH operational deadline requiring visible security gains. International donor
conference or funding commitments addressing Chatham House vicious circle analysis.
Artibonite security deterioration potentially expanding gang territorial control beyond
February 06, 2026

Port-au-Prince. Supreme Court TPS decision affecting approximately 300000 Haitian
nationals in United States. Humanitarian crisis escalation if food security and
displacement trends continue without increased assistance.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Gazette Haiti CPT Positioning Report February 5 2026
Chatham House Vicious Circle Analysis February 4 2026
Chatham House Security Governance Roadmap January 18 2026
Reuters Rubio Statement on CPT January 23 2026
Haiti Libre CPT Zapping Report February 6 2026
France24 PNH Operations Report January 17 2026
Trading Economics Haiti Exchange Rate Data February 6 2026
UN News Ruiz Massieu Statement January 20 2026
OAS General Secretariat Statement January 22 2026
UN Security Council Report Haiti Assessment January 2026
Amitiefm CARICOM EPG Statement January 9 2026
RFI Haiti Analysis February 6 2026
February 06, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*