# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-02-01
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: US Embassy Security Alert and Police Operations in Croix-des-Bouquets](#development-1-us-embassy-security-alert-and-police-operations-in-croix-des-bouquets)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: Political Dialogue Launch and February 7 Governance Transition Crisis](#development-2-political-dialogue-launch-and-february-7-governance-transition-crisis)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: CPT Internal Collapse and US Visa Sanctions Escalation](#development-3-cpt-internal-collapse-and-us-visa-sanctions-escalation)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: Humanitarian Crisis Reaches Emergency Levels with 5915 Deaths in 2025](#development-4-humanitarian-crisis-reaches-emergency-levels-with-5915-deaths-in-2025)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti enters the final week before the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires February
7 with no governance consensus reached. The US Embassy issued a security alert January 31
warning of heavy gunfire during major police operations in Croix-des-Bouquets that killed multiple
gang leaders. A critical three-day political dialogue launched February 1 in Petion-Ville to
negotiate post-transition architecture. International pressure intensifies against last-minute
government changes as five CPT members face US visa sanctions for gang links. Security and
political uncertainty converge at the most critical decision point since the 2024 gang uprising.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

US Embassy halted all personnel movements January 31 due to heavy gunfire north and south of
embassy during police anti-gang operations.
Political dialogue summit launched February 1 bringing together hundreds of actors to negotiate
governance framework for post-February 7 transition.
Five of seven CPT members now under US sanctions for alleged gang coordination and
obstruction of anti-gang efforts.
BINUH reported 5915 deaths and 2708 injuries in 2025 from gang violence with 1.3 million
internally displaced persons.
Federal court expected to rule February 2 on challenge to TPS termination affecting 350000
Haitians in the United States.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: US Embassy Security Alert and Police Operations in Croix-des-Bouquets

The United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued an urgent security alert evening January 31
warning of heavy gunfire and ongoing security operations north and south of the embassy and in
Croix-des-Bouquets. All US government personnel movements were immediately halted though
the embassy remained open for emergency services. American citizens were urged to avoid the
area and monitor local media for updates.
The alert followed a major Haiti National Police operation in Croix-des-Bouquets targeting the 400
Mawozo gang stronghold with Task Force support. The operation resulted in the killing of multiple
high-value gang leaders including Zotolan identified as second-in-command of Carrefour Marassa
gang and Ti Pikan another influential member. Security forces recovered a M16 rifle and
Kalashnikov during the operation. In response 400 Mawozo fighters launched a retaliatory attack
on Tabarre 27 causing civilian casualties and forcing residents to flee their homes.
This incident occurred against the backdrop of the PNH announcement January 31 of a
nationwide security reinforcement plan for February 2026. The force plans to deploy newly
February 01, 2026

graduated officers to priority departments including Artibonite Nord Centre Nippes and Sud-Est
and distribute armored vehicles to previously under-equipped departments. However Haitian
media noted skeptically that similar announcements have been made before without
implementation while gangs continue operations with impunity. The cycle of violence underscores
the fragility of security gains and gang capacity for immediate countermeasures even in
supposedly secured zones near diplomatic facilities.
The security environment remains severely degraded with armed gangs controlling an estimated
80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to recent UN and UNODC assessments. Gangs
exercise effective control over all access routes to the capital including maritime approaches to
main ports internal road networks linking north and south and principal land routes to the
Dominican border. This territorial dominance enables systematic extortion of commercial traffic
generating substantial gang revenue while disrupting humanitarian access and business
operations.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 400 Mawozo gang emerged as one of Haiti's most powerful criminal organizations following
the 2021 presidential assassination. The group gained international attention in October 2021
when it kidnapped 17 missionaries including children from a US-Canadian religious organization.
The gang operates primarily in Croix-des-Bouquets and controls key transportation corridors
linking Port-au-Prince to the Dominican Republic border.



## TALKING POINTS

Embassy security alert signals degraded conditions even in diplomatic zones previously
considered relatively secure.
PNH killed multiple high-value gang targets but immediate retaliation demonstrates gang
operational capacity.
Nationwide security reinforcement plan announced but credibility low given previous unfulfilled
promises.
Current violence levels cast serious doubt on August 2026 election timeline viability.
Gang territorial control at 80 to 90 percent makes humanitarian access and commercial transport
extremely hazardous.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should update security protocols and restrict non-essential movements
in Port-au-Prince metro area.
Businesses should review evacuation procedures and maintain remote management capabilities
February 01, 2026

for extended disruption scenarios.
Humanitarian actors should coordinate with PNH on security corridor availability before
dispatching convoys or field teams.
Electoral authorities should conduct realistic feasibility assessment of August timeline given
current security constraints.
Diplomatic missions should prepare contingency plans for potential evacuation or suspension of
operations if violence escalates.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: Political Dialogue Launch and February 7 Governance Transition Crisis

On February 1 CPT co-presidents Leslie Voltaire and Edgard Leblanc Fils launched a three-day
political dialogue summit at a hotel in Petion-Ville. The summit brings together hundreds of
participants from political parties religious leaders labor unions and civil society to negotiate the
post-February 7 governance architecture. Leblanc Fils emphasized the urgency of reaching a new
political accord stating it constitutes the indispensable framework for redefining national
governance and conferring a clear mandate to state authorities beyond February 7.
Under the April 3 and 4 2024 political agreement establishing the CPT Article 12.1 explicitly
states the council mandate ends February 7 2026 with Article 13 prohibiting any extension.
CPT President Leslie Voltaire confirmed January 30 that the council will leave office as
scheduled expressing confidence that political actors will reach an agreement before the
deadline. However as of February 1 no official succession mechanism has been
announced. If political actors fail to reach consensus by February 6 the UN envoy noted
that the constitution allows for the prime minister to remain in office under such
circumstances suggesting PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime could continue as caretaker executive
authority.
Multiple competing transition proposals have emerged from different political coalitions. A 70-plus
political party coalition proposed in November 2025 a one-year transition excluding current CPT
members featuring a dual executive system with transitional president and prime minister aiming
for late 2026 elections. A civil society initiative suggested in January 2026 a framework for
completing transition with choice between retaining current PM Fils-Aime or selecting civil society
February 01, 2026

figure while excluding political party members from president and PM positions to prevent
electoral bias. The Montana Accord Bureau advocated for three-member transitional presidential
council plus technocratic cabinet with oversight body to monitor government action.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated unequivocally January 23 that the CPT must be
disbanded by February 7 without corrupt individuals attempting to interfere in Haiti electoral
governance for personal benefit. The UN special envoy Carlos Ruiz warned January 22 that the
country no longer has time to waste on prolonged internal struggles. International pressure
against last-minute government changes intensified following a failed attempt by five CPT
members to dismiss PM Fils-Aime in late January which was sharply rebuked by the US State
Department.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has operated without a functioning parliament since January 2020 when legislative terms
expired without elections. President Jovenel Moise ruled by decree until his assassination in July
2021. The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 following a political
agreement brokered by CARICOM after Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned under pressure
during a February and March 2024 gang uprising. The CPT represents Haiti's fourth transitional
governance framework since 2004.



## TALKING POINTS

Political dialogue represents last opportunity to reach consensus before February 7 constitutional
deadline.
Multiple competing proposals reflect genuine ideological differences but absence of agreement
triggers governance vacuum.
PM Fils-Aime continuation as caretaker is constitutionally defensible fallback if no framework
agreed.
International community particularly United States signals zero tolerance for mandate extension
or corrupt interference.
Failure to resolve transition framework by February 6 creates institutional paralysis affecting donor
coordination and security operations.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Political actors should prioritize immediate transition consensus over perfect long-term
architecture to avoid constitutional crisis.
International organizations should prepare flexibility to work with interim authorities after February
7 while advocating for rapid legitimate framework.
February 01, 2026

Businesses should plan for continued political uncertainty through second quarter 2026 and
maintain contingency operations.
Diaspora organizations should monitor transition outcome closely as governance stability affects
deportation policies and remittance flows.
Security forces should maintain operational readiness for potential civil unrest during transition
period if consensus fails.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: CPT Internal Collapse and US Visa Sanctions Escalation

The CPT experienced a dramatic internal crisis in late January when five of seven voting
members attempted to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime just two weeks before the
council mandate expiration. On January 23 CPT members Edgard Leblanc Fils and Leslie Voltaire
held a press conference announcing the decision claiming a majority vote on January 22. The US
State Department issued a sharp rebuke late January 22 stating that retaining Fils-Aime was
crucial for Haiti anti-gang efforts and warning that politicians aligning with violent gangs would
face significant consequences.
On January 29 CPT member Smith Augustin issued a letter to his colleagues withdrawing his
support for the dismissal motion preventing Fils-Aime removal by reducing the anti-PM faction to a
minority. Augustin stated he initially supported the dismissal believing it might facilitate the
February 7 institutional transition but had reconsidered viewing further decision-making as
institutional escalation with unpredictable consequences. A subsequent attempt to remove CPT
coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr also failed when Augustin refused to participate.
On January 27 the US State Department imposed visa restrictions on two CPT members and one
cabinet minister citing their engagement in the management of gangs and other illicit groups in
Haiti and obstruction of the government anti-gang efforts. The announcement brought the total
number of CPT members under US sanctions to five. The State Department did not name the
individuals publicly but noted the restrictions applied to the officials and their immediate families.
This escalation signals growing donor frustration with transitional authorities and represents
unprecedented direct intervention in Haiti governance composition.
Three CPT members Smith Augustin Emmanuel Vertillaire and Louis Gerald Gilles face ongoing
corruption charges stemming from allegations they solicited approximately 760000 dollars in
February 01, 2026

bribes from the chairman of state-owned Banque Nationale de Credit to secure his position. The
ULCC Anti-Corruption Unit demanded prosecution in December 2024 but the Port-au-Prince
Court of Appeals suspended judicial summons in February 2025 citing presidential immunity. The
three remain in office but excluded from the six-month rotating presidency. CPT members Voltaire
and Leblanc Fils publicly criticized international interference stating everyone is seeking a Haitian
resolution to the crisis but when we begin to formulate a Haitian resolution the international
community intervenes with all its might.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was designed as a collective executive to prevent
concentration of power following the Moise assassination and Henry premiership controversies.
However the council has been plagued by internal divisions corruption allegations and
accusations of gang coordination since its April 2024 formation. Previous international sanctions
targeted individual Haitian elites for drug trafficking and gang financing but visa restrictions on
sitting transitional government members represent an escalation in external pressure tactics.



## TALKING POINTS

Five of seven voting CPT members now under US sanctions creating unprecedented legitimacy
crisis for transitional government.
Failed PM dismissal attempt demonstrates internal CPT paralysis and competing factional
interests just days before mandate expires.
Corruption charges against three members undermine public trust and justify international
skepticism of CPT governance.
US intervention in government composition reflects donor frustration but also raises questions
about Haitian sovereignty.
Internal divisions paralyze routine decision-making on director-general appointments and policy
implementation.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International donors should maintain pressure on corrupt CPT members while supporting
legitimate post-February 7 transition framework.
Political actors should prioritize clean slate approach for new executive to restore domestic and
international credibility.
Civil society organizations should document governance failures to inform institutional design of
next transition phase.
Legal authorities should preserve corruption case files for prosecution once presidential immunity
expires February 7.
February 01, 2026

Media organizations should continue investigating financial ties between CPT members and
criminal networks to inform public accountability.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: Humanitarian Crisis Reaches Emergency Levels with 5915 Deaths in 2025

The UN Integrated Office in Haiti released a devastating annual report January 30 documenting
that 5915 people were killed and 2708 injured in Haiti during 2025 due to gang violence and
security force operations. The fourth quarter alone October through December 2025 accounted
for 1523 deaths and 806 injuries. The cause breakdown for fourth quarter shows 62 percent
resulted from security force operations including private military company drone strikes 32 percent
from gang violence and 6 percent from self-defense groups and Bwa Kale movement targeting
suspected gang members.
The International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix documented 1287593
internally displaced persons representing 11 percent of Haiti population. This marks a 24 percent
increase compared to December 2024. The geographic distribution shows 77 percent displaced in
provinces outside Port-au-Prince and 23 percent in the capital with 55 percent of provincial IDPs
now originating from other rural areas rather than the capital. Most IDPs at 83 percent remain with
host families rather than in displacement sites creating enormous strain on fragile local resources.
In the 272 active displacement sites conditions are alarming with one latrine per 315 people on
average 40 percent of sites having no health services and 18 percent of sites where no children
attend school. An average of 27 women and girls experience gender-based violence daily
predominantly rapes including gang rapes. The Humanitarian Coordinator reported that children
constitute as much as 50 percent of gang membership due to forced recruitment and sexual
violence cases attended have tripled since 2021.
Food security conditions remain critical with 5.7 million people suffering from severe food
insecurity placing Haiti among the six largest hunger hotspots globally. Emergency IPC Phase 4
conditions persist in Port-au-Prince and IDP areas with 3.0 to 3.49 million people requiring food
assistance through July 2026. An estimated 277000 children suffer from acute malnutrition. The
UN launched an 880 million dollar humanitarian appeal December 17 2025 to assist 4.2 million
vulnerable people focusing on urgent multisectoral interventions in West Centre and Artibonite
departments where armed violence generates severe needs.
February 01, 2026



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti humanitarian crisis has progressively worsened since the 2021 presidential assassination
and 2022 gang territorial expansion. The situation accelerated dramatically following the February
and March 2024 gang uprising that forced PM Henry resignation and triggered mass
displacement from Port-au-Prince. Previous humanitarian emergencies in Haiti including the 2010
earthquake and 2016 Hurricane Matthew generated international response but current crisis
occurs amid declining global humanitarian funding and donor fatigue with protracted crises.



## TALKING POINTS

Nearly 6000 deaths in 2025 represents significant escalation in violence compared to previous
years with security operations causing majority of casualties.
1.3 million displaced persons constitute 11 percent of national population creating massive
humanitarian burden on host communities.
Displacement site conditions with 1 latrine per 315 people risk cholera and disease outbreaks
especially approaching rainy season.
83 percent of IDPs living with host families exhausts social support networks and creates
secondary displacement risk.
880 million dollar humanitarian appeal unlikely fully funded given global funding constraints and
competing crises.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should prioritize WASH interventions in displacement sites to prevent
disease outbreaks before rainy season.
Protection actors should scale gender-based violence response given 27 daily incidents and
tripling of cases since 2021.
Education partners should establish temporary learning spaces in 18 percent of sites where
children have no school access.
Food security programs should expand coverage given 5.7 million facing severe food insecurity
and malnutrition affecting 277000 children.
Donors should frontload funding to humanitarian appeal recognizing February through June as
critical period before potential security improvements.
CONFIDENCE
February 01, 2026

High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

US federal court ruling expected February 2 on challenge to TPS termination affecting 350000
Haitians with major implications for remittance flows and deportation risk. Political dialogue
summit concludes February 3 requiring monitoring for consensus framework or collapse without
agreement on post-February 7 governance. CPT members may attempt final policy decisions or
director-general appointments before mandate expires creating potential for last-minute
controversial actions. PNH nationwide security reinforcement deployments announced for
February require verification of actual implementation versus previous unfulfilled promises.



## THIS WEEK

February 7 CPT mandate expiration represents most critical decision point requiring identification
of who addresses nation and whether formal dissolution ceremony occurs. PM Fils-Aime
continuation as caretaker or new executive framework implementation determines governance
stability for coming months. International donor response to post-February 7 government affects
recognition sanctions relief and funding commitments. Gang strategic response to political
transition period could include violence escalation to exploit uncertainty or negotiations if major
leaders genuinely pursue dialogue as International Crisis Group reported.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

GSF Gang Suppression Force deployment progress with Special Representative Jack
Christofides assuming post mid-February and first April contingent arrivals determining force
generation timeline. Electoral calendar May 19 campaign launch deadline approaches requiring
CEP decision to proceed postpone or admit infeasibility given security constraints. Food security
trajectory into April through May lean season with Artibonite Department planting and harvest
subject to gang interference. Humanitarian funding gap for 880 million dollar appeal affecting
program sustainability and potential for hot meal suspension expansion and deeper ration cuts if
WFP 94 million dollar shortfall persists.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

US Embassy Port-au-Prince security alert January 31 2026
TripFoumi Haiti covering Croix-des-Bouquets police operation January 31 2026
Le Nouvelliste coverage of political dialogue launch February 1 2026
OCHA 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan December 17 2025
February 01, 2026

PBS coverage of CPT internal crisis January 23 2026
Vant Bef Info reporting PNH security reinforcement plan January 31 2026
IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 10 mid-2025
UNODC organized crime and gang violence explainer January 2026
US State Department sanctions announcement January 27 2026
Reuters reporting on UN envoy statements January 22 2026
ACLED Haiti violence analysis January 2026
International Crisis Group panel discussion January 29 2026
February 01, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*