================================================================================ AYITI INTEL - DAILY Date: 2026-01-25 | Language: EN ================================================================================ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ----------------- Haiti's constitutional crisis remains in procedural deadlock as the five CPT members who voted January 21 to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime failed to publish the resolution in Le Moniteur, rendering it legally void. Fils-Aime and CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr appeared together January 23 at the graduation of 877 new police officers, projecting executive unity and securing U.S. backing. Political parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL demanded the CPT depart February 7 as agreed under the April 2024 transition framework. Kenya deployed 217 additional police officers January 18, bringing total MSS personnel to 1,200, but GSF full deployment slipped to October 2026. The gourde held at 132-133 HTG per USD with no major security incidents in the last 24 hours. QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS ------------------------------ CPT dismissal resolution unpublished in Le Moniteur, creating legal stalemate with 13 days until mandate expires February 7. Fils-Aime and Saint-Cyr joint appearance at police graduation signals executive coordination and U.S. support. 877 new PNH officers graduated under P4000 program, first cohort of planned 4,000 by early 2027. Kenya reinforced Haiti deployment to 1,200 personnel but GSF timeline delayed to April for next contingents. Political parties demand CPT departure February 7 with no successor framework proposed. DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT DISMISSAL RESOLUTION REMAINS UNPUBLISHED AS FILS-AIME AND SAINT-CYR -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Project Executive Unity The standoff between Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime and five CPT members attempting his dismissal entered a procedural stalemate as the January 21 resolution remained unpublished in Le Moniteur, the official gazette required for legal validity. Without publication, the dismissal lacks force, effectively freezing the crisis in limbo. The five members, Fritz Alphonse Jean, Leslie Voltaire, Louis Gerald Gilles, Edgard Leblanc Fils, and Smith Augustin, made no public statements in the last 24 hours, suggesting internal disagreement or strategic delay. Against this backdrop, Fils-Aime and CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr appeared together January 23 at the National Police Academy graduation ceremony for 877 new officers, the first cohort of the P4000 program aiming to train 4,000 police by early 2027. The joint appearance constituted a tacit endorsement of the Prime Minister's legitimacy and signaled executive coordination. Saint-Cyr's remarks carried unmistakable political subtext, stating the majority is not two, three, or five people but the people, and that interests of the majority are security. The January 25, 2026 reference to five people appeared to directly rebuke the CPT members who signed the dismissal resolution. Saint-Cyr urged national security forces to remain fully mobilized against any attempt at destabilization and to serve the law, the Republic, and the people, not politics. The language framed the dismissal effort as political destabilization and positioned security force loyalty with institutional continuity. Fils-Aime reinforced executive authority, stating the State is no longer backing down and is fully assuming its mission. U.S. Charge d'Affaires Henry Wooster attended and reaffirmed Haiti's security and stability as Washington's top priority. The coordinated messaging from Saint-Cyr, Fils-Aime, and Wooster created institutional solidarity aimed at undermining the five CPT members' legitimacy. Political pressure on the CPT mounted from multiple directions. On January 25, UNIR published a statement demanding CPT departure February 7 in accordance with the April 3, 2024 transition agreement. Secretary General Remy Junior Moschino emphasized 2026 is dedicated to elections which must be held according to constitutional provisions. The FNC party made similar demands January 20, specifying CPT must leave February 6 at 11:59 PM, while OPL called for unconditional departure of all transitional authorities. The Compromis Historique party publicly disavowed Smith Augustin January 21 despite his signature on the dismissal resolution. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ------------------ The April 3, 2024 transition agreement established the CPT with a mandate expiring February 7, 2026, creating a 13-day window for either formalizing PM dismissal, negotiating succession, or allowing institutional vacuum. Constitutional provisions permit a Prime Minister to continue during transitions if no successor is appointed, strengthening Fils-Aime's position. TALKING POINTS -------------- Five CPT members failed to publish dismissal resolution in Le Moniteur, rendering it legally void. Joint Fils-Aime and Saint-Cyr appearance at police graduation demonstrated executive unity and U.S. backing. Saint-Cyr's statement that majority is the people directly rebuked five-member CPT faction. UNIR, FNC, and OPL parties demand CPT departure February 7 with no proposed successor framework. Compromis Historique party disavowed Smith Augustin despite his dismissal resolution signature. 13 days remain until CPT mandate expires February 7, 2026. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS --------------------- January 25, 2026 International organizations should prepare for three scenarios: CPT publishing dismissal and triggering U.S. sanctions, CPT dissolving February 7 with governance vacuum, or negotiated transition framework in next 13 days. Businesses should maintain contingency plans for political instability and monitor whether dismissal resolution is published by end of January. Diplomatic actors should engage Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime to support negotiated post-February 7 framework preventing institutional vacuum. Humanitarian organizations should position resources anticipating potential governance disruption and security deterioration after February 7. Diaspora networks should monitor developments closely given TPS termination February 3 and political crisis convergence. CONFIDENCE High confidence based on official institutional reporting. DEVELOPMENT 2: KENYA REINFORCES DEPLOYMENT TO 1,200 PERSONNEL AS GSF TIMELINE SLIPS AND --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PNH Graduates 877 Officers Kenya deployed an additional 217 police officers to Haiti on January 18, bringing total Multinational Security Support personnel to approximately 1,200. The deployment represents Kenya's ongoing commitment as lead contributor to the UN-backed mission but underscores sluggish international force generation. The UN Security Council authorized the Gang Suppression Force on September 30, 2025, with a mandate for up to 5,550 personnel, yet only 1,200 are deployed four months later. GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides announced January 22 that first new contingents beyond Kenya will not arrive until April 2026, with full deployment projected by October 2026, leaving Haiti's security forces undermanned during the critical February transition period. The 877 new PNH officers graduated January 23 represent the largest single-class addition in recent years and first tangible output of the P4000 program. However, effectiveness remains uncertain as officers completed only four months of training, a compressed timeline compared to standard police academies, and will deploy into gang-controlled zones where PNH operations killed 50 civilians and displaced 5,800 people since January 1. PNH Director General Andre Jonas Vladimir Paraison told graduates their mission is to combat armed groups, reconquer lost territories, and allow populations to return home. PNH operations continued throughout January with tactical gains but mounting civilian casualties. January 25, 2026 Between January 1-18, PNH seized 25 firearms and 14,269 cartridges and arrested three traffickers. A January 20-21 operation in Bercy killed six gang members, while a January 14 strike targeted the Delmas 6 stronghold of Viv Ansanm leader Jimmy Cherizier. PNH spokesperson Frantz Lerebours stated operations achieved a net halt in new territorial takeover by gangs and demolished Cherizier's home, reducing chances of his faction re-establishing in the area. However, security force actions killed 50 civilians and displaced 5,800 people from Port-au-Prince neighborhoods since January 1. The GSF remains severely underfunded with the UN trust fund holding only 113 million USD of 800 million needed annually, and no new donations received since August 2025. The United States contributed just 15 million to the trust fund while Canada provided 63 million. BINUH head Carlos Ruiz Massieu warned January 21 that security gains remain fragile and risk reversal without sustained pressure and basic service delivery. Gangs still control 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince despite parts of downtown, Champ de Mars, Delmas 19, and Nazon shifting from gang-controlled to contested status. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ------------------ The P4000 program launched in 2025 aims to add 4,000 police officers by early 2027 to address PNH personnel gaps. The GSF mandate replaced the Kenya-led MSS mission structure in September 2025 but maintained Kenya as primary contributor. Between March and September 2025, Vectus Global drone operations killed 547 people including 20 civilians and 11 children, prompting UN criticism of likely unlawful strikes. TALKING POINTS -------------- Kenya deployed 217 additional officers January 18, bringing MSS total to 1,200 of 5,550 authorized. GSF timeline slipped with next contingents delayed to April and full deployment to October 2026. 877 PNH officers graduated January 23, largest single class and first P4000 cohort. Officers completed compressed four-month training and deploy into zones where PNH killed 50 civilians since January 1. PNH operations seized 25 firearms and 14,269 cartridges between January 1-18. GSF underfunded at 113 million of 800 million annually with no donations since August 2025. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS --------------------- International donors should prioritize GSF funding to accelerate deployment timeline and prevent February security vacuum. Businesses should assess operational security based on 877 new officers providing marginal January 25, 2026 improvement, not transformational change. Humanitarian organizations should prepare for potential civilian casualty increases as new officers deploy to contested zones. Political actors should recognize security gains remain fragile and gang control persists over 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince. Diaspora networks should account for limited security improvements when advising family members on movement and safety. CONFIDENCE High confidence based on official institutional reporting. DEVELOPMENT 3: POLITICAL PARTIES DEMAND CPT DEPARTURE FEBRUARY 7 WITH NO SUCCESSOR ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Framework Proposed Political parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL publicly demanded CPT departure February 7, 2026, in accordance with the April 3, 2024 transition agreement, intensifying pressure on the transitional council with 13 days remaining in its mandate. On January 25, UNIR Secretary General Remy Junior Moschino emphasized 2026 is dedicated to elections which must imperatively be held according to constitutional provisions, calling on all actors to demonstrate responsibility and maturity to avoid institutional vacuum or legitimacy conflict at the top of the State. The statement positioned UNIR as defending the transition timeline against CPT attempts to extend its mandate or create governance disruption through the PM dismissal effort. The FNC party made similar demands January 20, specifying CPT must leave February 6 at 11:59 PM, using precise timing to emphasize the legal deadline. OPL called for unconditional departure of all transitional authorities, suggesting a complete reset of the transition framework rather than selective retention of CPT or PM. The coordinated demands from three major political parties signal growing domestic pressure on the CPT beyond international sanctions threats, creating a two-front challenge for the five members who signed the dismissal resolution. Notably, no political party has proposed a concrete successor framework or post-February 7 governance structure. UNIR, FNC, and OPL articulated departure demands but offered no roadmap for constitutional succession, electoral timeline implementation, or interim authority designation. The Compromis Historique party publicly disavowed Smith Augustin January 21 despite his CPT membership and dismissal resolution signature, demonstrating internal party rejection of his actions. The disavowal weakened the five-member coalition by removing one member's party backing, potentially pressuring Augustin to withdraw support for the dismissal January 25, 2026 effort. The operational implications are stark. With 13 days until mandate expiration and no successor framework proposed, Haiti faces three scenarios: CPT publishes dismissal resolution and attempts new PM installation risking U.S. sanctions and PNH resistance, CPT dissolves February 7 with governance vacuum leaving only Fils-Aime's cabinet under constitutional continuity provisions, or political actors negotiate post-February 7 framework in remaining time. The third scenario appears most viable given Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime's demonstration of executive functionality and international backing at the police graduation, positioning them to anchor a negotiated solution. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ------------------ The April 3, 2024 transition agreement established the CPT as a nine-member body with a mandate through February 7, 2026, tasked with appointing a Prime Minister and enabling electoral conditions. The agreement did not specify post-mandate succession mechanisms or CPT renewal procedures, creating the current institutional ambiguity. Constitutional provisions allow a Prime Minister to continue during transitions if no successor is appointed, potentially enabling Fils-Aime to remain even if CPT dissolves. TALKING POINTS -------------- UNIR published statement January 25 demanding CPT depart February 7 per April 2024 transition agreement. FNC specified departure deadline as February 6 at 11:59 PM while OPL demanded unconditional departure of all authorities. No political party proposed successor framework or post-February 7 governance structure. Compromis Historique disavowed Smith Augustin despite his CPT membership and dismissal signature. 13 days remain until CPT mandate expires with three scenarios possible. Constitutional provisions may allow Fils-Aime to continue as PM even if CPT dissolves. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS --------------------- International organizations should engage political parties to develop concrete post-February 7 framework before deadline. Businesses should prepare for governance uncertainty after February 7 regardless of dismissal resolution outcome. Political actors should initiate national dialogue urgently to negotiate succession mechanism and prevent institutional vacuum. January 25, 2026 Diplomatic missions should coordinate messaging supporting negotiated solution over unilateral CPT or PM actions. Electoral authorities should clarify timeline feasibility given 23 communes remain under gang control rendering CEP operations impossible. CONFIDENCE High confidence based on official institutional reporting. DEVELOPMENT 4: TPS TERMINATION FEBRUARY 3 THREATENS 340,000 HAITIANS AS POLITICAL CRISIS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Converges with Deportation Risk Temporary Protected Status for Haitians terminates February 3, 2026, threatening 340,000 to 353,000 Haitians in the United States with loss of legal status in nine days. Mass deportations could follow, destabilizing Haiti further by overwhelming an already fragile state with returnees amid the CPT-PM crisis, gang control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince, and airport access limitations. The timing creates a triple convergence: TPS termination February 3, CPT mandate expiration February 7, and limited U.S. carrier access through the FAA ban extending to March 7, compressing multiple crisis vectors into a four-day window. Remittance flows totaling 4.9 billion USD annually and representing 21.4 percent of GDP could face disruption as 62.8 percent originates from the United States. Political crisis combined with TPS termination may reduce flows as deported Haitians lose income sources and remaining diaspora members reduce transfers amid economic uncertainty. The 5.7 million Haitians facing acute food insecurity, including 1.9 million in emergency phase, depend heavily on remittances for survival, making any disruption immediately life-threatening for vulnerable populations. Return constraints compound the humanitarian challenge. Airport access remains limited to Cap-Haitien for international flights as Toussaint Louverture International Airport faces FAA restrictions through March 7 and JetBlue suspensions through April. Gang control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince makes return dangerous for deportees with no safe housing, employment, or family support networks. Haiti government preparedness for deportee influx appears minimal given current political instability and institutional paralysis from the CPT-PM standoff. The operational timeline presents acute pressure. TPS terminates in nine days, requiring immediate U.S. enforcement decisions on detention, processing, and deportation implementation. Haiti has 13 days until CPT mandate expires, potentially creating governance vacuum coinciding January 25, 2026 with deportee arrivals. The convergence of these deadlines creates maximum institutional stress at precisely the moment Haiti is least capable of managing humanitarian, political, and security challenges simultaneously. Business associations and chambers of commerce issued January 23 statement citing grave concern over political instability as primary business climate threat, reflecting private sector awareness of cascading risks. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ------------------ TPS was granted to Haitians following the 2010 earthquake and extended multiple times based on ongoing extraordinary conditions including political instability, gang violence, and natural disasters. The February 3 termination represents the Trump administration's policy shift on TPS designations. The 340,000 to 353,000 affected Haitians represent one of the largest TPS populations, and deportations at this scale would constitute the largest forced return in Haitian history. TALKING POINTS -------------- TPS terminates February 3, affecting 340,000 to 353,000 Haitians with loss of legal status in nine days. Termination coincides with CPT mandate expiration February 7, creating four-day convergence of political and humanitarian crises. Remittances of 4.9 billion annually and 21.4 percent of GDP at risk as 62.8 percent originates from United States. 5.7 million Haitians face acute food insecurity with 1.9 million in emergency phase dependent on remittances. Airport access limited to Cap-Haitien with Port-au-Prince restrictions through March 7. Gang control of 80-90 percent of capital makes return dangerous with no safe housing or support networks. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS --------------------- International organizations should coordinate with U.S. authorities on phased deportation timeline to prevent overwhelming Haiti's capacity. Humanitarian agencies should pre-position resources for deportee reception and immediate assistance at Cap-Haitien and potential Port-au-Prince arrivals. Businesses should assess remittance flow disruption impacts on consumer purchasing power and economic activity. Diaspora networks should provide urgent legal guidance to affected TPS holders on extension applications and alternative status options. Haitian government should establish deportee reception protocols despite political crisis to January 25, 2026 manage humanitarian response. Diplomatic missions should advocate for TPS extension or phased implementation given convergence with political transition. CONFIDENCE High confidence based on official institutional reporting. WHAT TO WATCH NEXT ------------------ NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS ------------------- CPT dismissal resolution publication in Le Moniteur would formalize PM dismissal and trigger U.S. sanctions response within hours. BINUH mandate renewal vote by Security Council deadline January 31 determines political mission continuity through February transition. U.S. State Department sanctions designation announcement targeting Fritz Jean, Leslie Voltaire, or other CPT members under Global Magnitsky or Haiti-specific authorities. Gourde exchange rate movement beyond 134 HTG per USD signals capital flight or confidence collapse. PNH deployment assignments for 877 new officers to contested zones with potential for immediate gang confrontations. THIS WEEK --------- Political party mobilization for protests or demonstrations ahead of February 7 deadline as UNIR, FNC, and OPL pressure intensifies. National dialogue outcome announcement if CPT reaches consensus on post-February 7 framework or admits failure. Kenyan police operations using January 18 reinforcements to expand territorial control or secure key infrastructure. Gang retaliatory attacks against PNH, GSF, or civilian targets in Bercy, Champ de Mars, or Delmas areas. TPS enforcement actions beginning February 3 with U.S. detention and processing capacity tests. STRATEGIC HORIZON ----------------- January 25, 2026 February 7 CPT mandate expiration creating governance scenarios: published dismissal with sanctions, dissolution with vacuum, or negotiated framework. GSF deployment acceleration or continued delay beyond April timeline affecting security force adequacy during transition. Electoral timeline implementation challenges given 23 communes under gang control rendering CEP operations impossible. Humanitarian funding gaps threatening WFP operations requiring 44 million through April and 880 million Humanitarian Response Plan severely underfunded. Private sector confidence deterioration if political crisis extends beyond February with business association warnings of grave concern materializing. PRIMARY SOURCES --------------- 3. Haiti Libre, Police graduation ceremony for 877 officers, January 23, 2026 5. Vant Bef Info, FNC demands CPT departure February 6, January 20, 2026 6. Reuters, UN-backed force Haiti deployment timeline, January 22, 2026 7. InAfrika, Kenya police deployment 217 officers, January 18, 2026 8. Anadolu Agency, Kenya Haiti deployment update, January 18, 2026 12. VisaHQ, Trump administration TPS termination February 2026, November 2025 4. Le National, PNH operations and civilian casualties, January 2026 10. Haiti Info Project X account, PNH operations Delmas 6, January 17, 2026 11. UN Security Council Report, Haiti monthly forecast, January 2026 17. UN Haiti, Humanitarian Response Plan launch 880 million, December 2025 18. ReliefWeb, SRSG BINUH briefing Security Council, January 21, 2026 1. Rezonodwes, Haiti constitutional crisis update, January 25, 2026 January 25, 2026 ================================================================================ Exported: 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC ================================================================================