# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-22
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: Late on January 21, several members of the Transitional Presidential Council](#development-1-late-on-january-21,-several-members-of-the-transitional-presidential-council)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: Police Nationale d'Haiti operations in the Bercy area between Cabaret and](#development-2-police-nationale-d'haiti-operations-in-the-bercy-area-between-cabaret-and)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: The Gang Suppression Force authorized under UNSC Resolution 2793](#development-3-the-gang-suppression-force-authorized-under-unsc-resolution-2793)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: Haiti's 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks 880 million dollars to assist](#development-4-haiti's-2026-humanitarian-response-plan-seeks-880-million-dollars-to-assist)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's transition framework faced its most severe test in the last 24 hours when multiple CPT
members attempted to revoke Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime, only to be blocked by an
explicit U.S. warning of sanctions against destabilizing actors. The failed institutional coup
exposes deep fractures within the transition authority just days before the February 7 deadline.
Simultaneously, PNH operations in the Bercy-Arcahaie corridor and central Port-au-Prince
generated approximately 6,000 new displacements since January 6, straining humanitarian
systems already operating at 10 percent hospital capacity. Gang territorial control remains at
80-90 percent of the capital while international security force deployment lags at 1,000 personnel
against a 5,500 target.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

U.S. government issued direct threat of action against CPT members supporting PM removal
attempt
PNH operations in Bercy and downtown Port-au-Prince continue with heavy equipment and drone
strikes
Approximately 6,000 newly displaced in capital since January 6 amid intensified security sweeps
RN1 remains impassable at multiple points between Port-au-Prince and Artibonite
GSF force strength remains at approximately 1,000 troops with full deployment pushed to summer
2026



## DEVELOPMENT 1: Late on January 21, several members of the Transitional Presidential Council

drafted and signed a resolution to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime. Initially five
members reportedly signed the document, but at least one later withdrew support, preventing
formation of a working majority. Laurent Saint-Cyr, serving as CPT coordinator, actively opposed
the maneuver and circulated a letter to council members warning that any attempt to destabilize
government composition so close to critical transition deadlines would undermine the entire
democratic process. The attempted removal collapsed within hours after the U.S. Embassy issued
an unusually direct public statement warning that anyone supporting government changes at this
stage would be acting against American interests and that Washington would act accordingly.
The U.S. intervention represents an unprecedented level of explicit pressure on Haitian political
actors. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau reinforced the message through both social
media and press briefings, framing any governmental change as inherently favoring gang
interests. The warning carries implicit threat of visa restrictions and potential sanctions-style
measures against individual CPT members, raising personal stakes for Haitian politicians
considering institutional maneuvers. This external veto power over elite decisions demonstrates
the degree to which Haiti's transition architecture now depends on international guarantees rather
January 22, 2026

than domestic political consensus.
The immediate crisis has been contained but underlying tensions within the CPT remain
unresolved. Multiple political coalitions continue to advance competing proposals for post-deadline
governance structures, including COPPOS-Haiti's framework for a 24-month extended transition
with bicephalous executive and the Civil Society Initiative's argument that the CPT has failed its
mandate and cannot legally extend itself. These divergent visions create significant uncertainty for
institutional continuity beyond the deadline, with no mechanism yet established for resolving
fundamental disagreements about transition architecture.
For operational actors, the failed PM removal attempt signals that basic government structures
will likely persist through the immediate deadline period due to external pressure, but domestic
legitimacy of those structures remains contested. International organizations and businesses
should prepare for scenarios ranging from contested authority claims to informal power-sharing
arrangements that preserve functional ministries while political elites negotiate broader transition
frameworks. The U.S. warning also clarifies that visa restrictions and sanctions remain active tools
for shaping Haitian political behavior, increasing unpredictability in elite decision-making.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established through the April 3, 2024 political accord as
a collective presidency mechanism to guide Haiti toward elections after the 2021 assassination of
President Jovenel Moise and subsequent institutional breakdown. The original accord specified
term limits but left ambiguity about extension conditions, creating current disputes over mandate
legitimacy.



## TALKING POINTS

CPT internal divisions nearly produced government collapse within 24 hours before U.S.
intervention
Washington has demonstrated willingness to use explicit sanctions threats as real-time political
leverage
Multiple Haitian coalitions advance incompatible proposals for governance beyond transition
deadline
No consensus mechanism exists for resolving fundamental disagreements about transition
extension
International community privileges institutional continuity over strict constitutional compliance
Personal sanctions risk now factors directly into Haitian elite political calculations
January 22, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Maintain contingency plans for contested government authority after deadline with multiple
claimants to legitimacy
Monitor visa restriction announcements as leading indicator of U.S. pressure on specific political
actors
Engage multiple political coalition representatives simultaneously to avoid backing single
transition framework
Prepare flexible contractual language for government agreements that accommodate interim
authority structures
Establish clear organizational protocols for validating state signature authority in contested
scenarios
Brief staff on likelihood of parallel governance claims and procedures for navigating institutional
ambiguity
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: Police Nationale d'Haiti operations in the Bercy area between Cabaret and

Arcahaie along Route Nationale 1 have continued for more than two weeks with sustained
clashes against Canaan-based gangs attempting to expand territorial control toward Arcahaie. On
the night of January 20-21, PNH forces supported by government task force units and
international security partners conducted operations that killed six alleged gang members and
seized weapons and ammunition. Despite operations beginning January 4, security assessments
indicate the Bercy corridor has not been fully secured and civilian return remains impossible due
to ongoing combat. The broader RN1 corridor faces multiple simultaneous threats including
community self-defense blockades near Saint-Marc and gang attacks around Montrouis that
displaced approximately 1,120 people.
The strategic importance of the Bercy-Arcahaie segment stems from its position as the primary
land route connecting Port-au-Prince to northern Haiti including Cap-Haitien and the Artibonite
agricultural heartland. Gang control of this corridor enables systematic extortion of commercial
traffic while cutting humanitarian access to violence-affected populations in Lower Artibonite and
Central Plateau. The prolonged PNH campaign indicates significant gang defensive capabilities
and suggests that even with international support, Haitian security forces lack the strength to
rapidly clear and hold contested territory. Operations have generated localized tactical gains but
have not fundamentally altered the security calculus for road movements.
January 22, 2026

Simultaneously with Bercy operations, PNH has intensified activities in central Port-au-Prince
neighborhoods including Bel-Air, La Saline, Delmas 2/4/6, and areas near the administrative
center. These operations employ explosive-laden drones, heavy demolition equipment, and
armored vehicles in sustained sweeps through previously inaccessible gang strongholds. Security
officials claim to have downgraded portions of downtown from red to orange security status, but
operations have generated approximately 6,000 new internally displaced persons since January 6
according to IOM and OCHA. Health services have been severely disrupted, with Medecins Sans
Frontieres suspending activities in Bel-Air after facilities were caught in crossfire and an
ex-volunteer was killed.
The tactical pattern emerging from both Bercy and Port-au-Prince operations shows that PNH can
achieve temporary territorial gains when supported by GSF personnel and private security
contractors, but lacks capacity to establish sustained presence and civilian authority in cleared
areas. Each operation generates displacement that strains humanitarian systems already
operating at severe resource constraints, with only approximately 10 percent of hospital-capacity
health facilities fully operational. For operational planning, this indicates that RN1 will remain a
high-risk corridor unsuitable for routine commercial or humanitarian movement until security
forces can demonstrate ability to hold cleared territory rather than simply conducting kinetic
sweeps.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Route Nationale 1 serves as Haiti's primary north-south arterial road connecting the capital to
breadbasket regions and second-tier cities. Gang expansion from Port-au-Prince metropolitan
area into surrounding corridors accelerated sharply in 2024-2025 as armed groups sought to
control revenue-generating checkpoints and expand territorial influence beyond saturated urban
zones.



## TALKING POINTS

PNH operations in Bercy ongoing since January 4 without achieving territorial control sufficient for
civilian return
RN1 remains impassable at multiple points due to gang activity and community blockades
Approximately 6,000 new IDPs generated in Port-au-Prince since January 6 from intensified
security operations
Downtown operations employ heavy weapons and drones but lack follow-on civilian authority
establishment
Medecins Sans Frontieres suspended Bel-Air activities after crossfire incident killed ex-volunteer
Only 10 percent of hospital-capacity health facilities fully operational amid displacement surge
January 22, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Designate RN1 as non-permissive for routine staff movements and commercial traffic until
sustained security improvements demonstrated
Route all northern Haiti access through Cap-Haitien aviation gateway or maritime options where
feasible
Maintain at least 30-day supply buffers in Port-au-Prince and regional hubs to account for
unpredictable corridor closures
Develop contingency plans for rapid facility evacuation if security operations approach
organizational compounds
Engage PNH and GSF for advance notification of planned operations near humanitarian sites
Prepare displacement response capacity for potential additional surges if operations expand to
other gang-held zones
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: The Gang Suppression Force authorized under UNSC Resolution 2793

currently deploys approximately 1,000 personnel, primarily Kenyan police officers who arrived in
multiple rotations between June 2024 and December 2025. On January 22, UN Special Envoy
Carlos Ruiz-Massieu announced that additional contingents are expected to arrive by April 2026,
with the force projected to reach full authorized strength of 5,500 troops by summer or autumn
2026, contingent on sustained funding and contributing country commitments. The GSF mission
concept focuses on intelligence-led counter-gang operations, protection of critical infrastructure
including airport and port facilities, and securing humanitarian corridors in support of PNH and
Armed Forces of Haiti operations.
The six-month gap between current deployment and projected full strength creates a critical
vulnerability window during which gang territorial control is unlikely to be fundamentally
challenged. Current GSF numbers remain insufficient to conduct sustained operations beyond
Port-au-Prince and immediate priority corridors, forcing reliance on episodic PNH sweeps rather
than establishment of permanent security presence in contested areas. The Kenyan contingent
has gained operational experience since mid-2024 but faces persistent questions about mandate
sustainability given limited troop rotation capacity and dependence on external funding that has
chronically underperformed donor commitments.
January 22, 2026

International security support architecture combines the UN-authorized GSF with bilateral
advisory support from the United States and other partners, creating complex coordination
requirements and potential gaps in operational unity. The GSF operates under a support mandate
rather than full peacekeeping authorities, limiting its ability to independently conduct certain
enforcement actions. This constrains operational flexibility and creates dependencies on PNH
decision-making that may not always align with international priorities. The delayed force
generation also raises questions about whether the planned August 30, 2026 first-round election
date remains realistic given security prerequisites for nationwide voter registration and polling
station operations.
For planning purposes, stakeholders should assume that security environment improvements
before mid-2026 will be limited to specific geographic zones where GSF and PNH concentrate
resources, primarily downtown Port-au-Prince, airport surroundings, and select arterial routes.
Gang territorial control will likely remain near current levels across most of the capital and Lower
Artibonite until force strength reaches levels sufficient for simultaneous operations in multiple
contested zones. The summer 2026 timeline for full deployment also suggests that any significant
security dividends from the international intervention will not materialize until the second half of
the year at earliest.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Kenya led the Multinational Security Support Mission beginning June 2024 after months of delay
due to legal challenges and funding negotiations. The September 2025 UNSC authorization
transformed the mission into the Gang Suppression Force with enhanced mandate but
maintained Kenya as principal contributor and did not convert it to a traditional UN peacekeeping
operation.



## TALKING POINTS

GSF currently deploys approximately 1,000 personnel against authorized ceiling of 5,500 troops
Full force strength projected for summer-autumn 2026 pending funding and troop contributions
Under-strength deployment limits GSF to priority corridors and critical infrastructure protection
Current force levels insufficient to fundamentally challenge gang territorial control beyond
localized operations
Kenyan contingent faces sustainability questions given rotation requirements and funding
dependencies
Security environment unlikely to support nationwide electoral operations before substantial force
increases
January 22, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Plan security budgets and risk assessments assuming current high-threat environment continues
through at least mid-2026
Concentrate field operations in zones with established GSF presence rather than expecting broad
security improvements
Monitor force generation announcements from contributing countries as leading indicator of
deployment acceleration
Engage BINUH and GSF command on humanitarian corridor prioritization to align operational
plans
Prepare contingency scenarios for electoral timeline adjustments if security conditions remain
non-permissive
Factor delayed security improvements into annual program design and avoid over-optimistic
planning assumptions
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: Haiti's 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks 880 million dollars to assist

4.2 million of 6.4 million people in need, representing over half the national population. The plan
prioritizes West, Centre, and Artibonite departments where violence directly affects civilian
populations alongside support to internally displaced person hosting communities in more stable
Grand Sud and Grand Nord regions. Despite the December 18, 2025 launch, early 2026 funding
remains severely constrained, forcing the World Food Programme to halve rations and suspend
hot meal programs due to a 139 million dollar shortfall. Food security assessments project Crisis
and Emergency phase conditions persisting through May 2026, with particularly severe impacts in
Port-au-Prince, Cite Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, and displacement sites.
The humanitarian crisis interacts directly with security dynamics as gang territorial expansion into
Artibonite and Centre departments has disrupted agricultural production in historically productive
zones. Between January and August 2025, intentional homicides in these two departments
increased 210 percent compared to 2024, with 1,303 victims recorded. This violence coincides
with planting and harvest periods, creating cascading food security effects that extend beyond
immediate conflict zones. The combination of displacement, agricultural disruption, and funding
shortfalls creates conditions where humanitarian needs are expanding faster than response
capacity, particularly as the 1.4 million internally displaced population requires sustained
assistance.
January 22, 2026

Operational access constraints compound funding limitations as humanitarian actors face
systematic barriers to reaching populations in need. The Route Nationale 1 corridor closure
affects access to Lower Artibonite while urban gang control limits movements within
Port-au-Prince neighborhoods. Medecins Sans Frontieres' suspension of activities in Bel-Air after
a January 6 crossfire incident illustrates that even organizations with extensive crisis experience
face untenable security conditions when caught between gang positions and security force
operations. With only 10 percent of hospital-capacity facilities fully operational and 4.9 million
people requiring emergency medical assistance, the health system operates in a state of near
collapse.
The humanitarian financing gap creates direct operational risks for international organizations and
businesses as unmet needs drive population movements, increase security threats, and
destabilize areas previously considered relatively secure. Internally displaced populations place
strain on host community resources, potentially generating tension and localized conflict over
scarce services. The combination of food insecurity, health system breakdown, and massive
displacement creates conditions conducive to disease outbreaks, further complicating operational
environments. Organizations should prepare for scenarios where humanitarian conditions
deteriorate faster than security improvements materialize.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has faced chronic humanitarian needs since the 2010 earthquake, but the post-2021 political
crisis and gang territorial expansion transformed manageable challenges into acute emergency
conditions. Gang control of agricultural zones and supply routes represents a structural shift that
converts urban violence into nationwide food security crisis.



## TALKING POINTS

HRP targets 4.2 million people with 880 million dollar appeal facing severe early-year funding
shortfalls
WFP forced to halve rations and suspend hot meals due to 139 million dollar funding gap
Approximately 1.4 million internally displaced persons require sustained assistance across
multiple sectors
Gang expansion into Artibonite agricultural zones generated 210 percent increase in homicides
and disrupted production
Only 10 percent of hospital-capacity health facilities fully operational with 4.9 million needing
emergency medical care
MSF suspended operations in Bel-Air after crossfire incident exposing risks even for experienced
crisis responders
January 22, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Prioritize life-saving interventions over medium-term resilience programming given resource
constraints and access limitations
Establish supply chain redundancy including pre-positioning in multiple locations to account for
corridor closures
Coordinate closely with WFP and OCHA on food security hotspots requiring urgent resource
allocation
Develop protocols for temporary program suspension and staff withdrawal if security conditions
around sites deteriorate
Monitor IDP population movements as early warning indicator for security situation changes
Integrate health system capacity assessments into all field operation planning given facility
limitations
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for any renewed CPT attempts to alter government composition now that initial PM
removal effort has failed and U.S. warning is public. Additional institutional maneuvering could
trigger immediate sanctions announcements or escalated international pressure. Watch for
CARICOM or OAS statements responding to governance tensions as regional organizations
assess transition stability. Track PNH operational announcements regarding Bercy corridor as
sustained combat beyond three weeks suggests either imminent breakthrough or potential
operational stalemate requiring tactical adjustments.



## THIS WEEK

National dialogue meetings between CPT and political coalitions scheduled to continue with
sessions involving Montana accord representatives, December 21 accord signatories, and
additional civil society formations. Substantive proposals emerging from these discussions could
shape post-deadline transition architecture or conversely expose irreconcilable divisions requiring
external mediation. GSF and PNH will likely announce results from ongoing Port-au-Prince
January 22, 2026

operations including any additional neighborhoods downgraded from red security status or
conversely any tactical withdrawals from previously cleared areas. Humanitarian coordination
meetings will address displacement response for approximately 6,000 new IDPs since January 6
and potential additional movements if operations expand.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

The period between now and early April represents final window for achieving meaningful security
improvements before projected GSF force expansion begins. Failure to demonstrate sustainable
territorial control gains during this period will likely drive reassessment of August 30 election date
feasibility and potentially force electoral calendar adjustments. International donor decisions on
HRP funding in first quarter will determine whether humanitarian response can scale to meet
expanding needs or must conduct further program cuts. Post-deadline governance arrangements
will crystallize between late January and mid-February as political actors either converge on
consensus transition framework or fragment into competing authority claims requiring
international arbitration.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Le Nouvelliste coverage of CPT attempt to revoke Prime Minister and U.S. warning (21-22
January 2026)
3. Le National coverage of COPPOS-Haiti transition proposals to CPT (January 2026)
5. UN News feature on Haiti crisis and gang territorial control (20-21 January 2026)
7. Security Council Report monthly forecast on Haiti (January 2026)
8. HaitiLibre reporting on PNH operations in Bercy corridor (22 January 2026)
9. HALO Solutions weekly security report covering Bercy operations (6-13 January 2026)
12. Reuters reporting on GSF deployment timeline and force strength (22 January 2026)
13. UN Security Council briefing transcript by BINUH Special Representative (20-21 January
2026)
14. Relief Web publication of 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan documents (December 2025)
15. The New Humanitarian in-depth feature on gang violence and food security (21 January 2026)
16. IMF Staff-Monitored Program documents on Haiti macroeconomic indicators (2025)
17. U.S. State Department travel advisory for Haiti (current as of January 2026)
January 22, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*