# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-19
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

---

## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT National Political Dialogue Enters Final Coordination Window](#development-1-cpt-national-political-dialogue-enters-final-coordination-window)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: Gang Strategic Pause Reaches Forty-Three Days Entering Assessment](#development-2-gang-strategic-pause-reaches-forty-three-days-entering-assessment)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: Dual Institutional Vacuum Risk As BINUH Expires Before CPT Mandate](#development-3-dual-institutional-vacuum-risk-as-binuh-expires-before-cpt-mandate)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

---


## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the first business day after the critical weekend passed without CARICOM emergency
summit, with the CPT continuing national political dialogue meeting COPPOS, KOREPAD,
Montana Accord, and December 21 representatives. With exactly nineteen days until February
7, -represents the absolute final window for consensus allowing eighteen to seventeen days for
implementation. The forty-three day gang attack pause continues as armed groups await
dialogue outcomes before deciding whether to resume violence late January. UN BINUH
mandate expires January 31, twelve days away and seven days before CPT expiration, creating
dual institutional vacuum risk. Haiti enters final nineteen days with international coordination
collapsed and -representing last opportunity for Haitian-led coordinated transition before
operational constraints make proper implementation impossible.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT launches national political dialogue with major civil society and political coalitions
representing final coordination window before February 7 deadline.
Gang violence pause reaches forty-three consecutive days with no attacks despite PNH
operations, suggesting strategic discipline awaiting political outcomes.
UN BINUH mandate expires January 31 without renewal announcement, seven days before
CPT mandate ends February 7.
CARICOM emergency summit did not materialize over weekend despite previous warnings that
time is running out for Haiti transition consensus.
Montana Accord, COPPOS, and December 21 representatives meeting CPT to discuss
post-February 7 governance frameworks with nineteen days remaining.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT National Political Dialogue Enters Final Coordination Window

The Transitional Presidential Council launched its national political dialogue January 18 and
continues January 19 with meetings scheduled for four critical groups representing the absolute
final window for consensus before operational impossibility. sessions include COPPOS-Haiti et
Allies, KOREPAD, Montana Accord representatives, and December 21 Accord representatives.
This dialogue occurs on the first business day after the critical weekend of January 18-19
passed without the anticipated CARICOM emergency summit, confirming that international
facilitation has collapsed and leaving Haitian actors to negotiate their own post-February 7
governance framework with exactly nineteen days remaining before the CPT mandate
expiration.
January 19, 2026

The operational timeline reality creates severe constraints because with nineteen days until
February 7, -represents the absolute final window for consensus building. If consensus is
reached eighteen days remain for implementation which requires decree drafting three to five
days, stakeholder consultations five to seven days, CPT approval two to three days, Le Moniteur
publication one to two days, and public rollout three to five days for a total requirement of
fourteen to twenty-two days. If consensus is reached seventeen days remain which represents
the operationally minimum viable timeframe with high failure risk. If consensus is reached or
later, only fourteen to sixteen days remain which is operationally insufficient for proper
governance transition.
The groups participating present fundamentally irreconcilable proposals that complicate rapid
consensus. COPPOS-Haiti presented its October 14 proposal calling for reduced CPT size,
suppression of the Prime Minister position during transition, creation of a Vice-President
position, and elections in November 2026 representing a nine-month extension. Montana
Accord presented its December 21 proposal calling for collective resignation of CPT and Prime
Minister and creation of a Conference of Stakeholders to supervise designation of transition
authorities. The Civil Society Initiative presented its January 6 proposal calling for a
seventeen-member deliberative assembly with an interim president drawn from civil society or
high-ranking state institutions. These three major proposals converge on the principle that CPT
must change but diverge fundamentally on executive structure, timeline, and leadership
selection mechanisms.
Internal CPT dynamics further complicate the dialogue outcome because according to reporting
from Haiti24 on January 19, certain councilors within the CPT are advocating for reduction of
the institution while other factions favor mandate extension beyond February 7. This internal
deadlock means that even if civil society groups unify around a single proposal the CPT itself
may not approve it. With nineteen days remaining, CPT internal disagreement between
extension factions, reduction factions, and departure factions creates conditions where
-consensus is operationally unlikely. Any delays beyond evening create conditions for either
institutional vacuum on February 7 with no agreed successor and competing legitimacy claims,
rushed procedurally flawed transition with legal challenges and lack of stakeholder buy-in, or
unilateral CPT extension triggering opposition mobilization from groups like MORN which
declared CPT expired on December 28.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

January 19, 2026

The CPT was established April 3 2024 through an agreement between political parties and civil
society organizations to govern Haiti during the transition period leading to elections. The
original transition timeline called for presidential elections and transfer of power by February 7
2026, the constitutional date marking the end of the previous presidential term. The CPT
replaced the unelected government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry who resigned under
international pressure in March 2024 following gang attacks that destabilized Port-au-Prince.



## TALKING POINTS

January 19 represents first business day after critical weekend passed without CARICOM
emergency summit confirming international facilitation has collapsed.
CPT dialogue with COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana, and December 21 representatives
represents absolute final window for consensus allowing eighteen to seventeen days
implementation timeline.
Three major civil society proposals converge on CPT must change but diverge fundamentally on
executive structure, timeline, and leadership selection mechanisms.
Internal CPT deadlock between extension factions, reduction factions, and departure factions
means even civil society consensus may not secure CPT approval.
If no consensus by January 22, Haiti enters final sixteen days with unilateral CPT actions or
institutional vacuum assured.
Minimum viable implementation timeline requires fourteen to twenty-two days for decree
drafting, stakeholder consultations, CPT approval, publication, and public rollout.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Prepare contingency frameworks for February 7 institutional vacuum
scenario given -consensus operationally unlikely due to irreconcilable proposals and CPT
internal deadlock.
Private Sector: Accelerate business continuity planning for February 7-14 period assuming
governance uncertainty and potential competing legitimacy claims from multiple factions.
Political Actors: Prioritize rapid consensus on minimal viable framework by January 20 evening
recognizing seventeen days represents absolute minimum for implementation without
procedural failures.
Diaspora: Monitor -dialogue outcomes closely as failure to achieve consensus creates
conditions for either unilateral CPT extension or institutional vacuum triggering domestic
mobilization.
Civil Society: Coordinate unified proposal submission by morning to maximize eighteen-day
implementation window and prevent delays that create operationally insufficient fourteen to
sixteen day periods.
January 19, 2026

CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: Gang Strategic Pause Reaches Forty-Three Days Entering Assessment

Phase
The forty-three day gang attack pause continuing from December 21 through January 19
demonstrates that armed groups are extending strategic discipline specifically to assess through
dialogue outcomes before making their late January decision whether to resume violence or
extend the pause through February 7. The pause's continuation despite January 14 drone
strikes destroying three houses belonging to Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier at Delmas 6, thirteen
days of continuous PNH operations in downtown Port-au-Prince Bel Air Delmas and La Saline
from January 6 through 19, and January 18 downtown cleaning operations removing barricades
and clearing Grand Rue demonstrates that gangs possess sufficient territorial control and
operational discipline to maintain extended restraint while monitoring political developments.
Human rights defender Pierre Esperance issued a January 18 critique highlighting the
contradiction between security narrative and ground reality by questioning whether security
restoration is credible when the most feared gang leaders including Barbecue, Izo 5 Segond,
Vitelhomme Innocent, and Lanmo San Jou remain at large and continue to exercise verified
territorial control over approximately eighty to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince. Despite official
PNH spokesman claims of conducting a dynamic of restoring public order with secured patrols
in areas not accessible for years, the fact that Barbecue continues to surface publicly speaking
openly on behalf of Viv Ansanm and challenging state authority raises fundamental doubts
about whether police can translate tactical advances into lasting territorial control.
With nineteen days until February 7 and the CPT dialogue occurring gangs face a five-day
assessment window from through January 20-24 to decide their strategy. Scenario A involves
resuming violence January 20-25 if -dialogue produces no consensus or announcements
exclude amnesty provisions, allowing gangs to pressure transition negotiations by
demonstrating government cannot secure capital without gang cooperation and establishing
leverage for post-February 7 discussions. Resuming violence late January provides ten to
fourteen days of pressure before February 7, sufficient to disrupt remaining humanitarian
January 19, 2026

operations, close additional infrastructure, generate new displacement waves beyond the
current 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and force government to negotiate or face
transition in chaos.
Scenario B involves extending the pause through February 7 if -dialogue signals openness to
negotiations even without explicit amnesty. This strategy positions gangs as responsible actors
demonstrating capacity to provide security through violence suspension, allows them to claim
stake in governance transition by facilitating smooth February 7 passage without disruption, and
enables negotiation with whoever assumes power post-February 7 from position of strength
having provided security during critical transition period. The forty-three day pause continuing
through suggests gangs are waiting specifically for -to assess whether dialogue produces
consensus including amnesty or negotiation provisions, whether CPT announces extension
signaling government weakness exploitable through violence resumption, and whether
international actors intervene creating negotiation opportunities.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The December 21 2024 start of the gang attack pause followed months of intense violence
throughout 2024 during which armed groups expanded territorial control to approximately eighty
to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince and carried out major attacks including the March 2024
coordinated assaults that forced Prime Minister Ariel Henry's resignation. Previous gang pauses
have typically lasted days to weeks, making the current forty-three day pause unprecedented in
duration and suggesting strategic calculation rather than operational weakness or security force
pressure.



## TALKING POINTS

Forty-three consecutive days without major gang-initiated violence represents longest sustained
pause on record despite PNH operations and drone strikes.
Gangs control approximately eighty to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince with major leaders
including Barbecue remaining at large despite January 14 targeted strikes.
through January 20-24 represents critical five-day assessment window for gang strategic
decision on violence resumption or pause extension.
If -dialogue produces no consensus or excludes amnesty, expect violence resumption January
20-25 providing ten to fourteen days pressure before February 7.
If dialogue signals negotiation openness, gangs may extend pause through February 7 as show
of good faith for post-deadline role discussions.
January 19, 2026

Human rights defender critique highlights contradiction between government claims of restoring
public order and reality that feared gang leaders remain operationally active.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Prepare rapid humanitarian response capacity for potential violence
resumption late January if -dialogue fails to produce consensus frameworks.
Private Sector: Implement enhanced security protocols for January 20-25 period assuming
possible gang violence resumption if political dialogue excludes armed group interests.
Political Actors: Consider whether governance frameworks should include mechanisms for
armed group demobilization discussions to extend forty-three day pause through February 7
transition.
Diaspora: Monitor gang leader public statements during January 20-24 assessment period for
signals of violence resumption intentions or negotiation openness.
Humanitarian Organizations: Position emergency supplies and evacuation capacity for potential
displacement surge if gangs resume attacks late January exploiting political transition chaos.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: Dual Institutional Vacuum Risk As BINUH Expires Before CPT Mandate

The UN BINUH mandate expires January 31 2026, twelve days away and seven days before the
February 7 CPT mandate expiration, creating a critical coordination gap where Haiti faces two
institutional vacuums simultaneously with the UN political mission withdrawal and the CPT
mandate ending. As of January 19, no UN Security Council resolution renewing BINUH has
been announced despite expectations that the Council would vote on renewal before the
January 31 expiration. The absence of renewal announcement with twelve days remaining
creates fundamental uncertainty about whether the international community will maintain
coordinated presence for the February 7 transition or withdraw from political mediation role
leaving Haiti to manage the deadline unilaterally.
BINUH was established in 2019 as the UN political mission for Haiti with previous renewals
occurring on twelve-month cycles from 2019 through 2025. The July 14 2025 renewal extended
January 19, 2026

BINUH to January 31 2026 for only six and one half months, the shortest renewal period, with
official rationale citing uncertainty surrounding the future of UN response in Haiti and perception
that BINUH is increasingly undersized to meet the emergency. BINUH's mandate functions
include good offices advisory and political awareness, supporting Haitian authorities in
governance political dialogue security justice and human rights promotion, and coordinating with
OAS CARICOM and bilateral donors on integrated international response.
The critical timeline creates severe coordination challenges because January 19 marks twelve
days until BINUH expiration and nineteen days until CPT expiration. If BINUH expires January
31 without renewal, Haiti operates February 1 through 6 for six days without UN political mission
before CPT mandate ends February 7. This dual vacuum scenario eliminates the UN
coordination mechanism required to activate the OAS Roadmap Version 3 institutional continuity
clause from November 5 2025 stating that if the Presidential Transitional Council were to expire
without legitimate successor, the OAS CARICOM and UN would work with Haitian authorities to
avoid power vacuum. Without BINUH presence February 1-7, the UN lacks institutional
mechanism in Haiti to coordinate with OAS and CARICOM on emergency governance
frameworks.
The absence of BINUH renewal announcement as of January 19 suggests three possible
interpretations. Interpretation A involves last-minute renewal where UN Security Council is
waiting for January 20-24 outcomes from CPT dialogue and potential governance frameworks
before deciding BINUH renewal terms, potentially extending twelve months if consensus
emerges or three to six months if deadlock persists. Interpretation B involves February 1-7
emergency session where UN Security Council schedules emergency meeting to
simultaneously address BINUH renewal and February 7 CPT expiration creating coordinated
international response. Interpretation C involves withdrawal strategy where UN Security Council
allows BINUH to expire January 31 as planned withdrawal signaling shift from political mission
to security mission through GSF plus humanitarian response through OCHA without political
mediation role, confirming international community no longer attempting to broker Haiti political
transitions.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

BINUH replaced the earlier UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti including MINUSTAH which
operated 2004-2017 and MINUJUSTH which operated 2017-2019. The transition from
peacekeeping to political mission reflected international community assessment that Haiti
required diplomatic engagement and institutional support rather than military stabilization. The
January 19, 2026

January 31 2026 mandate expiration coincides with broader international debate about
effectiveness of UN political missions in complex crises and whether alternative mechanisms
like the GSF can provide more targeted security support.



## TALKING POINTS

UN BINUH mandate expires January 31, twelve days away and seven days before February 7
CPT mandate expiration creating dual institutional vacuum risk.
No UN Security Council renewal announced as of January 19 despite expectations of vote
before January 31 expiration date.
If BINUH expires without renewal, Haiti operates February 1-6 without UN political mission
before CPT mandate ends eliminating coordination mechanism.
July 2025 BINUH renewal for only six months reflected uncertainty about UN role and
perception that mission undersized for Haiti emergency scale.
OAS institutional continuity clause requires UN coordination with OAS and CARICOM but
BINUH expiration eliminates UN presence for February 1-7 period.
Three interpretations possible: last-minute renewal awaiting dialogue outcomes, emergency
session February 1-7, or planned withdrawal from political mediation.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Clarify BINUH renewal status by January 25 latest to avoid
coordination vacuum during final week before February 7 CPT expiration.
Private Sector: Prepare for scenario where both UN political mission and CPT mandate expire
creating February 1-7 period without clear international or domestic governance frameworks.
Political Actors: Coordinate directly with OAS and CARICOM on contingency mechanisms for
February 1-7 period assuming BINUH expiration eliminates UN coordination presence.
Diaspora: Monitor UN Security Council deliberations during January 20-31 for signals of
international community commitment level to Haiti transition support.
Humanitarian Organizations: Establish direct coordination channels with OAS CARICOM and
bilateral donors independent of BINUH assuming political mission may not be present February
1-7.
CONFIDENCE
January 19, 2026

High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will CPT dialogue with COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana Accord, and December 21
representatives on January 19 and January 20 produce consensus on post-February 7
governance framework by evening, allowing seventeen days for implementation representing
operationally minimum viable timeline, or will pass without consensus confirming Haiti enters
final seventeen days with no coordinated plan. Monitor for official CPT announcements evening
or morning either declaring consensus framework with implementation timeline or
acknowledging continued dialogue without agreement. Consensus by evening enables
marginally adequate implementation, while or later consensus creates operationally insufficient
fourteen to sixteen day periods assuring institutional vacuum or rushed procedurally flawed
transition.



## THIS WEEK

Will gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence during late January period from January 22 through
January 26 to exploit political chaos and pressure amnesty negotiations, or will they extend the
forty-three day pause through month end awaiting post-February 7 vacuum for negotiation
leverage. Monitor downtown Port-au-Prince, Bel Air, Delmas, La Saline, and Cite Soleil for signs
of gang mobilization including barricade reconstruction, armed group movements, or attacks on
humanitarian corridors. Violence resumption late January provides ten to fourteen days of
pressure before February 7 sufficient to disrupt transition, while pause extension through
January 31 suggests gangs waiting for February 1-7 coordination vacuum to negotiate from
strength position.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

January 19, 2026

Will UN Security Council announce BINUH renewal before January 31 expiration
maintaining international coordination presence for February 7 transition, or will mandate
expire creating seven-day gap from February 1-6 when Haiti operates without UN political
mission before CPT mandate ends. Monitor Security Council calendar for scheduled
votes on Haiti during January 20-31 period and statements from permanent members on
BINUH future. Standard twelve-month renewal signals unexpected confidence in Haiti
stability prospects, short three to six month renewal indicates continued uncertainty
about UN role, and expiration without renewal confirms international withdrawal from
political mediation leaving Haiti to manage February 7 unilaterally with OAS institutional
continuity clause lacking UN coordination mechanism.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Gazette Universitaire, CPT lance dialogue politique national gouvernance post-fevrier,
January 18 2026
14. Haiti Libre, Haiti UN BINUH mandate reduced by 6 months, July 14 2025
9. Le Floridien, PNH operations signal possible reconquest of gang-held neighborhoods in
Port-au-Prince, January 2026
11. DW, Haiti UN expert sounds alarm over growing gang violence, January 2026
15. OAS, Secretary General presents update of roadmap on Haiti, November 5 2025
8. Reuters, Haiti operation destroys homes of gang leader Barbecue local media reports,
January 15 2026
2. Haiti Libre, Haiti Actualite Zapping, January 18 2026
3. Haiti24, 7 fevrier 2026 le conseil presidentiel de transition entre promesse de depart et
velleites de prolongation, January 19 2026
4. Vantbefinfo, Haiti les signataires de l'accord de montana presentent une feuille de route pour
la transition post 7 fevrier 2026, December 21 2025
5. Haiti Libre, Haiti Civil Society Initiative proposal for the completion of the transition, January 6
2026
6. Vantbefinfo, COPPOS Haiti plaide pour une transition reformee afin de sortir Haiti de
l'impasse politique, October 14 2025
7. Ouest-France, Les forces de securite en Haiti menent une intense campagne contre les
gangs, January 15 2026
January 19, 2026



---

*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*