# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-16
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: The CARICOM Critical Window Closes Without Action](#development-1-the-caricom-critical-window-closes-without-action)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: The 39-Day Gang Pause Continues Despite Provocation](#development-2-the-39-day-gang-pause-continues-despite-provocation)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: Weekend Becomes Critical Inflection Point for February 7 Trajectory](#development-3-weekend-becomes-critical-inflection-point-for-february-7-trajectory)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the final day of CARICOM's critical decision window with zero framework announcements
from the Transitional Presidential Council, civil society organizations, or international actors
through 5:34 PM EST. The 39-day gang attack pause continues despite January 14 drone
strikes on gang leader hideouts, demonstrating unprecedented strategic discipline as gangs
prioritize February 7 amnesty negotiations over immediate retaliation. With 22 days until the
February 7 2026 constitutional deadline and the critical window closed without action, the
weekend becomes the decisive inflection point where CARICOM must choose between
convening an emergency summit, withdrawing facilitation, or accepting compressed 14-18 day
implementation timelines with heightened operational risk.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CARICOM's January 13-17 critical decision window closes with no governance framework
announcements.
39-day gang attack pause continues despite January 14 drone strikes on gang leader
Cherizier's hideouts.
Weekend represents last opportunity for CARICOM emergency Heads of Government summit
before final three weeks.
Any framework announced January 20 or later faces compressed 18-day or shorter
implementation timeline.
22 days remain until February 7 2026 Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: The CARICOM Critical Window Closes Without Action

January 16 2026 marks the final day of the CARICOM critical decision window identified in the
January 12 Group of Eminent Persons warning about the slowness of actors in finding common
ground despite points of convergence in numerous proposals. The absence of any framework
announcements through 5:34 PM EST on represents a critical failure of the coordination
process and triggers three immediate implications for Haiti's February 7 constitutional deadline.
CARICOM's credibility is now at stake after the January 12 statement expressing deep concern
January 16, 2026

implicitly set the January 13-17 window as the last opportunity for Haitian-led consensus before
international intervention. The passage of this window without announcements suggests Haitian
actors failed to demonstrate the patriotism CARICOM called for, CARICOM facilitation has not
produced consensus despite weeks of engagement by the Eminent Persons Group holding talks
with council members and political leaders, and international coordination remains paralyzed by
the U.S.-Canada split reflected in Secretary Rubio's January 1 comments versus Minister
Giroux's December 16 position.
With the critical window closed and 22 days until February 7, CARICOM faces three options
over the weekend. Option A involves convening an emergency CARICOM Heads of Government
summit to select and endorse one civil society proposal such as the Civil Society Initiative from
January 6, RANFOR from January 11, or ANR from November 6, pressure the Transitional
Presidential Council to accept the endorsed framework, coordinate international actors including
the OAS, UN, U.S., and Canada around a unified position, and set an implementation deadline
by announcing the framework January 20 for 18-day implementation. Option B involves issuing a
public statement that CARICOM has exhausted facilitation efforts despite providing multiple
proposals and technical support, Haitian actors have failed to demonstrate political will to reach
consensus, CARICOM withdraws from the mediation role forcing Haiti to navigate February 7
unilaterally, and the international community will respond to whatever framework emerges
post-February 7 rather than legitimizing any pre-February 7 arrangement. Option C involves
continuing behind-the-scenes facilitation through the weekend without public statements,
allowing negotiations to extend into next week but accepting a compressed 14-18 day
implementation window with heightened operational risk.
The passage of without announcements means any framework announced January 20 or
later faces 20 days or fewer for implementation creating operational challenges including
decree drafting requiring 3-5 days, stakeholder consultations requiring 5-7 days,
Transitional Presidential Council approval requiring 2-3 days, Le Moniteur publication
requiring 1-2 days, and public rollout requiring 3-5 days for a minimum total of 14-22
days. This compressed timeline creates high failure risk from insufficient time for proper
consultations, legal reviews, or public communication, and creates a legitimacy deficit as
rushed processes undermine public confidence. With 22 days until February 7, the
critical window closure without action is a strategic failure that exponentially increases
risk of institutional vacuum, competing frameworks, or unilateral Transitional Presidential
Council extension on February 7.
January 16, 2026



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM established its Group of Eminent Persons mediation role in mid-2024 following the
collapse of the Montana Accord process and has been facilitating dialogue between the
Transitional Presidential Council, civil society organizations, and political actors for over six
months. The January 12 2026 statement represented CARICOM's most explicit warning about
the urgency of reaching consensus before the February 7 constitutional deadline.



## TALKING POINTS

The CARICOM critical decision window identified as January 13-17 has closed without any
governance framework announcements from Haitian or international actors.
Three civil society proposals remain uncoordinated including the Civil Society Initiative from
January 6, RANFOR from January 11, and ANR from November 6.
Any framework announced January 20 faces a compressed 18-day implementation timeline
creating operational risks including insufficient time for decree drafting, stakeholder
consultations, legal reviews, and public communication.
The weekend of January 18-19 represents the last opportunity for CARICOM to convene an
emergency Heads of Government summit before entering the final three weeks.
CARICOM's credibility depends on decisive action over the weekend after identifying the
January 13-17 window as critical for Haitian actors to demonstrate political will.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM should convene an emergency Heads of Government summit over the weekend of
January 18-19 to select and endorse one civil society framework and pressure the Transitional
Presidential Council to accept it by January 20.
International actors including the U.S., Canada, UN, and OAS should coordinate their positions
over the weekend to present a unified framework to the Transitional Presidential Council rather
than maintaining the current U.S.-Canada split.
Civil society organizations including RANFOR, the Civil Society Initiative, and ANR should
January 16, 2026

attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to present a unified proposal by January 20.
The Transitional Presidential Council should announce its departure or extension framework by
January 20 to allow 18 days for implementation rather than waiting until the final week of
January.
Media outlets should begin daily countdown coverage starting January 20 to increase public
pressure on political actors to finalize frameworks.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: The 39-Day Gang Pause Continues Despite Provocation

The 39-day gang attack pause spanning December 21 2025 through January 16 2026 continues
without interruption despite the January 14 drone strikes that reduced to ashes gang leader
Jimmy Cherizier's hideouts in Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline. This represents the longest
sustained period without major gang-initiated violence in Port-au-Prince on record and
demonstrates unprecedented gang strategic discipline that validates the Crisis Group's
December 15 assessment that gangs seek amnesty as part of the February 7 transition.
Gangs' failure to retaliate against the January 14 drone strikes targeting their most high-profile
leader indicates three critical dynamics. First, gang coalitions including G9, G-Pep, and 400
Mawozo maintain consolidated command structures with centralized discipline preventing rogue
factions from retaliating despite the symbolic provocation. Second, gangs view February 7
amnesty negotiations as more valuable than immediate revenge for hideout destruction,
demonstrating strategic prioritization of long-term political incorporation over short-term tactical
victories. Third, gangs assess PNH operations as symbolic government theater rather than
existential threats, as evidenced by continued gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of
Port-au-Prince according to the MOPAL January 4 assessment.
The IOM's January 15 report of 5,800 newly displaced persons in Port-au-Prince demonstrates
that PNH operations produce civilian displacement even when gangs do not retaliate. Drone
strikes in densely populated areas including Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline force civilians to flee
January 16, 2026

regardless of combat outcomes, meaning the humanitarian crisis compounds despite the
39-day gang attack pause. This pattern suggests PNH operations serve primarily symbolic
political functions for the government rather than achieving meaningful territorial control or
population protection.
With 22 days until February 7 and the CARICOM critical window closed without framework
announcements, gangs face a strategic decision point in late January between January 20-25.
Scenario A involves continuing the pause if behind-the-scenes negotiations signal willingness to
include amnesty provisions in post-February 7 frameworks, using the pause as a show of good
faith for negotiations, a demonstration of governance capacity through violence suspension, and
leverage for post-February 7 roles in whatever governance structure emerges. Scenario B
involves resuming violence if government maintains Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 28 no
negotiations doctrine and announces Transitional Presidential Council extension without gang
engagement, with violence resumption between January 20-25 designed to pressure February 7
negotiations by demonstrating government impotence, exploit the compressed timeline as the
Council struggles with implementation, and establish leverage for post-February 7 governance
negotiations. Scenario C involves extending the pause through February 7 but launching major
escalation in the week after February 7 between February 8-15 if no amnesty framework
emerges, targeting political actors, economic infrastructure, or international facilities to force
negotiations with whoever governs post-February 7.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The current 39-day pause represents the longest sustained period without gang-initiated attacks
since gang territorial control expanded to 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince in early 2024.
Previous operational pauses typically lasted 7-14 days and ended with resumed violence
targeting government facilities or international infrastructure.



## TALKING POINTS

The 39-day gang attack pause from December 21 through January 16 continues despite
January 14 drone strikes on gang leader Cherizier's hideouts demonstrating unprecedented
strategic discipline.
Gangs' failure to retaliate validates the Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that gangs
prioritize February 7 amnesty negotiations over immediate tactical responses to government
provocations.
January 16, 2026

The IOM's January 15 report of 5,800 newly displaced persons shows PNH operations produce
humanitarian costs even without gang retaliation.
Gangs face a strategic decision point between January 20-25 to either continue the pause
awaiting amnesty signals or resume violence to pressure February 7 negotiations.
Gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to MOPAL's January 4
assessment remains unchanged despite drone strikes.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

The government should clarify whether Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 28 no negotiations
doctrine remains in effect or whether behind-the-scenes discussions with gang representatives
are occurring to explain the 39-day pause.
International actors should assess whether the 39-day pause represents a genuine negotiation
opportunity or a tactical repositioning by gangs before resumed violence in late January.
Humanitarian organizations should prepare for potential displacement spikes if gangs resume
operations between January 20-25 in response to the CARICOM critical window closure without
amnesty framework announcements.
The Transitional Presidential Council should decide over the weekend whether to include gang
representatives in post-February 7 governance discussions to extend the 39-day pause through
the constitutional deadline.
Security analysts should monitor January 20-25 for potential gang violence resumption if
announcements exclude amnesty provisions from governance frameworks.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: Weekend Becomes Critical Inflection Point for February 7 Trajectory

January 16, 2026

The absence of any announcements on January 16 during the final day of CARICOM's critical
window creates maximum pressure for weekend actions on January 18-19 because political
actors, international organizations, and civil society groups must now decide whether to convene
emergency coordination mechanisms or accept that Haiti will navigate the February 7
constitutional deadline through uncoordinated or unilateral processes. The weekend represents
the last opportunity for structured international intervention before entering the final three weeks
with compressed implementation timelines.
Political actors' calculations over the weekend reveal three parallel decision tracks. The
Transitional Presidential Council is waiting to see if CARICOM convenes an emergency summit
over the weekend before announcing either a unilateral extension or a departure framework that
addresses civil society demands. Civil society organizations including RANFOR, the Civil
Society Initiative, and ANR recognize they failed to unify during the critical window and may
attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to present a consolidated proposal by
January 20. International actors including CARICOM, the OAS, and the UN must decide over
the weekend whether to convene an emergency summit, withdraw facilitation acknowledging
coordination failure, or continue silent negotiations accepting compressed timelines.
Public and media pressure intensifies with 22 days remaining until February 7 as the silent
triggers three amplification dynamics. Haitian media outlets including Le Nouvelliste, Haiti Libre,
and Radio Metropole will begin daily countdown coverage starting next week, transforming the
February 7 deadline from an institutional concern to a public crisis narrative. Radio Metropole's
January 5 framing of February 7 as a basculement or collapse/tipping point becomes the
mainstream media narrative, increasing public anxiety and political pressure on the Transitional
Presidential Council. Opposition movements including MORN and Montana Accord have the
weekend to organize campaigns demanding Transitional Presidential Council departure if no
frameworks are announced, potentially including protests or public statements by .
January 20 becomes the de facto new deadline for frameworks if the weekend passes without
CARICOM emergency summit or Transitional Presidential Council announcements. A
announcement creates a compressed 18-day implementation window that heightens operational
risk through insufficient time for proper decree processes, increases legitimacy deficit as the
public perceives rushed last-minute arrangements, and triggers gang strategic decisions as
gangs assess announcements to determine whether to resume violence or extend the 39-day
pause through February 7. The weekend's outcome determines whether Haiti's February 7
transition occurs through coordinated international frameworks with 18-day implementation,
uncoordinated competing proposals from civil society and the Transitional Presidential Council,
or institutional vacuum with no frameworks announced until the final week of January.
January 16, 2026



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM's January 12 2026 statement warning about the slowness of actors in finding
common ground represented the organization's most explicit deadline pressure after six months
of facilitation. The silent confirms that neither the Transitional Presidential Council nor civil
society organizations responded to this warning during the identified January 13-17 window.



## TALKING POINTS

January 16 passed without any governance framework announcements creating maximum
pressure for weekend emergency coordination by CARICOM, civil society, or the Transitional
Presidential Council.
The weekend of January 18-19 represents the last opportunity for CARICOM to convene an
emergency Heads of Government summit before entering the final three weeks with
compressed implementation timelines.
January 20 becomes the de facto new deadline for framework announcements with any
announcement creating only 18 days for implementation before February 7.
Haitian media will begin daily countdown coverage starting next week transforming February 7
from an institutional deadline to a public crisis narrative.
Gangs will assess weekend and developments to determine whether to resume violence in late
January or extend the 39-day pause through February 7.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM should announce by January 17 whether it will convene an emergency Heads of
Government summit for January 18 or formally withdraw from facilitation acknowledging
coordination failure.
The Transitional Presidential Council should hold emergency weekend sessions to decide
whether to announce a departure framework by January 20 or prepare for unilateral extension
beyond February 7.
January 16, 2026

Civil society organizations should attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to
consolidate the Civil Society Initiative, RANFOR, and ANR proposals into a unified framework
presentable by January 20.
International media should increase coverage of the February 7 deadline over the weekend to
pressure Haitian and international actors toward decisive action before .
Diplomatic missions in Port-au-Prince should coordinate over the weekend to present a unified
position to the Transitional Presidential Council by morning.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will CARICOM convene an emergency Heads of Government summit over the weekend of
January 18-19 to select and endorse a civil society framework or will the weekend pass without
international coordination confirming facilitation has failed. Will civil society organizations
including RANFOR, the Civil Society Initiative, and ANR attempt emergency coordination over
the weekend to present a unified proposal by January 20. Will the Transitional Presidential
Council hold emergency weekend sessions to decide whether to announce a departure or
extension framework by morning.



## THIS WEEK

Will the Transitional Presidential Council, Prime Minister Fils-Aime, or unified civil society
announce governance frameworks on January 20 creating a compressed but potentially viable
18-day implementation timeline or will the week pass without announcements confirming entry
into the final two weeks. Will gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence in late January between
January 20-25 to exploit the compressed timeline and pressure amnesty negotiations or will
they extend the 39-day pause through February 7 awaiting post-deadline governance
negotiations. Will Haitian media begin daily countdown coverage starting January 20
January 16, 2026

transforming the February 7 deadline into a public crisis narrative.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

Will Haiti navigate the February 7 constitutional deadline through coordinated international
frameworks with CARICOM endorsement or through uncoordinated competing proposals from
civil society and the Transitional Presidential Council creating legitimacy deficits. Will gangs
maintain strategic discipline through February 7 prioritizing long-term amnesty negotiations or
resume violence in late January to establish leverage for post-February 7 governance
discussions. Will the Transitional Presidential Council announce departure by February 7 or
attempt unilateral extension beyond the constitutional mandate creating potential institutional
vacuum or competing governance claims.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons statement January 12 2026 expressing deep concern
about slowness of actors in finding common ground.
Haiti Libre comprehensive daily monitoring January 16 2026 showing no new political or security
developments as of 5:34 PM EST.
IOM report January 15 2026 documenting 5,800 newly displaced persons in Port-au-Prince.
Crisis Group assessment December 15 2025 analyzing gang strategic calculations regarding
February 7 amnesty negotiations.
Prime Minister Fils-Aime statement December 28 2025 declaring no negotiations doctrine with
gang representatives.
MOPAL assessment January 4 2026 documenting gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of
Port-au-Prince.
Radio Metropole analysis January 5 2026 framing February 7 as basculement or
collapse/tipping point.
Miami Herald report January 9 2026 on CARICOM Eminent Persons Group holding talks with
council members and political leaders.
Civil Society Initiative proposal January 6 2026 for completion of transition.
RANFOR political dialogue call January 11 2026 and January 14 2026.
ANR framework November 6 2025 proposing Conseil d'Etat governance structure.
PNH operational reports January 14 2026 documenting drone strikes on gang leader Cherizier
hideouts in Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline.
Secretary Rubio statement January 1 2026 on U.S. position regarding Haiti transition.
Minister Giroux statement December 16 2025 on Canadian position regarding Haiti transition.
January 16, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*