# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-13
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: The Voltaire Conditional Departure Framework](#development-1-the-voltaire-conditional-departure-framework)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: CARICOM Escalates Pressure on Haitian Political Actors](#development-2-caricom-escalates-pressure-on-haitian-political-actors)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: Infrastructure Theater Masks Territorial Control Gaps](#development-3-infrastructure-theater-masks-territorial-control-gaps)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Leslie Voltaire confirmed the Transitional Presidential Council will depart February 7
but introduced conditions requiring sixty percent political class consensus and
international community approval, contradicting the April 3 Agreement's unconditional
mandate termination. CARICOM escalated pressure with its second warning in four
days, expressing deep concern about actor slowness despite identified convergence
points in transition proposals. The government inaugurated National Route 3 between
Hinche and Saint-Raphael while Route 1 remains impassable at Montrouis and Route
2 faces periodic blockages, demonstrating capacity in secure zones but inability to
clear gang-controlled territories. Twenty-five days remain until the constitutional
deadline.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Leslie Voltaire stated CPT will leave February 7 but subordinated departure to political
consensus formula and international approval.
CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons issued second warning in four days expressing
deep concern about slowness of Haitian actors.
National Route 3 Hinche-Saint-Raphael section inaugurated while primary routes
remain blocked by gang control.
Police reported seizing thirty-three weapons and twelve thousand rounds in recent
operations.
Twenty-five days remain until February 7 constitutional deadline with no successor
framework agreement.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: The Voltaire Conditional Departure Framework

CPT Presidential Coordinator Leslie Voltaire delivered two public statements between
January 10 and January 12 that represent the first explicit commitment by a Council
member to honor the February 7 mandate expiration but introduced conditional
language that fundamentally alters the commitment's meaning and creates ambiguity
about whether departure will occur if specified conditions remain unmet. In Jacmel on
January 10, Voltaire stated the Council signed to leave and will no longer be
January 13, 2026

legitimate after February 7, using unconditional language aligned with Article 12.1 of
the April 3 Agreement. However, in Jeremie on January 12 during a Chamber of
Commerce ceremony, Voltaire added that departure would be subordinate to adoption
of a formula capable of rallying nearly sixty percent of the Haitian political class
without offending the international community.
The distinction between unconditional and conditional framing reveals strategic
positioning that allows multiple interpretations of the February 7 commitment. If a
transition formula achieves sixty percent political class consensus and international
approval by late January, the CPT departs as promised and Voltaire's statements
prove credible. If no such formula emerges, the Council can argue it cannot
responsibly create an institutional vacuum by departing without a successor
framework, effectively justifying continuation beyond the constitutional deadline
through the conditional language introduced in the January 12 statement. Vant Bef
Info editorial analysis published January 13 questioned whether clear and definitive
departure exists when subordinated to fragile political balances and external actor
approval, noting the CPT risks accentuating public mistrust by reiterating the same
promise without specifying implementation mechanisms.
The conditional framework creates institutional uncertainty about who holds authority
to determine whether the specified conditions have been met. If the CPT retains
unilateral authority to assess whether sixty percent consensus and international
approval exist, the conditional departure becomes a discretionary extension
mechanism controlled by the Council itself rather than an externally verifiable
standard. The January 12 statement does not identify which entity will certify that
conditions have been satisfied, whether CARICOM, the international community
collectively, Haitian civil society, or the CPT itself. With twenty-five days remaining until
February 7, the absence of specified verification mechanisms means the conditional
framework could authorize indefinite extension if the CPT determines at any point that
conditions remain unmet.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 3 Agreement Article 12.1 stipulates the CPT mandate ends February 7
January 13, 2026

without reference to conditions or contingencies. Article 6.1 of the May 23 decree
states the Council cannot benefit from mandate extension per legal analysis
presented by Jerry Tardieu in December.



## TALKING POINTS

Voltaire's January 10 Jacmel statement used unconditional language matching April 3
Agreement terms.
The January 12 Jeremie statement introduced two conditions not present in
constitutional documents.
Sixty percent political class consensus threshold has no legal basis in transition
agreements.
International community approval requirement creates external veto over Haitian
constitutional process.
No verification mechanism exists to certify whether conditions have been satisfied.
CPT may retain unilateral authority to assess condition fulfillment creating
self-extension power.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Demand CPT clarify whether all nine Council members endorse Voltaire's conditional
framework or if statement represents minority position.
Require CPT specify which entity holds authority to certify sixty percent consensus
and international approval have been achieved.
Request international community define what constitutes approval and which actors
must provide it.
Monitor whether other CPT members issue statements this week supporting or
contradicting conditional departure framework.
Prepare contingency plans for both February 7 departure and extension scenarios
given framework ambiguity.
Track civil society and opposition group responses to conditional language over next
seven days.
CONFIDENCE
January 13, 2026

Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: CARICOM Escalates Pressure on Haitian Political Actors

The CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons issued a statement January 12 expressing
deep concern about the slowness of Haitian actors in finding common ground despite
points of convergence in numerous publicly available transition proposals,
representing the second warning in four days following the January 9 statement that
time is running out. The January 12 escalation indicates CARICOM has identified
viable frameworks with overlapping elements across multiple proposals but views the
negotiation impasse as a failure of political will rather than absence of technical
solutions. The statement specifically references points of convergence in proposals,
suggesting CARICOM technical staff have analyzed civil society frameworks, political
party positions, and international recommendations to identify areas of agreement
that Haitian actors are failing to capitalize on.
CARICOM's characterization of actor slowness rather than proposal inadequacy
signals growing international frustration with what regional observers interpret as
deliberate delay tactics serving individual political interests at the expense of national
stability. The call for actors to demonstrate patriotism above all if Haitians wish to
decide their own destiny implies CARICOM views the negotiation stalemate as
self-interested maneuvering rather than principled disagreement over governance
structures. This framing suggests the alternative to Haitian-led consensus may be
external imposition of a transition framework, which CARICOM has historically
opposed but may consider unavoidable if domestic actors exhaust the remaining
twenty-five day window without reaching agreement.
The timing of two warnings within four days indicates CARICOM assesses the critical
decision window is narrowing to immediate timeframes rather than the full remaining
period until February 7. If CARICOM issues warnings January 9 and January 12 with
escalating language, the regional body likely expects concrete movement toward
consensus by January 17, leaving twenty-one days for implementation rather than
negotiation. Failure to demonstrate progress this week may trigger CARICOM
January 13, 2026

emergency Heads of Government summit convening, withdrawal from facilitation role
leaving Haiti to manage February 7 transition unilaterally, or endorsement of a specific
proposal over others to break the deadlock.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM has served as principal facilitator of Haitian political dialogue since March
2024 when regional leaders brokered the April 3 Agreement establishing the
transitional framework. The Group of Eminent Persons was established to provide
ongoing technical support and mediation for transition implementation.



## TALKING POINTS

CARICOM identified points of convergence across multiple transition proposals
submitted by different actors.
Regional body characterizes delay as actor slowness rather than framework
inadequacy or technical complexity.
Second warning in four days signals escalating urgency and narrowing decision
window.
Call for patriotism implies CARICOM views impasse as self-interested political
maneuvering.
Alternative to Haitian-led consensus may be external framework imposition despite
CARICOM's historical opposition.
Critical decision window likely closes January 17 if pattern of warnings continues
requiring concrete progress this week.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor for third CARICOM statement by January 15 which would establish pattern of
daily pressure.
Track whether CARICOM convenes emergency Heads of Government summit this
week to address actor slowness.
Identify which specific proposals contain the convergence points CARICOM
references to assess viable compromise elements.
January 13, 2026

Prepare for scenario where CARICOM endorses civil society January 6 proposal or
alternative framework to break deadlock.
Assess whether January 17 represents hard deadline for consensus before entering
implementation-only period.
Monitor international community statements following CARICOM warnings to gauge
coordinated pressure campaign.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: Infrastructure Theater Masks Territorial Control Gaps

The government inaugurated the rehabilitated National Route 3 section between
Hinche and Saint-Raphael on January 13 including the Hinche bypass and launch of
Saint-Raphael bypass construction, occurring twenty-five days before the CPT
mandate expiration and one day after Secretary of State Andresol promised to reopen
routes to the South and North before February 7. The timing demonstrates
government capacity to execute infrastructure projects in secure zones of the Centre
Department but exposes inability to address the primary territorial control challenge
blocking national commerce and mobility. National Route 1 remains impassable at
Montrouis since January 6 per OCHA reporting, and National Route 2 faces periodic
gang blockages in Leogane and Artibonite checkpoints, meaning the two principal
corridors connecting Port-au-Prince to the country's second and third largest cities
remain outside government control.
The disconnect between Route 3 inauguration in a secure area and Route 1 and
Route 2 impassability in gang-controlled territories reveals the Andresol promise to
reopen southern and northern routes by February 7 is operationally unrealistic given
the twenty-five day timeframe. Route 3 between Hinche and Saint-Raphael does not
constitute the route to the North, which requires passage through Montrouis on Route
1 where gang control persists. Clearing and securing Montrouis requires sustained
January 13, 2026

security operations involving the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security
Support mission, establishment of permanent security posts to prevent gang return,
and maintenance operations to ensure sustained access. Twenty-five days is
insufficient to execute security clearance, establish permanent presence, and
demonstrate sustained control necessary to reopen commercial traffic and civilian
mobility on routes that have been blocked since early January.
The Route 3 inauguration functions as symbolic demonstration of government activity
ahead of the February 7 deadline but does not address the core territorial control
deficit that prevents economic activity, humanitarian access, and population mobility
across gang-controlled zones. The police reported seizing thirty-three weapons and
twelve thousand rounds in recent operations during a January 12 press conference,
but this quantitative metric does not translate to territorial recovery or route security.
The government can host ribbon-cutting ceremonies in areas where it maintains
control but cannot execute the military operations necessary to break gang territorial
dominance in strategic corridors that determine whether Haiti functions as a unified
national territory or a collection of disconnected enclaves.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

National Route 1 has faced periodic gang blockages since 2021 with increasing
frequency and duration. The current Montrouis blockage since January 6 represents
the longest sustained closure of the primary northern corridor. Route 2 blockages
have similarly intensified over the past year as gang federations expanded territorial
control.



## TALKING POINTS

Route 3 inauguration demonstrates capacity in secure zones but does not address
gang-controlled corridor problem.
Andresol January 12 promise to reopen routes by February 7 is operationally
unrealistic with twenty-five days remaining.
Route 1 Montrouis blockage requires sustained military operations not ribbon-cutting
ceremonies to resolve.
January 13, 2026

Police seizure of thirty-three weapons and twelve thousand rounds does not translate
to territorial recovery.
Government can execute infrastructure projects where it already controls territory but
cannot extend control to contested areas.
Timing of Route 3 inauguration suggests symbolic theater designed to demonstrate
progress ahead of February 7 deadline.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Assess whether government will attempt Montrouis clearance operation in next two
weeks or abandon route reopening promise.
Monitor whether PNH and Multinational Security Support mission coordinate
sustained operations at Route 1 and Route 2 blockage points.
Track economic impact of continued Route 1 and Route 2 closures on fuel
distribution, food supply, and commercial activity.
Evaluate whether Route 3 inauguration generates positive media coverage sufficient
to offset Route 1 and Route 2 closure impacts.
Prepare analysis of post-February 7 territorial control scenarios if current government
cannot secure primary corridors.
Monitor whether opposition groups use infrastructure theater versus territorial reality
contrast to delegitimize CPT extension arguments.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor whether additional CPT members issue statements supporting or
contradicting Voltaire's conditional departure framework. If the Council remains silent,
January 13, 2026

Voltaire's position may represent minority view rather than institutional consensus.
Track whether civil society groups or opposition movements respond to conditional
language by demanding unconditional February 7 departure per April 3 Agreement
terms.



## THIS WEEK

Watch for potential CARICOM emergency summit convening or third warning
statement by January 15 establishing pattern of daily pressure on Haitian actors. The
critical decision window likely closes January 17 if no concrete progress toward
consensus emerges, forcing either external framework imposition or transition into
implementation-only period with compressed timelines. Monitor whether government
attempts Montrouis clearance operation to support Andresol route reopening promise.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

Assess whether CPT will invoke conditional framework to justify extension if sixty
percent consensus and international approval remain uncertified by early February.
Track whether international community coordinates pressure campaign following
CARICOM warnings or fractures into competing positions on transition pathways.
Monitor opposition group mobilization capacity if CPT attempts extension beyond
constitutional deadline using conditional departure rationale.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Vant Bef Info editorial analysis on conditional departure framework
Haiti Libre comprehensive news coverage including CARICOM statement and Route
3 inauguration
CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons official statement January 12
Public Infrastructure Ministry Route 3 inauguration announcement
April 3 2024 Political Agreement Article 12.1 on CPT mandate termination
Le Nouvelliste Port-au-Prince daily reporting on Voltaire statements and government
activities
AlterPresse coverage of CPT earthquake anniversary statement
OCHA humanitarian situation reporting on Route 1 Montrouis blockage
Haitian National Police press conference January 12 on operational results
May 23 2024 Presidential Decree Article 6.1 on mandate extension prohibition
January 13, 2026

Civil society January 6 transition proposal documentation
Haiti24 security situation monitoring
January 13, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*