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AYITI INTEL - WEEKLY
Date: N/A | Language: EN
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Haiti's first week under single-executive governance following the February 7 CPT dissolution
revealed a catastrophic security force imbalance of 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters against 400
combat-ready police officers while humanitarian funding collapsed to 3.4 percent of documented
need. The United States achieved unprecedented international consensus backing Prime Minister
Fils-Aime but domestic political opposition crystallized around legitimacy concerns as no inclusive
dialogue mechanisms emerged. Child recruitment by armed groups tripled in 2025 with minors
now comprising 30 to 50 percent of gang membership transforming the crisis into a child
protection emergency. China actively courted Haiti with financial incentives to break Taiwan
diplomatic ties introducing great-power competition into what was previously treated as regional
instability. Judicial and anti-corruption institutions asserted independence through TPS protection
rulings and expanded ULCC investigations while security conditions deteriorated with Kenscoff
corridor attacks and surging Port-au-Prince kidnappings creating humanitarian access disruption.
WEEK IN REVIEW
February 9. The emergence of a parallel Collegue Presidentiel led partly by US-sanctioned former
CPT members created immediate dual-authority crisis within 48 hours of CPT dissolution. The
self-declared Collegue issued its first official communique CPR-001 establishing two institutional
commissions in direct competition with Prime Minister Fils-Aime who delivered a national address
flanked by security forces signaling sector backing. The United States authorized up to 5 million
dollars in military financing for the Forces Armees d'Haiti marking the first such funding since the
1990s through Foreign Military Financing Program and Peacekeeping Operations for Haitian
Coast Guard equipment and FAd'H non-lethal assistance. France formally endorsed the transition
while three US warships remained deployed off Port-au-Prince under Operation Southern Spear.
The PNH launched training for 1,200 new recruits under the P4000 program representing 40
percent force expansion over 16 months. The convergence of parallel governance structures
competing international military support and accelerating police recruitment revealed institutional
fragmentation at the precise moment when unified authority was most critical for democratic
transition execution.
February 10. Every major international stakeholder achieved unprecedented coordination backing
PM Fils-Aime within 48 hours through formal statements from US, BINUH, OAS, France, Canada,
and Dominican Republic. BINUH explicitly invoked UNSCR 2814 providing legal framework for
international support to interim government while OAS characterized the interim period as short
purposeful and clearly directed to prevent mandate creep. Domestic political forces mobilized
opposition with Kolektif Tet Ansanm warning against unilateral governance and lawyer Marc Sony
Charles declaring Fils-Aime decisions unconstitutional. The rival Collegue Presidentiel issued no
new communique in this cycle and the absence of international endorsement significantly
diminished its near-term viability. Macroeconomic indicators remained stable with gourde holding
at 131 per dollar and January customs revenue showing slight year-over-year increase. The
February 15, 2026

international consensus contrasted sharply with domestic legitimacy challenges establishing the
strongest external backing for any Haitian executive since CPT formation while exposing the
weakest constitutional foundation creating operationally functional but constitutionally hollow
governance.
February 11. US Charge d'Affaires Wooster testified before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
revealing force imbalance of approximately 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters against only 400
effectively combat-ready PNH officers. Wooster classified Haiti's gangs as proto-insurgent
movements generating between 60 and 75 million dollars annually through systematic extortion
rather than traditional criminal organizations. The International Rescue Committee simultaneously
warned Haiti is on the verge of humanitarian collapse with funding at only 3.4 percent of
documented need. PM Fils-Aime consolidated executive authority by dismissing Economy
Minister Alfred Metellus and assuming the portfolio himself removing potential rival and
establishing direct control of national treasury. The United States announced additional 16 million
dollars in food security funding. The testimony marked significant shift in US policy language from
characterizing the challenge as gang violence to explicitly identifying it as proto-insurgency
threatening state survival with combined policy reframing justifying more aggressive military
intervention and financial warfare measures.
February 12. UNICEF reported child recruitment by armed groups tripled in 2025 with minors now
comprising 30 to 50 percent of gang membership and some recruits as young as age nine
transforming Haiti's security crisis into child protection emergency requiring immediate
programmatic response and altered rules of engagement for incoming forces. China is actively
courting Haiti with financial incentives to break its 70-year diplomatic relationship with Taiwan
introducing great-power competition into what was previously treated as regional stability
challenge. Caribbean Security Group CEO Austin Holmes testified that China offering
infrastructure financing and development assistance creating strategic implications as Haiti is one
of Taiwan's 12 remaining diplomatic allies globally. UNICEF estimated that armed groups use
boys as scouts and ammunition carriers while subjecting girls to sexual violence and forced
domestic labor with primary drivers being poverty affecting more than 60 percent of population
surviving on less than four dollars per day. The convergence of child protection emergency and
geopolitical competition revealed that Haiti's crisis now extends beyond security and humanitarian
domains into fundamental questions of state sovereignty and international alignment affecting US
regional influence calculations.
February 13. Federal Judge Ana Reyes refused to stay her TPS ruling preserving protections for
over 350,000 Haitians while reading death threats against her in open court demonstrating judicial
independence under political pressure. The ULCC announced it will expand investigations beyond
the 30-day asset declaration requirement for former CPT members directly targeting Louis Gerald
Gilles, Smith Augustin, and Emmanuel Vertilaire implicated in BNC corruption scandal. The
Superior Council of the Judiciary barred all judges from political activity through Resolution
CSPJ-SP/02-2026/887 foreclosing proposals to install Court of Cassation judge as provisional
February 15, 2026

president. Canada-funded Morne-Casse training center neared completion with 200-officer
capacity and first instructor training scheduled for end of February targeting specialized anti-gang
units. These developments signaled institutional assertions of independence in post-CPT
transition framework with judiciary refusing political entanglement, anti-corruption mechanisms
advancing accountability probes, and federal courts protecting diaspora economic lifelines against
executive branch termination attempts creating separation of powers dynamics that constrain
unilateral governance approaches.
February 14. Viv Ansanm gangs burned farmer homes in Kenscoff marking seventh major attack
phase since January 2025 targeting sole viable road connecting Port-au-Prince to southern
departments while kidnapping-for-ransom operations surged in capital targeting professionals. PM
Fils-Aime exercised first municipal appointment authority installing new Port-au-Prince
commission but political dialogue remained frozen since February 7 despite international calls for
inclusive consultation mechanisms. The Kenscoff corridor represents critical strategic
infrastructure as gang control of National Routes 1, 2, and 3 leaves this mountain route as
primary alternative for humanitarian organizations accessing South and Southeast departments
where IRC reports 1.4 million displaced persons requiring aid distribution. Judge Reyes TPS stay
denial created temporary stability but Trump administration can escalate to higher courts creating
extended uncertainty period as DHS admission of possessing addresses of TPS holders in
Springfield Ohio signals enforcement infrastructure preparation. The targeting of farmers
specifically revealed economic warfare tactics aimed at food security disruption beyond territorial
acquisition creating food weaponization scenarios that compound already severe crisis conditions.
February 15. Security conditions deteriorated materially across Port-au-Prince despite ongoing
police operations with kidnappings rising for several weeks in Delmas corridor including priest,
lawyer, and judge among current hostages. Gang leader Izo openly participated in and financed
carnival activities in Village de Dieu with no official government response demonstrating
operational impunity. Haiti experiencing critical security force transition gap as Kenya-led MSS
with approximately 1,000 personnel begins drawdown while Gang Suppression Force not
expected until April 2026 creating three-to-six-month vulnerability window. Elections remain
scheduled for August 30 first round but CEP flags 23 gang-controlled communes as inaccessible
and faces 137 million dollar unfunded budget. TPS court decision expected before February 19
affecting legal status and work authorization for 350,000 Haitians with potential immediate impact
on remittance flows critical as approximately 60 percent of population lives on less than one dollar
per day. The convergence of deteriorating security, delayed international force deployment, and
diaspora legal uncertainty created compounding pressures on already fragile transition
framework.
THEMATIC ANALYSIS
Governance Legitimacy Paradox Under International Backing. The week demonstrated Haiti's
most acute governance legitimacy challenge since the April 2024 political accord as
February 15, 2026

unprecedented international consensus supporting PM Fils-Aime contrasted sharply with
domestic political fragmentation and constitutional hollowness. Within 48 hours of February 7 CPT
dissolution, every major international stakeholder issued formal recognition statements with
BINUH invoking UNSCR 2814 to establish legal framework, OAS characterizing interim period as
short and purposeful, and US France Canada plus Dominican Republic completing consensus.
This coordination reflects advance diplomatic planning and shared assessment that governance
vacuum posed greater risk than imperfect transitional authority. However, domestic opposition
immediately crystallized with Kolektif Tet Ansanm warning against unilateral governance, lawyer
Marc Sony Charles declaring decisions unconstitutional, and over 220 registered political parties
unable to achieve consensus on successor framework. The paradox creates operationally
functional governance with strong external legitimacy but weak constitutional foundation and
limited domestic political buy-in. This configuration enables PM Fils-Aime to exercise executive
authority including municipal appointments and ministerial dismissals but leaves transition
vulnerable to domestic political pressure and legitimacy challenges particularly as August 30
electoral timeline approaches requiring broad political consensus for candidate registration and
voting legitimacy. The January 2025 polling showing 52 percent distrusted CPT and 51 percent
distrusted prime minister indicates weak mandate for transitional institutions generally creating
sustainability questions regardless of international backing strength.
Security Force Imbalance and Proto-Insurgency Reframing. Wooster Senate testimony on
February 11 fundamentally reframed Haiti's security challenge from gang violence to
proto-insurgency by quantifying force disparities that threaten state survival. The revelation that
approximately 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters operate under coordinated command structures
against maximally 400 combat-ready PNH officers produces effective combat ratio of 7.5 to 1 in
gang favor. Wooster characterized armed groups as proto-insurgent movements rather than
criminal organizations noting they now control territory generate systematic revenue and
challenge state authority in ways exceeding traditional organized crime. The gangs generate
between 60 and 75 million dollars annually according to Haiti Finance Ministry estimates primarily
through extortion of shipments transiting from Dominican Republic enabling parallel state
operations with systematic taxation of street vendors, bus companies, industrial parks, and
seaports. This revenue sustainability means military operations alone cannot defeat economically
self-sustaining armed groups requiring financial disruption through sanctions and supply chain
interdiction to complement security operations. The policy reframing justifies more aggressive
military intervention and financial warfare measures while establishing existential urgency for
Gang Suppression Force deployment given revealed force imbalance. UNICEF child recruitment
data showing minors comprise 30 to 50 percent of gang membership with tripled recruitment in
2025 adds child protection emergency layer requiring altered rules of engagement and
international humanitarian law compliance. The combination of force imbalance, economic
self-sustainability, and child combatant prevalence transforms security response requirements
from counternarcotics model to counterinsurgency framework incorporating territorial control
objectives, financial warfare, and child demobilization protocols creating significantly more
complex operational environment than traditional policing approaches.
February 15, 2026

Humanitarian System Collapse and Child Protection Emergency. The week revealed complete
breakdown of humanitarian response capacity as IRC declared Haiti on verge of collapse with
funding at catastrophic 3.4 percent of documented need making effective operations impossible.
World Food Programme forced to cut rations in half and suspend meals for newly displaced due
to funding shortfalls requiring 44 million dollars through April 2026 but unable to support even
reduced programming at current levels. More than 8,000 killed in 2025 representing 20 percent
increase over 2024 while gender-based violence cases reached 8,000 up 25 percent and 1.4
million people displaced with half being children. The most alarming indicator is sexual violence
against children increased 1,000 percent since 2023 while child recruitment by armed groups
rose 700 percent in first quarter 2025 alone. UNICEF needs 30 million dollars to assist every child
requiring release, reintegration, education, and trauma support but humanitarian funding collapse
creates operational impossibility. World Bank warns human capital deficits could cost Haiti up to
51 percent of future revenues from nutrition and education failures creating reinforcing negative
dynamics where security failure drives humanitarian crisis which fuels armed group recruitment.
The 270,214 forcibly returned in 2025 with nearly 20 percent already internally displaced before
leaving and 60 percent recidivism rate demonstrates deportation ineffectiveness while adding
pressure to collapsed reception capacity. The funding crisis at 3.4 percent of need represents
near-total international donor disengagement occurring simultaneously with worst protection
indicators in modern Haitian history creating conditions for mass starvation and systematic child
exploitation without immediate emergency mobilization to close massive financing gap.
Geopolitical Competition and Institutional Independence Assertions. The week introduced new
strategic dimension as China actively courts Haiti with financial incentives to break 70-year
Taiwan diplomatic relationship while judicial and anti-corruption institutions asserted
independence constraining unilateral executive governance. Caribbean Security Group CEO
Holmes testified that China offering infrastructure financing and development assistance targeting
Haiti as one of Taiwan's 12 remaining diplomatic allies with 2026 marking 70th anniversary
creating symbolic significance for potential diplomatic realignment. Beijing gaining foothold in Haiti
would establish Chinese presence 90 miles from Cuba and 600 miles from US mainland while
reducing Taiwan's diplomatic allies from 12 to 11 transforming what was previously treated as
regional stability challenge into domain where great-power interests directly intersect with Haiti's
transition. Simultaneously, institutional independence assertions emerged through multiple
channels. Federal Judge Reyes refused TPS termination stay while reading death threats in open
court preserving protections for 350,000 Haitians demonstrating judicial independence under
political pressure. ULCC announced expanded investigations beyond asset declarations directly
targeting former CPT members implicated in BNC scandal with Director Hans Joseph surviving
removal attempts and maintaining institutional position. Superior Council of Judiciary barred all
judges from political activity foreclosing proposals for Court of Cassation judge as provisional
president establishing judicial boundaries against executive entanglement. These institutional
assertions create separation of powers dynamics that constrain PM Fils-Aime unilateral
governance approaches while Chinese competitive diplomacy offers alternative patron with
February 15, 2026

potentially fewer governance conditionalities than Western partners creating leverage for Haitian
leaders in negotiations affecting both democratic transition trajectory and regional security
architecture.
TREND ANALYSIS
Executive Authority Concentration Without Constitutional Legitimacy. Direction is consolidating as
PM Fils-Aime exercised municipal appointment authority, dismissed Economy Minister assuming
portfolio himself, and operated without visible inclusive dialogue mechanisms despite international
calls for consultation. The trend shows movement from collective CPT decision-making to
concentrated single-executive governance backed by unprecedented international consensus but
lacking domestic constitutional foundation or political buy-in. Conditions for continuation include
sustained US backing, absence of major policy failures, and prevention of rival governance
structure emergence. Conditions for reversal include domestic opposition consolidation, security
deterioration attributable to governance decisions, or international community withdrawal of
support due to unilateral governance approach. Critical inflection point arrives as electoral
preparation deadlines approach requiring broad political consensus for candidate registration and
voting legitimacy that concentrated authority model may not generate creating sustainability
questions for February 7, 2027 inauguration timeline.
Security Deterioration Despite Increased International Engagement. Direction is worsening as
kidnappings surge in Delmas corridor, gang leader Izo operates with public impunity financing
carnival activities, Kenscoff corridor faces seventh attack phase threatening southern
humanitarian access, and Viv Ansanm coalition expands into previously safe areas. Murder rate
rose 20 percent in 2025 with Artibonite and Centre departments seeing 210 percent increase
while Wooster testimony revealed catastrophic 7.5 to 1 force imbalance favoring gangs. The trend
demonstrates that current PNH operations, Kenya MSS presence, and planned GSF deployment
have not reversed gang territorial control or reduced violence lethality despite increased security
sector attention and resources. Conditions for continuation include delayed GSF deployment
creating three-to-six-month transition gap, gang economic self-sustainability through extortion
revenues, and child recruitment acceleration providing manpower replacement. Conditions for
reversal require GSF full deployment by October 2026, financial warfare measures disrupting
gang revenue streams, and territorial control operations beyond highway clearance targeting gang
economic infrastructure and recruitment networks. Critical determinant is whether April 2026 GSF
arrival produces immediate territorial gains or faces operational constraints requiring extended
buildup period before combat effectiveness achieved.
Humanitarian Funding Collapse Creating Protection Cascades. Direction is accelerating
downward as 2026 appeal funded at less than 4 percent of need forcing WFP ration cuts,
UNICEF child protection programming gaps, and IRC collapse warnings. The trend shows
progressive international donor disengagement from Haiti humanitarian response occurring
simultaneously with worst protection indicators including 1,000 percent increase in child sexual
February 15, 2026

violence, 700 percent surge in gang recruitment, and 8,000 killed in 2025. Conditions for
continuation include competing global humanitarian priorities, donor fatigue after decades of Haiti
assistance, and security conditions preventing effective aid delivery creating disincentive for
funding commitments. Conditions for reversal require major donor emergency mobilization in Q1
2026, visible security improvements enabling humanitarian access, and governance credibility
signals from Fils-Aime administration demonstrating effective resource management. Critical
threshold is whether UNICEF 30 million dollar child protection appeal and WFP 44 million dollar
food gap generate donor response within next 30 to 45 days before malnutrition indicators
deteriorate irreversibly and child recruitment becomes institutionally embedded within gang
structures creating long-term demobilization challenges.
OUTLOOK FOR THE UPCOMING WEEK
PM Fils-Aime faces immediate decision on political dialogue initiation versus continued unilateral
governance as international calls for inclusive consultation mechanisms contradict current
operational approach. If dialogue framework announced with concrete deliverables before June
electoral preparation deadlines, this would address domestic legitimacy concerns and create
consensus foundation for August 30 timeline. If unilateral governance continues without visible
consultation, domestic opposition likely consolidates around legitimacy deficit narrative
accelerating as campaign period approaches creating electoral boycott risks. Probability
assessment suggests continued unilateral approach more likely given international backing
strength and absence of immediate crisis forcing dialogue concession.
TPS court ruling expected before February 19 determines legal status for 350,000 Haitians with
immediate work authorization and deportation protection implications. If Judge Reyes issues final
ruling maintaining protections, this preserves remittance flows and diaspora economic lifeline
through appellate process creating extended stability period. If Trump administration prevails on
appeal or Reyes reverses preliminary injunction, accelerated deportations begin into crisis
environment with 90 percent capital gang control creating humanitarian catastrophe and
remittance collapse. Probability assessment suggests protections maintained through immediate
February 19 deadline but ultimate resolution requires Supreme Court involvement creating
multi-month uncertainty period.
Security force transition gap crystallizes as Kenya MSS drawdown timeline becomes explicit while
GSF April deployment approaches. If Kenya announces specific withdrawal schedule without
coordinated GSF arrival synchronization, vulnerability window extends through spring creating
gang opportunity for territorial consolidation. If GSF advance elements arrive March establishing
coordination mechanisms with PNH before Kenya departure, transition gap minimizes. Trigger
event is Kenya Foreign Affairs official statement on drawdown timeline following Principal
Secretary Sing'Oei announcement that mission achieved primary stabilization objective creating
presumption of imminent departure.
February 15, 2026

STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS
International Community. The unprecedented consensus backing PM Fils-Aime creates
coordination advantage but generates dependency risk as governance sustainability relies on
sustained external support rather than domestic legitimacy. UNSCR 2814 provides legal
framework for BINUH engagement while GSF deployment timeline targets April first contingents
and October full deployment creating six-month operational planning window. Critical decision
point arrives if domestic opposition consolidates requiring choice between maintaining PM
backing despite legitimacy concerns or pressing for inclusive dialogue that could delay electoral
timeline. OAS characterization of interim period as short and purposeful establishes expectation
management preventing mandate creep but creates pressure for visible progress on security and
electoral preparation benchmarks within 60 to 90 days. Humanitarian funding crisis at 3.4 percent
of need requires emergency donor mobilization closing massive gap or accepting operational
collapse with protection cascades including child recruitment acceleration and malnutrition crisis.
China diplomatic courting of Haiti necessitates competitive response through development
assistance acceleration or acceptance of potential Taiwan relationship termination affecting
regional influence calculations. Timing constraint is March to April period when multiple decision
windows converge including GSF deployment, ULCC investigation outcomes, TPS appellate
resolution, and electoral preparation milestone deadlines creating compressed timeframe for
policy adjustments.
Private Sector and Investors. Macroeconomic stability with gourde holding at 131 per dollar and
January customs revenue showing year-over-year increase provides short-term operational
continuity but security deterioration creates medium-term disruption risks. Kenscoff corridor
attacks threaten sole logistics route to southern departments requiring either aerial transport at
prohibitive costs or acceptance of gang checkpoint taxation affecting supply chain economics.
Gang leader Izo public impunity financing carnival activities signals state enforcement incapacity
creating business environment where criminal organizations operate without legal consequences
affecting investment climate and contract enforcement reliability. USCG port compliance deadline
approaching could trigger vessel denials at US ports if Haiti fails to meet international security
standards creating trade disruption scenarios for import-export operations. Workforce impacts
from accelerating deportations particularly in northern departments receiving TPS termination
flights may affect labor availability in sectors employing diaspora-connected populations. Water
quality findings showing 83 percent of packaged water failing standards creates public health
liability for corporate operations requiring independent testing protocols. Decision windows include
Q1 2026 for contingency planning on Kenscoff alternative routes, March to April for USCG
compliance response preparations, and immediate period for workforce assessment given TPS
uncertainty. Risk mitigation priorities center on logistics redundancy, compliance verification for
port operations, and supply chain diversification reducing single-point dependencies on
gang-controlled infrastructure.
Political Actors. The absence of functioning dialogue mechanisms since February 7 creates
February 15, 2026

strategic dilemma for opposition forces between accepting marginalization under PM unilateral
governance or organizing boycott campaigns risking international community censure. KTA
collective warning against unilateral governance establishes opposition messaging template but
lacks enforcement mechanisms given PM international backing strength. Electoral calendar
shows May 19 campaign start requiring party registration and candidate nomination processes
but CEP silence on compliance procedures creates uncertainty whether electoral framework will
accommodate opposition participation or proceed with limited field. The 220-plus registered
parties demonstrate fragmentation preventing unified alternative governance proposal giving PM
tactical advantage in negotiations. ULCC expanded investigations targeting former CPT members
create accountability pressure but also political weapon potential if prosecutions appear selective
rather than systematic affecting rule of law perceptions. Critical decision point is whether
opposition consolidates around single alternative framework before June or accepts participation
in August 30 process under current governance structure. Timing considerations include March 9
ULCC asset declaration deadline as first accountability test, April to May period for electoral
framework negotiations, and ongoing international engagement determining whether external
actors press for inclusive dialogue or maintain current PM backing. Strategic calculation centers
on whether boycott threat generates consultation concessions or whether international community
proceeds with elections despite limited political participation accepting legitimacy deficits to
maintain timeline.
Diaspora. TPS ruling expected before February 19 creates immediate legal status uncertainty for
350,000 beneficiaries affecting work authorization, deportation protection, and remittance
capacity. Judge Reyes stay denial preserves protections pending appeal but Trump administration
escalation to higher courts compresses decision timeline creating planning impossibility for
long-term commitments. DHS admission of possessing Springfield Ohio addresses signals
enforcement infrastructure preparation for targeted operations if legal protections eventually fall
creating demonstration effect concerns. Remittance flows represent critical economic lifeline as
approximately 60 percent of Haiti population lives on less than one dollar per day making sudden
disruption economically devastating for recipient households. Electoral participation provisions in
electoral law create diaspora voting opportunities but individuals facing deportation unlikely to
engage politically or consider return for voting purposes reducing diaspora electoral engagement
precisely when financial support most needed. Carnival closures February 16 to 18 reduce
consular service availability during critical TPS decision window creating administrative backlog if
adverse ruling requires documentation updates. Immediate priorities include monitoring US court
filings daily through February 19, preparing legal clinics for post-ruling guidance, and coordinating
with consular officials for extended service hours. Medium-term considerations center on whether
diaspora organizations maintain electoral engagement or shift focus to deportation defense
affecting political transition support and February 7, 2027 inauguration legitimacy. Strategic
question is whether diaspora maintains dual-track approach supporting democratic transition
while defending TPS protections or whether legal uncertainty forces complete prioritization of
immigration status preservation over Haiti political engagement.
February 15, 2026

SOURCES
Haiti Government Communication Office PM Fils-Aime national address February 7, 2026
France Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official statement on CPT end and transition February 9, 2026
OAS General Secretariat Statement E-019/26 on Haiti Political Transition
BINUH Statement on End of Transitional Presidential Council Mandate
United States Department of State Statement on Haiti Transition February 7, 2026
Canada Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand Statement February 9, 2026
Vant Bef Info Collegue Presidentiel CPR-001 communique February 9, 2026
Kolektif Tet Ansanm pou Ayiti Formal Note February 8, 2026
Better World Campaign Senate hearing analysis with Wooster and Holmes testimony February
10, 2026
International Rescue Committee Humanitarian collapse press release February 11, 2026
UNICEF ReliefWeb Child recruitment tripled report February 12, 2026
Taiwan Plus News China courting Haiti testimony February 12, 2026
US News Judge refuses stay on TPS ruling February 12, 2026
Le Nouvelliste English ULCC expands scrutiny beyond wealth declarations February 12, 2026
Le Nouvelliste CSPJ bars magistrates from political participation
HaitiLibre Anti-gang training center dedicated to specialized units
Tele Haiti and Pacific Kenscoff gang arson attacks February 13, 2026
Reuters Haiti CPT mandate transition coverage February 2026
CSIS Haiti Embarks on Another Rocky Political Transition February 8, 2026
UN News Haiti crisis at breaking point Security Council briefing January 20, 2026
Human Rights Watch World Report 2026 Haiti chapter
World Food Programme Haiti emergency 44 million gap and ration cuts January 14, 2026
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Haiti 2026 Security and Foreign Assistance Priorities
hearing record
AlterPresse Horizon toujours incertain Analysis February 10, 2026
February 15, 2026


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Exported: 2026-03-01 06:59 UTC
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