# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-11
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1](#development-1)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2](#development-2)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3](#development-3)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4](#development-4)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CARICOM issued a public warning January 9 that time is running out for Haiti's leaders to agree on
transition ahead of February 7 CPT mandate expiration revealing that despite talks by CARICOM
Eminent Persons Group UN BINUH OAS La Francophonie and US Canadian embassies these
actors have failed to get Haitians to resolve the political impasse with only agreement being that
CPT must leave office but how that will happen and who will ensure it remains unclear. Miami Herald
reported CPT members attempted to replace coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM
Fils-Aime removal while PM negotiates to remain after February 7 without presidential oversight
structure. National Route No. 1 remains impassable at Montrouis since January 6 severing
Port-au-Prince from northern Haiti. The 30-day Port-au-Prince operational pause continues.
Twenty-seven days until February 7.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CARICOM publicly warns time running out for February 7 transition with no consensus on post-CPT
governance framework despite multiple international actors holding talks.
CPT internal conflict exposed as members attempted to replace Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM
removal while PM Fils-Aime seeks to govern post-February 7 without CPT oversight.
National Route No. 1 impassable at Montrouis since January 6 blocking commercial and
humanitarian traffic between capital and northern Haiti demonstrating gang strategic control of
infrastructure chokepoints.
Port-au-Prince 30-day operational pause continues as longest sustained period without major gang
violence on record while Artibonite offensive persists with 1,120 displaced in Montrouis.
Twenty-seven days until February 7 CPT mandate expiration with window for coordinated action
narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk.



## DEVELOPMENT 1

CARICOM WARNING CONFIRMS INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION FAILURE ON FEBRUARY 7
TRANSITION
The Caribbean Community issued a public warning January 9 that time is running out for Haiti's
leaders to agree on transition ahead of the February 7 CPT mandate expiration representing the first
explicit acknowledgment by a major international actor that the transition remains unresolved with 27
days remaining. The warning issued by CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group reveals that despite
holding talks with council members and political leaders multiple international actors including UN
Integrated Office in Port-au-Prince La Francophonie Organization of American States and United
States and Canadian embassies have failed to get Haitians to resolve the political impasse. The
Miami Herald reports that the only agreement appears to be that the nine-member council must
leave office on February 7 but how that will happen and who will ensure it happens remain unclear.
January 11, 2026

The CARICOM warning confirms that the five-day silence observed January 7-11 in government
communications reflects negotiation failure rather than progress toward consensus. Multiple
proposals from international actors have not produced agreement on post-February 7 governance
frameworks including no consensus on replacement formula enforcement mechanism or institutional
continuity arrangements. The warning that time is running out suggests international actors now
recognize the window for coordinated action has narrowed to the next 10-14 days with delays
beyond late January creating risk of institutional vacuum on February 7. The absence of a specific
CARICOM proposal indicates international actors are waiting for Haitian-led solutions rather than
imposing frameworks revealing continued fragmentation between US positions favoring CPT
departure and Canadian positions supporting extension.
The timing of the CARICOM warning coincides with revelation of CPT internal fracturing over PM
Fils-Aime's future suggesting international actors are responding to deteriorating internal consensus
within Haitian institutions rather than external pressure. The warning represents public escalation
intended to pressure Haitian political actors including CPT members PM Fils-Aime political parties
and civil society to reach consensus immediately. With 27 days remaining until February 7 and no
visible progress toward agreed transition framework the CARICOM warning confirms Haiti faces
three possible scenarios: CPT extension requiring international legitimization and contradicting
Article 6.1 prohibition, PM-only governance post-February 7 without CPT oversight creating
constitutional ambiguity, or dual governance crisis if both CPT and PM claim legitimacy after
mandate expiration.
The CARICOM warning amplifies pressure on stakeholders to resolve transition within compressed
timeline while revealing fundamental weakness in international coordination mechanisms that have
failed to bridge US-Canada split on CPT extension or produce unified framework for post-February 7
governance.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM has maintained active engagement in Haiti's political transitions since 2004 through its
Eminent Persons Group mechanism which has historically mediated between Haitian political actors
and international community during institutional crises.



## TALKING POINTS

CARICOM publicly confirms international coordination failure on February 7 transition despite talks
by UN OAS La Francophonie US and Canada.
Only agreement is CPT must leave February 7 but no consensus on how departure happens or who
enforces it.
Window for coordinated action narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk.
January 11, 2026

International actors waiting for Haitian-led solutions rather than imposing frameworks revealing
continued US-Canada split on CPT extension.
CARICOM warning represents public escalation to pressure immediate consensus among Haitian
political actors with 27 days remaining.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International stakeholders should convene emergency coordination meeting January 12-15 to
reconcile competing positions on CPT extension versus PM-only governance and establish unified
framework for post-February 7 legitimization.
Political actors should prioritize consensus-building on transition mechanism January 12-20 focusing
on enforcement arrangements for CPT departure and institutional continuity provisions to prevent
dual governance crisis.
Civil society organizations should mobilize public pressure for transparent transition planning and
accountability mechanisms to ensure February 7 deadline compliance.
Diaspora networks should coordinate advocacy with CARICOM member states and international
partners to support Haitian-led transition solutions and prevent institutional vacuum.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2

CPT INTERNAL FRACTURING EXPOSES COMPETING POST-FEBRUARY 7 GOVERNANCE
SCENARIOS
The Miami Herald reported January 9 that CPT members were accused of trying to replace current
coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr who did not back attempts to get rid of Prime Minister Alix Didier
Fils-Aime exposing fundamental power struggle within the council over post-February 7 governance.
The report reveals Saint-Cyr and PM Fils-Aime form minority bloc supporting PM retention through
February 7 and Saint-Cyr retention as coordinator while CPT majority supports removing PM
Fils-Aime replacing Saint-Cyr and extending CPT mandate beyond February 7. The Miami Herald
confirmed the PM is trying to negotiate a deal to remain on after February 7 but without a
presidential oversight structure indicating strategy to govern alone post-mandate expiration without
CPT supervision.
The internal CPT conflict reached critical point during first full week after government resumption
with accusations of Saint-Cyr replacement attempt occurring in early January per this week
January 11, 2026

reference in January 9 report. The five-day silence observed January 7-11 in official CPT
communications likely reflects this internal crisis rather than external negotiations with international
actors. Vant Bef Info analysis published January 7 confirmed discussions are being raised about
possible reorganization of transition process or extension of current system without any official
decision having been announced yet indicating both options remain under consideration but no
consensus achieved. The CPT has not communicated new public calendar concerning next steps of
political process or organization of elections as of January 7 confirming institutional paralysis.
The Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict creates three distinct post-February 7 scenarios with
fundamentally different legitimacy and enforcement implications. Scenario A envisions CPT removes
Fils-Aime appoints new PM and extends CPT mandate beyond February 7 requiring international
legitimization and contradicting Article 6.1 prohibition against extension. Scenario B envisions PM
Fils-Aime survives through February 7 CPT dissolves on mandate expiration and PM governs alone
post-February 7 requiring no international legitimization since PM was appointed by CPT under
existing authority. Scenario C envisions stalemate where CPT cannot remove Fils-Aime due to
Saint-Cyr opposition CPT cannot extend mandate due to Article 6.1 prohibition and both CPT and
PM claim legitimacy post-February 7 creating dual governance crisis.
With 27 days until February 7 the Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict must resolve within next 7-14
days to prevent institutional vacuum or dual governance crisis on mandate expiration date with no
visible mechanism for forcing consensus among competing CPT factions.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 with nine members and rotating
coordinator position intended to provide collective presidential authority during transition period
toward elections with explicit mandate expiration date of February 7 2026 per Article 6.1.



## TALKING POINTS

CPT members attempted to replace coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM Fils-Aime
removal exposing fundamental internal power struggle.
Saint-Cyr and PM Fils-Aime form minority bloc opposing PM removal while CPT majority supports
removing PM and extending council mandate.
PM Fils-Aime negotiating to remain after February 7 without presidential oversight structure seeking
to govern alone without CPT supervision.
Three competing scenarios create fundamentally different legitimacy implications: CPT extension
requiring international support, PM-only governance under existing authority, or dual governance
crisis.
Internal conflict must resolve within 7-14 days to prevent institutional vacuum on February 7 with no
January 11, 2026

visible consensus mechanism.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CPT members should convene emergency internal session January 12-15 to resolve coordinator
dispute and establish unified position on post-February 7 governance preventing dual legitimacy
crisis.
PM Fils-Aime should clarify constitutional basis for governing without CPT oversight post-February 7
and secure explicit international recognition before mandate expiration to prevent legitimacy
challenges.
International mediators should facilitate direct negotiations between Saint-Cyr bloc and CPT majority
January 12-20 focusing on compromise framework that prevents institutional vacuum while
respecting Article 6.1 prohibition.
Civil society observers should monitor CPT internal decision-making processes and demand
transparent communication on transition plans to ensure accountability and prevent backroom deals.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3

NATIONAL ROUTE NO. 1 SEVERANCE DEMONSTRATES GANG STRATEGIC CONTROL OF
INFRASTRUCTURE CHOKEPOINTS
OCHA and Haiti Libre reports confirmed January 6-10 that National Route No. 1 has been
impassable at the Montrouis segment as of January 6 severing Port-au-Prince from northern Haiti
and blocking commercial and humanitarian traffic between the capital and Cap-Haitien. The route
impassability results from December 23 gang attack on Montrouis that displaced 1,120 individuals
who fled to Saint-Marc municipality with IOM confirming 225 households affected. The security
situation remains precarious and unstable significantly impacting humanitarian access in various
locations within Saint-Marc municipality as well as along National Route No. 1 which serves as
primary artery connecting West Department to Artibonite Centre and Nord Departments.
The National Route No. 1 severance represents critical operational development with strategic
implications for Haiti's crisis trajectory. The route connects Port-au-Prince population 2.6 million to
Cap-Haitien population approximately 500,000 and serves as primary commercial corridor for food
fuel and goods movement between capital and northern agricultural hubs. Its impassability since
January 6 means commercial traffic halted between regions humanitarian aid delivery to Nord
Department severely constrained and economic isolation of northern Haiti from capital's markets
January 11, 2026

banks and services. The Montrouis blockage demonstrates gang strategic control of chokepoints on
Haiti's primary infrastructure including National Route No. 1 at Montrouis segment Port-au-Prince
airport and port under periodic threat and Artibonite agricultural corridor under gang control per
MOPAL January 4 assessment.
showing gangs consolidating control of peripheral regions including Artibonite and Plateau Central
while maintaining 30-day operational pause in Port-au-Prince effectively surrounding and isolating
the capital. PM Fils-Aime's January 10 statement claiming 2026 will be year of security and that fear
has changed sides with security forces recovering territories previously under gang control is directly
contradicted by National Route No. 1 impassability since January 6 five days before statement,
1,120 displaced in Montrouis December 23, and MOPAL assessment confirming gangs control
quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince Artibonite and Plateau Central. The PM's optimistic messaging
appears designed to legitimize strategy revealed by Miami Herald to remain on after February 7
without presidential oversight structure suggesting post-February 7 governance claim will rest on
security progress narratives operationally unsupported by infrastructure and displacement evidence.
The National Route No. 1 severance combined with PM's contradictory security claims creates
information environment where government messaging diverges fundamentally from operational
reality complicating stakeholder assessment of transition viability and governance legitimacy
post-February 7.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

National Route No. 1 has historically served as Haiti's primary north-south artery since colonial era
connecting capital to major northern cities and agricultural regions with economic and humanitarian
significance amplified during crisis periods requiring aid distribution and population movement.



## TALKING POINTS

National Route No. 1 impassable at Montrouis since January 6 severing Port-au-Prince from
Cap-Haitien and northern Haiti blocking commercial and humanitarian traffic.
December 23 gang attack displaced 1,120 individuals to Saint-Marc demonstrating gang control of
strategic infrastructure chokepoints beyond Port-au-Prince.
Route severance halts food fuel and goods movement between capital and northern agricultural
hubs creating economic isolation and humanitarian access constraints.
PM Fils-Aime January 10 claim that security forces recovering territories directly contradicted by
route impassability and continued displacement five days before statement.
Infrastructure crisis reveals divergence between government security messaging and operational
reality complicating stakeholder assessment of transition viability.
January 11, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian actors should establish alternative supply routes to northern Haiti bypassing
Montrouis segment and coordinate with security forces on convoy protection to maintain aid delivery
capacity.
International observers should independently verify government security claims against operational
evidence including route accessibility displacement figures and gang territorial control assessments
before legitimizing post-February 7 governance arrangements.
Private sector actors should assess supply chain vulnerabilities created by infrastructure severance
and develop contingency plans for continued operations under route impassability scenarios.
Media organizations should systematically cross-reference government security statements with
independent operational reporting to provide accurate information environment for stakeholder
decision-making.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4

THIRTY-DAY PORT-AU-PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE CONTINUES AS LONGEST SUSTAINED
PERIOD WITHOUT GANG VIOLENCE
Port-au-Prince marked January 11 with zero new major gang security incidents completing 30
consecutive days without major gang violence from December 21 through January 11 representing
the longest sustained operational pause on record. January 11 follows pattern of 29-day pause
December 21 through January 10 with no incidents reported by Haiti Libre Haiti24 Le Nouvelliste or
other monitored sources as of 5:21 PM EST. The pause continues despite ongoing Artibonite
offensive including December 23 Montrouis attack that displaced 1,120 individuals and January 6
confirmation that National Route No. 1 remains impassable at Montrouis segment demonstrating
geographic shift in gang operational focus from capital to peripheral regions.
The 30-day pause contradicts PM Fils-Aime January 10 claim that 2026 will be year of security
based on progress made by security forces in recovering territories and that fear has changed sides
referring to progressive weakening of criminal groups. The operational pause suggests gang
strategic calculation rather than security force success with gangs maintaining territorial control in
Port-au-Prince while consolidating positions in Artibonite and Plateau Central per MOPAL January 4
assessment confirming gangs control quasi-totality of these regions. The pause may represent
preparation phase for resumed operations targeting February 7 institutional transition or strategic
January 11, 2026

repositioning to exploit CPT internal fracturing and approaching mandate expiration deadline.
The continuation of operational pause through January 11 creates 30-day window for government
and international actors to resolve February 7 transition planning without active gang violence
complicating security operations. However the pause combined with ongoing Artibonite offensive
and National Route No. 1 severance indicates gang capacity for resumed operations remains intact
with strategic positioning around capital infrastructure rather than territorial retreat. Vant Bef Info
January 7 analysis confirming vast areas of country still escape control of law enforcement despite
Saint-Cyr institutional and diplomatic initiatives corroborates assessment that operational pause
reflects gang strategic choice not security force gains.
With 27 days until February 7 the operational pause creates compressed window for transition
resolution while gang positioning around infrastructure chokepoints and peripheral territorial
consolidation suggests potential for rapid escalation if political impasse continues through mandate
expiration date.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous sustained operational pauses in Port-au-Prince typically preceded major gang offensives
including March 2024 airport siege and coordinated attacks on government infrastructure with
historical pattern showing pauses as preparation phases rather than permanent de-escalation.



## TALKING POINTS

Thirty consecutive days without major Port-au-Prince gang violence December 21 through January
11 represents longest sustained operational pause on record.
Pause continues despite ongoing Artibonite offensive including 1,120 displaced in Montrouis and
National Route No. 1 impassability since January 6 showing geographic shift in gang operations.
Operational pause suggests gang strategic calculation rather than security force success with
territorial control maintained while consolidating peripheral positions.
Historical pattern shows operational pauses typically precede major offensives suggesting potential
for rapid escalation around February 7 institutional transition.
Thirty-day window creates opportunity for transition resolution without active gang violence but gang
capacity for resumed operations remains intact.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security planners should utilize 30-day operational pause to accelerate February 7 transition
preparations assuming pause may end abruptly around mandate expiration date.
January 11, 2026

Intelligence analysts should monitor gang positioning and communications for indicators of resumed
operations particularly targeting February 7 institutional vulnerabilities or exploiting CPT internal
fracturing.
Government actors should avoid interpreting operational pause as permanent security gains and
maintain contingency plans for rapid escalation scenarios during transition period.
International partners should coordinate security support during remaining 27 days to capitalize on
operational pause window while preparing for potential gang offensive around February 7 deadline.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for CPT or PM Fils-Aime public statements addressing CARICOM January 9 warning and
Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict revealed by Miami Herald indicating whether internal impasse will
be acknowledged or denied.
Track for emergency international coordination meetings convened by CARICOM UN or OAS
January 12-13 to reconcile competing positions on CPT extension versus PM-only governance
showing escalation of diplomatic pressure.
Observe for resumption of gang violence in Port-au-Prince ending 30-day operational pause
particularly targeting government infrastructure or symbolic locations signaling exploitation of
institutional fracturing.



## THIS WEEK

Watch for CPT internal session January 12-17 to resolve coordinator dispute and establish unified
position on post-February 7 governance determining whether Saint-Cyr retains position or CPT
majority replaces coordinator.
Monitor for international mediator proposals January 13-17 from CARICOM UN or bilateral actors
offering specific frameworks for February 7 transition showing shift from waiting for Haitian
consensus to imposing external solutions.
Track for National Route No. 1 accessibility updates indicating whether Montrouis segment reopens
or remains impassable affecting commercial and humanitarian traffic between Port-au-Prince and
January 11, 2026

northern Haiti.
Observe for PM Fils-Aime clarification of constitutional basis for post-February 7 governance without
CPT oversight revealing strategy to legitimize PM-only authority after mandate expiration.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

Twenty-seven days until February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration with window for coordinated
international action narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk becomes acute.
Three competing post-February 7 scenarios remain unresolved: CPT extension requiring
international legitimization and contradicting Article 6.1 prohibition, PM-only governance under
existing appointment authority, or dual governance crisis if both CPT and PM claim legitimacy.
Gang strategic positioning around infrastructure chokepoints and 30-day operational pause
suggests capacity for rapid escalation exploiting institutional transition vulnerabilities with historical
pattern showing pauses precede major offensives.
US-Canada split on CPT extension remains unresolved preventing unified international framework
for transition legitimization with CARICOM warning confirming coordination failure despite multiple
actor engagement.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Miami Herald Caribbean Coverage January 9 2026
Vant Bef Info Analysis on Laurent Saint-Cyr Five Month Assessment January 7 2026
Haiti Libre Daily News Coverage January 2026
OCHA Relief Web Haiti Armed Attacks and Population Displacement Montrouis Update No. 1
January 6 2026
De Ultimo Minuto Report on PM Fils-Aime Statement January 10 2026
Le Nouvelliste Haiti Daily News Monitoring January 11 2026
Haiti24 News Monitoring January 11 2026
IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Artibonite Assessment January 2026
MOPAL Security Assessment January 4 2026
UN Integrated Office BINUH Haiti Reporting January 2026
Organization of American States Haiti Monitoring January 2026
La Francophonie Haiti Engagement Reports January 2026
US Embassy Port-au-Prince Public Communications January 2026
January 11, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*