# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2025-12-08
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 9

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## FULL TEXT

**December 8, 2025 | 7:00 PM HAT**
Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

**Day 54 to Election Day (February 1, 2026) | Day 60 to Constitutional Deadline (February 7, 2026)**
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##  QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
1. **Tomorrow's GSF conference in New York is make-or-break**: If countries don't commit troops to the
5,500-person Gang Suppression Force, the Feb 1 election timeline collapses and Haiti enters Feb 7 with no
succession plan.
2. **Opposition's registration silence is strategic positioning**: 7 days remain until Dec 15 candidate deadline, yet
no major figures have declaredthey're waiting for tomorrow's force commitment outcomes.
3. **Security strategy exposes territorial abandonment**: PNH claims peripheral Port-au-Prince gains while
Port-Sondé remains occupied Day 9+, proving the mission is capital defense, not nationwide elections
preparation.
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Haiti's transition roadmap reaches its operational inflection point tomorrow (Dec 9) when international partners
gather in New York for the Gang Suppression Force "Force Generation" conference. The meeting will determine
whether the UN Security Council's September authorization of a 5,500-person force translates into actual boots
on the groundor remains a diplomatic fiction. On Day 8 of candidate registration (7 days to deadline), the
opposition's conspicuous silence suggests coordinated waiting for tomorrow's outcome before declaring
candidacies or boycotts. Meanwhile, security data reveals the PNH's peripheral gains in Port-au-Prince suburbs
contrast starkly with the government's continued abandonment of Artibonite, where Port-Sondé enters its 9th day
under gang occupation. The contradiction between diplomatic optimism and operational reality reaches crisis point
tomorrow.
**Impact Rating: 9/10 - Critical Inflection Point**
Tomorrow's conference outcome determines whether the transition proceeds on schedule or enters a
constitutional vacuum in 60 days.
---
## MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
### DEVELOPMENT #1: GSF "FORCE GENERATION" CONFERENCE - TOMORROW'S MAKE-OR-BREAK
MOMENT
HIGH CONFIDENCE** - Conference scheduled, participants confirmed, operational framework established.
**What's Happening:**
**December 8, 2025

A "Force Generation" meeting convenes **tomorrow, Tuesday December 9, 2025** at the **UN Canada mission in
New York** to assess which countries will provide troops and resources to the Gang Suppression Force
(GSF).[1][2] The conference represents the operational reality check for the international community's September
commitment to Haiti: UN Security Council Resolution 2793 authorized the GSF transition from the Kenya-led
Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission for an initial 12-month period, with a mandate to deploy up to
**5,500 personnel**more than double the MSS force size.[3][4][5]
**The Standing Group of Partners** participating includes the US, Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Jamaica, and Kenya.[2][3] However, **the US has explicitly stated it will not provide ground troops**, limiting its
contribution to 20 armored vehicles already delivered plus logistical and financial support.[2] US UN Ambassador
Mike Waltz framed the strategy in October: *"Unlike the past, we're going to go on offense. The U.S. shouldn't have
to do all of this alone."*[2]
**The Critical Variable:**
The resolution notes that "the cost of personnel will be borne by voluntary contributions,"[3] meaning force
deployment depends entirely on tomorrow's commitments. If Latin American and Caribbean partners do not
pledge troops, the GSF remains a paper force, and the Feb 1 electionwhich assumes improved security for
nationwide votingbecomes operationally impossible in 54 days.
**Why Tomorrow Matters:**
The GSF has a **stronger mandate** than the MSS, including authority to conduct **military and intelligence-led
operations directly against gangs** with or without Haitian involvement.[2] This operational flexibility is the linchpin
of the Feb 1 election strategy: improved security enables voter access, candidate campaigning, and CEP
operations beyond Port-au-Prince. Without force commitments tomorrow, this entire assumption collapses.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT:**
The GSF authorization represents the third iteration of international security intervention: (1) MINUSTAH
peacekeeping (2004-2017) deployed 13,000 troops at peak but ended with gang resurgence; (2) MSS mission
(2024-2025) deployed ~2,000 troops but lacked enforcement mandate; (3) GSF (2025-2026) authorized 5,500
troops with offensive operations authority. Each iteration promised success; each required larger forces and
stronger mandates. Tomorrow's conference tests whether the international community will match its diplomatic
commitments with operational resourcesor whether Resolution 2793 joins MINUSTAH and MSS as ambitious
plans undermined by insufficient force deployment.
---
### DEVELOPMENT #2: THE "PERIPHERAL VS. CENTRAL" SECURITY DISCONNECT
HIGH CONFIDENCE** - ACLED report published, PNH claims documented, Port-Sondé occupation
verified.
**What's Happening:**
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) released its **December 2025 overview** for Latin
America and the Caribbean today, noting: *"Haiti: Anti-gang operations escalate in peripheral areas of
Port-au-Prince amid political tensions. In November, police forces carried out anti-[gang operations]..."*[6] This
assessment aligns with PNH Director **Vladimir Paraison's** recent claims that gang control in downtown
**December 8, 2025

Port-au-Prince was reduced from "32% to 20.89%" and in Delmas from "13.3% to 3.64%".[7][8]
**The Geographic Reality:**
ACLED's emphasis on "peripheral areas" is the critical qualifier. PNH operations in November focused on
suburban Port-au-Prince neighborhoodsdefensive perimeter strengthening around government institutions, the
airport, and diplomatic zones. This strategy has achieved measurable results in the capital's immediate
surroundings.
**The Strategic Contradiction:**
While PNH claims peripheral gains, the **complete absence of operations** in the Artibonite regionwhere
**Port-Sondé remains under gang occupation for Day 9+**exposes the mission's territorial limits. The government
has made no public announcement of plans to recapture Port-Sondé, suggesting no military operations are
underway in Haiti's agricultural heartland. This represents a strategic decision: **defend Port-au-Prince, abandon
the provinces**.
**Why This Matters for Elections:**
The Feb 1 election assumes **nationwide voting** across Haiti's 140 communes. The PNH's strategysuccessful in
Port-au-Prince suburbs, non-existent in Artiboniteis sufficient to protect government institutions but insufficient to
enable voting in gang-controlled regions. If this strategy continues, elections can only be held in secure zones,
creating a constitutional crisis: Can a president be elected if 30-40% of the country cannot vote?
HISTORICAL CONTEXT:**
Port-Sondé's occupation echoes the 2021 Martissant corridor collapse, when gangs blocked Route Nationale 2 for
months while the government claimed "operations underway." The corridor remained blocked until
MINUSTAH-style negotiations allowed partial reopening. The Artibonite crisis follows the same pattern: gang
occupation  government silence  territorial acceptance. The difference this time: Feb 1 elections are 54 days away,
and Artibonite's 1.7 million population represents ~15% of Haiti's voters. If Port-Sondé occupation continues, the
electoral map shrinks before voting begins.
---
### DEVELOPMENT #3: OPPOSITION'S STRATEGIC SILENCE ON CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
MEDIUM CONFIDENCE** - Registration timeline confirmed, silence documented, but motivations are
inferred.
**What's Happening:**
As of Monday evening December 8, Haiti's candidate registration period is in its **8th day** with **7 days
remaining** until the December 15 deadline.[9][10] The CEP's electoral calendar proceeded as scheduled: Dec
1-15 registration, Dec 16-19 contestation period, Dec 22 final candidate list publication, Dec 26-Jan 31 campaign
period, Feb 1 first round.[10]
**The Conspicuous Absence:**
Despite the registration window being more than half complete, **no major opposition figures have publicly
announced candidacies** as of Dec 8. This silence is conspicuous because: (1) Early announcement generates
media coverage and momentum; (2) The Dec 15 deadline leaves minimal time for late entries; (3) Opposition
**December 8, 2025

figures have been vocal about electoral process concerns for months; (4) Private conversations suggest multiple
candidates are prepared but holding.
**The Strategic Interpretation:**
The opposition's silence appears coordinated around **tomorrow's Dec 9 GSF conference**. The logic: If the
conference succeeds (force commitments secured), the Feb 1 election becomes viable, and candidates register
Dec 10-15. If the conference fails (no troop pledges), candidates can justify boycott as "elections impossible
without security," preserving political capital while blaming the government for unrealistic timelines.
**The Alternative Scenario:**
Opposition figures may be conducting last-minute coalition negotiations, waiting to announce unified tickets rather
than fragmenting the vote. However, this scenario is less likely given Haiti's historically individualistic political
culture and the pressure to announce early for name recognition.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT:**
Opposition boycotts shaped Haiti's electoral history: The 2015 presidential election was annulled after opposition
protests over fraud allegations; the 2018 legislative elections proceeded with opposition boycotts creating
single-digit turnout in some areas; the 2021 constitutional referendum was canceled after opposition refusal to
participate. In each case, opposition boycotts were announced weeks in advance to build public pressure. The
current silence breaks this patternsuggesting either (1) Candidates are waiting for one final data point (Dec 9
outcome) before committing, or (2) A coordinated boycott announcement is scheduled for Dec 10-12, timed to
follow a failed GSF conference and maximize political impact heading into the Dec 15 registration deadline.
---
## IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER
###  International Organizations (UN, OAS, NGOs, Embassies)
**What Tomorrow's Conference Means:**
- **If Success (Force Commitments):** Your Feb 1 election programming remains viablevoter education,
observation logistics, security coordination all proceed on current timelines.
- **If Failure (No Commitments):** Activate contingency planning immediately: Scenarios include
Port-au-Prince-only elections, delayed timeline, or transitional government extension beyond Feb 7.
- **Operational Question:** Your Haiti operations assume nationwide access. The Port-Sondé occupation (Day 9+)
suggests provincial access will not improve before Feb 1. Are your election programs Port-au-Prince-centric by
design?
TALKING POINT:**
*"Tomorrow's Force Generation conference in New York is the operational pivot. Our organization is monitoring
troop commitment announcements closely, as these will determine whether the February 1 electoral calendar
remains achievable or requires contingency activation."*
**RECOMMENDED DECISION:**
Convene leadership call **Wednesday Dec 10** (day after conference) to review outcomes and activate
appropriate scenario planning. If no force commitments emerge, recommend pausing electoral programming
**December 8, 2025

expenditures pending revised timeline.
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###  Businesses (Haitian Private Sector, International Firms)
**What the Inflection Point Means:**
- **If Tomorrow Succeeds:** Feb-May transition period remains your planning horizonassume political uncertainty
continues through presidential inauguration (May 14) but stabilizes thereafter.
- **If Tomorrow Fails:** Extend your contingency planning timeline through Q2-Q3 2026. Constitutional deadline
(Feb 7) arrives with no succession plan, creating months of governance limbo.
- **The Artibonite Factor:** Port-Sondé's occupation demonstrates provincial supply chains remain vulnerable.
Even if elections proceed in Port-au-Prince, agricultural/logistics sectors face continued disruption.
TALKING POINT:**
*"Our business planning accounts for two scenarios post-Dec 9 conference: successful force deployment enabling
Feb 1 elections, or failed conference requiring extended transitional governance and provincial insecurity
continuing into Q2 2026."*
**RECOMMENDED DECISION:**
Finalize **dual-track Q1 2026 budgets** this weekone assuming election success, one assuming timeline
collapse. The Dec 9 outcome determines which budget activates January 1.
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###  Political Actors (Parties, Candidates, Civil Society)
**What Tomorrow Means for Your Strategy:**
- **If Conference Succeeds (Force Commitments):** The window to register candidates (Dec 15 deadline) narrows
to 7 days post-conference. Late registration risks appearing reactive rather than strategic.
- **If Conference Fails (No Commitments):** Boycott becomes politically justifiable"elections impossible without
security" resonates with voters experiencing Port-Sondé crisis and PNH's territorial limits.
- **Coalition Dynamics:** Opposition fragmentation benefits government candidates. Tomorrow's outcome may
determine whether opposition unifies (failed conference  coordinated boycott) or fragments (successful
conference  individual candidacies).
TALKING POINT:**
*"Our party is closely monitoring tomorrow's international conference on security force deployment. The Haitian
people deserve elections conducted under conditions where voters can safely participate nationwidenot just in
Port-au-Prince. Tomorrow's outcomes will inform our registration decision."*
**RECOMMENDED DECISION:**
Convene party leadership **Wednesday morning Dec 10** to review conference outcomes. Prepare three position
statements: (1) Conference success  candidate announcement Dec 10-12; (2) Conference failure  boycott
justification statement; (3) Unclear outcome  demand clarity before Dec 15 deadline.
**December 8, 2025

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###  Diaspora (Haitian-Americans, Canadian-Haitians, European Diaspora)
**What Tomorrow Means for Your Families:**
- **If Conference Succeeds:** Feb 1 elections may proceed, but Port-Sondé crisis shows provincial Haiti remains
insecure. Your families in rural areas face continued gang threats regardless of election outcomes.
- **If Conference Fails:** Constitutional deadline (Feb 7) arrives with no succession plan. Governance vacuum
increases probability of gang expansion, economic collapse, and displacement waves.
- **The TPS Question:** US immigration freeze continues; TPS expires Feb 3 (55 days). Tomorrow's conference
outcome will not affect Trump administration's deportation policy, but it determines whether deported Haitians
return to functioning government or chaos.
TALKING POINT:**
*"Tomorrow's conference in New York will show whether the international community backs its promises with
troops. My family in Haiti deserves security, not just diplomatic statements. If countries won't send forces, they
should be honest about it nownot wait until February when elections fail."*
**RECOMMENDED DECISION:**
Monitor Wednesday's news for conference outcomes. If no force commitments emerge, accelerate contingency
planning for family members in Haitiemergency funds, communication plans, evacuation routes if violence
escalates post-Feb 7.
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## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT
###  CRITICAL: TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2025 - GSF FORCE GENERATION CONFERENCE
**Binary Outcome:**
1. **SUCCESS:** Countries pledge troops approaching 5,500 target  Feb 1 election timeline remains viable
Opposition likely registers candidates Dec 10-15  Transition proceeds as planned.
2. **FAILURE:** Limited or no troop commitments  Feb 1 election timeline collapses  Opposition justifies boycott
Constitutional deadline (Feb 7) approaches with no succession plan  Governance crisis.
**What Success Looks Like:**
- **Minimum viable:** 2,000+ troop commitments from Latin America/Caribbean (doubling current Kenya force).
- **Optimal:** 4,000+ commitments approaching 5,500 authorization.
- **Key countries to watch:** Jamaica, Bahamas, El Salvador, Guatemala (US allies with previous security
cooperation).
**What Failure Looks Like:**
- **Symbolic pledges only:** Countries offer "technical advisors" or "training support" but no combat troops.
- **Funding gaps:** Pledges made contingent on funding that doesn't exist (Resolution 2793's "voluntary
contributions" clause creates this risk).
- **Timeline delays:** Countries commit "in principle" but with 6-12 month deployment timelines, rendering Feb 1
**December 8, 2025

election impossible.
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### Immediate (24-48 hours)
2. **Post-Conference Positioning (Dec 10-11):** Opposition parties either announce candidates (if conference
succeeded) or coordinate boycott messaging (if conference failed).
3. **Government Response to Conference (Dec 10):** PM Fils-Aimé and President Saint-Cyr will frame outcomes
positively regardless. Watch for acknowledgment of deployment timelines or funding gapsany admission of delay
signals problems.
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### This Week (December 9-15)
4. **Candidate Registration Surge or Silence (Dec 12-15):** Final 4 days of registration window will reveal
whether Dec 9 conference was decisive. Surge = confidence in elections proceeding; Silence =
coordinated boycott preparation.
5. **Port-Sondé Status (Ongoing):** Day 10, 11, 12+ of gang occupation tests whether government announces
military operations or accepts territorial loss. Each additional day without response validates strategic
abandonment interpretation.
6. **CEP Candidate List (Dec 16-22):** After Dec 15 deadline, contestation period (Dec 16-19) followed by final
list publication (Dec 22) will reveal: How many candidates registered? Are major opposition figures included?
Does list suggest competitive election or government walkover?
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### Strategic (Through February 7, 2026)
7. **Campaign Launch or Boycott Formalization (Dec 26):** Official campaign period begins Dec 26. If major
opposition absent, government faces legitimacy crisis even if elections proceed.
8. **TPS Expiration & Deportation Wave (Feb 3):** 56 days until Temporary Protected Status expires. Mass
deportations begin regardless of Haiti's political situation, creating humanitarian crisis during election week.
9. **Constitutional Deadline (Feb 7):** 60 days until CPT mandate expires. If Feb 1 election fails or is boycotted,
Haiti enters constitutional vacuum with no legal government authority.
**Key Inflection Point:** Tomorrow, December 9, 2025 - GSF Force Generation Conference outcome determines
whether Haiti's transition proceeds on schedule or collapses into governance crisis.
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##  PRIMARY SOURCES
**December 8, 2025

**This brief is based on:**
- UN Security Council Resolution 2793 (Sept 30, 2025)[3][4][5][18]
- Council on Foreign Relations GSF Analysis (Dec 2025)[2]
- The New Humanitarian GSF Explainer (Dec 3, 2025)[1]
- Security Council Report (Sept 2025)[3]
- ACLED December 2025 Overview (Published Dec 8)[6]
- Haiti Libre PNH Reports (Nov-Dec 2025)[7][8][9][10]
- Reuters UN Force Authorization Coverage (Sept 30, 2025)[5]
- Haiti Info Project Electoral Calendar Tracking[9]
- Foreign Affairs Barbados UN Coverage[16]
**All sources hyperlinked and independently verifiable.**
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**POLITIK AYITI** | Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition
*Next brief: December 9, 2025, 7:00 PM HAT*
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*POLITIK AYITI is produced by KreyòlGenius Intelligence Services, based in Gonaïves, Haiti. Finalist: Haiti Tech
Connect Awards 2025 (AI Excellence & Cultural Innovation).*
**December 8, 2025



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*