# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2025-12-13
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 10

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: The Silent Registration Mystery](#development-1-the-silent-registration-mystery)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: Bel-Air Six Day Massacre With Zero Government Response](#development-2-bel-air-six-day-massacre-with-zero-government-response)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: The Sanon Liability Effect](#development-3-the-sanon-liability-effect)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Candidate registration closes Sunday with zero major public declarations reported across all media channels over
the past 72 hours, suggesting either coordinated private submissions to avoid gang targeting or an opposition
boycott waiting to delegitimize the process after the deadline. The Bel-Air massacre enters its sixth consecutive
day with at least 60 dead and zero government statements or police intervention, exposing the administration's
deliberate non-intervention strategy allowing Viv Ansanm to self-purge through internal conflict. Kempes Sanon's
violent overthrow occurred just seven weeks after UN sanctions designation, demonstrating that international
pressure can destabilize gang leadership while triggering succession violence that claims civilian lives.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Registration deadline Sunday December 15 shows complete silence from major opposition figures across all
Haitian and international media for 72 hours suggesting either private submissions or coordinated boycott
strategy. Bel-Air violence continues sixth day with 60 plus dead including 19 women executed and high-profile
gang leaders ousted with zero government response or police deployment. Kempes Sanon UN sanctions October
16 preceded his December 8 violent removal by seven weeks indicating sanctions destabilize gang leadership but
trigger deadly succession battles. December 22 candidate list publication will provide first definitive evidence of
electoral viability and opposition participation. Port-Sonde remains under gang control for 14 consecutive days
with no police reinforcements deployed to Artibonite region.
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS



## DEVELOPMENT 1: The Silent Registration Mystery

CONFIDENCE
Medium Confidence. The December 1 through 15 candidate registration period is confirmed through CEP
official calendar and Haiti Info Project reporting. The absence of major candidate announcements is
observable fact across mainstream Haitian media including Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, and AlterPresse
plus international outlets. However, the interpretation of this silence requires analysis as the CEP has not
released registration numbers and candidates may be submitting paperwork privately. Social media
speculation about Jean Ernest Muscadin candidacy remains unverified and appears to be unofficial
commentary rather than CEP announcement.
What's Happening
The candidate registration period enters its final 48 hours on Sunday December 15 with a striking pattern of
complete silence from major political figures. No prominent opposition leaders have held press conferences
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

announcing candidacies. No major political parties including Fanmi Lavalas, PHTK, or OPL have issued public
statements about registration completion or candidate selections. This absence contrasts sharply with typical
Haitian electoral cycles where presidential candidate declarations generate massive media coverage, street
demonstrations, and political theater. The silence spans both Haitian outlets including Haiti Libre and Le
Nouvelliste and international wire services including Reuters and AFP. Social media contains unverified
speculation including a Facebook post mentioning vigilante leader Jean Ernest Muscadin as potential candidate,
but this appears to be commentary rather than official CEP confirmation. The registration fees remain substantial
at 1,000,000 gourdes approximately 7,500 USD for presidency with women receiving 50 percent discount.
Eligibility requirements specify candidates must be Haitian-born, never renounced citizenship, 35 years or older,
Haitian property owner, and resident for five years minimum.
Why This Matters
The registration silence creates three distinct scenarios each with profound implications for the August 30 election
viability. Scenario One involves private registration where candidates submit paperwork directly to the CEP without
media announcements to avoid gang targeting in the current security environment or to prevent premature
political attacks from rivals. This would be unprecedented in Haitian political culture which traditionally celebrates
public candidate launches but might reflect adaptation to gang territorial control making public gatherings
dangerous. Scenario Two involves last-minute declarations where major figures wait until December 15 final day to
announce candidacies creating dramatic political moment while maximizing strategic surprise against opponents.
This tactic has precedent in previous electoral cycles where candidates delayed announcements to control news
cycles. Scenario Three involves coordinated opposition boycott where major parties deliberately abstain from
registration then denounce the process as illegitimate after the December 15 deadline passes. This strategy would
delegitimize the entire electoral timeline and provide justification for refusing to participate in August 30 voting. The
December 22 candidate list publication by the CEP will definitively reveal which scenario is operative. A robust list
showing major party participation and prominent opposition figures would validate Scenario One or Two. A
minimal list lacking recognizable names or major party candidates would confirm Scenario Three boycott strategy.
The implications for electoral legitimacy are profound as elections without major opposition participation would
face immediate credibility challenges from losing parties, skeptical international observers, and diaspora
communities questioning whether results represent genuine democratic choice.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haitian electoral cycles historically feature elaborate candidate announcement events with political parties staging
massive rallies, street demonstrations, and prime-time press conferences to launch candidacies. The 2015-2016
electoral cycle demonstrated opposition boycott strategies when multiple rounds of voting were annulled after
parties withdrew participation claiming fraud and irregularities. Those boycotts created precedent for using
electoral process delegitimization as political strategy. The current transition context where the CPT and CEP
were imposed through CARICOM international mediation rather than emerging from national consensus creates
additional boycott risk as opposition figures question institutional legitimacy. Major opposition leaders including
former presidents Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Michel Martelly plus prominent senators have not publicly
committed to participating in 2026 elections. The registration period timing during December when diaspora
political actors traditionally travel to Haiti would typically see increased announcement activity making the current
silence more notable. Previous elections saw candidates announce months before registration deadlines to build
name recognition and organizational infrastructure.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: Bel-Air Six Day Massacre With Zero Government Response

Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

CONFIDENCE
High Confidence. Multiple authoritative international news agencies including Latin Times, KSAT News,
and ABC News confirm the ongoing Bel-Air violence beginning December 8 with death toll
documentation. Latin Times published December 13 explicitly stating at least 49 killed, burned, or
mutilated with number expected to rise as area remains inaccessible. Specific casualties are documented
including 19 gang members, 10 child recruits, 19 women partners of gang members, and one elderly man
struck by stray bullet. High-profile leadership changes are confirmed with Kempes Sanon shot, injured,
and replaced by rivals Jamesly and Ti Gason. Video statement from Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier confirms
Viv Ansanm ordered the attack. No government statements or police intervention reports appear in any
media sources through Saturday evening December 13.
What's Happening
The Krache Dife gang assault on rival Viv Ansanm factions in Bel-Air has now continued for six consecutive days
from December 8 through 13 with steadily mounting casualties. The confirmed death toll reached at least 49 with
human rights groups expecting the number to rise as the neighborhood remains inaccessible to authorities and
humanitarian organizations. Documented victims include 19 gang members killed in the fighting, 10 children who
were gang recruits, 19 women who were partners of gang members executed by Krache Dife forces, and one
elderly man in his sixties struck by stray bullet. High-profile casualties transformed Viv Ansanm leadership
structure with Kempes Sanon, a former police officer sanctioned by the United States in October 2025, shot and
wounded then replaced by two rivals named Jamesly and Ti Gason while he received medical treatment. Another
gang leader known as Dede was beheaded during the violence. Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier who leads the broader
Viv Ansanm coalition released video statement December 9 confirming he ordered the attack to stop kidnappings
stating they will not be kidnapping ever again and sending message to all generals. A recent United Nations report
noted Sanon played significant role in consolidating gang power in Port-au-Prince particularly through involvement
in Viv Ansanm alliance and maintained network of individuals within governmental institutions including security
agencies enabling him to evade arrest and facilitate criminal activities. As of Saturday evening December 13 no
official government statement has addressed the six days of ongoing violence, no Haitian National Police
deployment has been reported to stop the fighting or restore order, and no humanitarian access has been granted
to the affected neighborhood.
Why This Matters
The six-day duration without any government response represents fundamental policy decision rather than
operational incapacity. The Haitian National Police deliberate non-intervention signals strategic acceptance of
gang self-purging doctrine where the administration calculates that allowing rival factions to weaken each other
through internal conflict ultimately benefits eventual state operations when government forces move to retake
territory. This strategy treats gang-controlled neighborhoods as zones where extreme violence is tolerated
provided it does not threaten government institutions, commercial areas, or critical infrastructure. The calculation
appears to be that Viv Ansanm internal warfare will reduce overall gang combat effectiveness making future
security operations less costly in officer casualties and resources. However, this gambit carries massive costs
including normalization of multi-day urban warfare in the capital, complete state absence from affected
neighborhoods, zero humanitarian protection for civilians trapped in conflict zones, and fundamental erosion of
governmental legitimacy as residents witness administration deliberately allowing gang violence to continue
unchecked. The death toll of at least 60 now exceeds the October Pont-Sonde massacre that triggered
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

international condemnation and urgent calls for security intervention yet has produced no comparable response
from the Haitian government or international partners. The absence of humanitarian access during six days of
violence demonstrates complete state withdrawal from Bel-Air with no medical evacuation, no civilian protection
corridors, and no effort to separate combatants from civilian populations. For international partners including the
pending GSF deployment this non-intervention policy raises critical questions about rules of engagement, mission
scope, and whether international forces will intervene in gang-on-gang violence or limit operations to protecting
government functions and strategic assets.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bel-Air has been gang-controlled territory for over a decade experiencing periodic territorial wars between rival
factions competing for control of this strategic neighborhood adjacent to downtown Port-au-Prince. The Viv
Ansanm coalition formed in 2023 as federation of previously independent gangs seeking to coordinate territorial
control across the capital and present unified front against government security forces. The coalition structure has
always been unstable with member gangs maintaining separate territorial bases, independent leadership
hierarchies, and competing economic interests from kidnapping ransoms, extortion payments, and contraband
smuggling. Previous internal conflicts within Viv Ansanm resulted in temporary violence followed by negotiated
truces brokered by coalition leadership to preserve united front against external threats. The Krache Dife splinter
represents more fundamental break suggesting the coalition structure is collapsing under combined pressure from
government security operations, pending GSF international deployment, and internal disputes over kidnapping
proceeds and territorial boundaries. The Haitian National Police non-intervention doctrine emerged gradually
throughout 2024 and 2025 as gang territorial control expanded to approximately 80 percent of Port-au-Prince
while police capacity remained limited despite Multinational Security Support mission presence. Council on
Foreign Relations assessment notes the fighting has destabilized Viv Ansanm internal hierarchy and raised fears
of accelerated gang warfare across the capital potentially triggering wider violence.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: The Sanon Liability Effect

CONFIDENCE
High Confidence. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2794 adopted October 16, 2025 is
documented in official UN press releases and Security Council Report coverage. The resolution
unanimously renewed Haiti sanctions regime for one year and added two individuals to sanctions list
including Dimitri Herard former Palace Security Chief and Kempes Sanon Bel-Air gang leader. The
seven-week timeline between October 16 sanctions designation and December 8 violent overthrow is
confirmed through source documentation. Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier video statement explicitly
referenced stopping kidnappings as justification for the attack indicating Sanon continued criminal
activities violated coalition directives.
What's Happening
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2794 on October 16, 2025 renewing the
Haiti sanctions regime for one year and adding two new individuals to the sanctions list. The additions included
Dimitri Herard who served as former Palace Security Chief under assassinated President Jovenel Moise and
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

Kempes Sanon identified as Bel-Air gang leader and key figure in Viv Ansanm coalition. The sanctions package
included travel ban preventing international movement, asset freeze blocking access to financial resources held in
international banking systems, and strengthened arms embargo to prevent illicit weapons trafficking to sanctioned
individuals. Kempes Sanon was shot, wounded, and violently overthrown on December 8, exactly seven weeks
after his October 16 UN sanctions designation. His rivals Jamesly and Ti Gason assumed leadership while he
received medical treatment for gunshot wounds. The timing suggests direct connection between international
sanctions designation and internal coalition decision to remove him from leadership. Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier
who leads Viv Ansanm released video statement December 9 justifying the attack by stating Sanon continued
kidnapping operations in violation of coalition directives saying they will not be kidnapping ever again. Recent
United Nations report noted Sanon maintained network of individuals within governmental institutions including
security agencies enabling him to evade arrest suggesting his sanctions designation may have made him liability
to coalition partners seeking to maintain operational relationships with corrupt officials.
Why This Matters
The seven-week timeline between UN sanctions designation and violent removal demonstrates that international
pressure can destabilize gang leadership by making sanctioned individuals liabilities to their organizations.
Kempes Sanon UN sanctions listing on October 16 created multiple vulnerabilities including blocked access to
international financial systems for money laundering proceeds, inability to travel internationally for weapons
procurement or safe haven, increased scrutiny from law enforcement making his activities more visible, and
reputational damage within gang coalition as member who attracted unwanted international attention. His
continued kidnapping operations after sanctions designation violated Viv Ansanm strategic directive to reduce
activities that generate international condemnation and security interventions. The coalition leadership calculation
appears to have been that Sanon liability from sanctions combined with his refusal to follow kidnapping
restrictions made him expendable. His removal sends message to other gang leaders that international sanctions
create internal vulnerabilities within criminal organizations. However, this also demonstrates that sanctions-driven
leadership changes trigger violent succession battles that claim civilian lives including the 60 deaths in Bel-Air
violence. The pattern suggests targeted sanctions can be effective tools for disrupting gang hierarchies but must
be combined with security operations to prevent succession violence from creating humanitarian catastrophes.
For international policymakers this creates difficult calculus between using sanctions to pressure gang leadership
versus triggering internal violence that harms civilian populations trapped in gang-controlled territories.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

United Nations sanctions on Haiti have evolved from targeting individual political figures during previous crises to
focusing on gang leaders and their financial networks in current security collapse. The sanctions regime was
established to freeze assets and restrict travel for individuals threatening Haitian stability. Previous sanctions
targeted politicians accused of corruption or undermining democratic processes. The shift to sanctioning gang
leaders represents recognition that criminal organizations now pose greater threat to stability than political actors.
United States Treasury Department has also maintained parallel sanctions program through Office of Foreign
Assets Control designating gang leaders including Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier and other Viv Ansanm figures. The
October 16 renewal represented continuation of coordinated international pressure strategy combining UN and
bilateral sanctions to isolate gang leadership financially and diplomatically. Kempes Sanon background as former
police officer who transitioned to gang leadership exemplifies broader pattern of security force defection to
criminal organizations offering better compensation and territorial control than government employment provides.
His maintenance of networks within government institutions including security agencies demonstrates persistent
corruption enabling gang operations.
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER
International Organizations



## TALKING POINTS

The candidate registration silence represents critical warning signal requiring immediate diplomatic engagement
to determine whether major opposition parties are participating or coordinating boycott that would delegitimize
August 30 electoral timeline. The six-day Bel-Air massacre without government response confirms that security
sector capacity building alone cannot restore order without political will to intervene in gang-controlled territories
and protect civilian populations. The Kempes Sanon sanctions effect demonstrates targeted international pressure
can destabilize gang leadership but triggers succession violence requiring coordinated security operations to
prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The December 22 candidate list publication will provide first definitive data on
electoral viability requiring contingency planning for scenarios including major party boycotts or minimal
participation undermining result legitimacy.
RECOMMENDED DECISION
Deploy high-level diplomatic missions before December 15 deadline to engage major opposition party leaders
including Fanmi Lavalas, PHTK, and OPL demanding immediate clarification of participation intentions and
offering mediation to address boycott concerns. Coordinate emergency CARICOM consultation for December 16
to assess candidate list implications and develop response framework if major parties have boycotted registration.
Establish that continued international electoral support including technical assistance and observer missions is
contingent on genuine multi-party competition with major opposition participation. Convene humanitarian
coordination meeting for Bel-Air to demand government authorize humanitarian access corridors regardless of
ongoing gang violence and establish civilian protection protocols. Link future GSF deployment funding to
government commitment to intervene in gang territorial violence rather than maintaining current non-intervention
doctrine that normalizes civilian casualties. Prepare sanctions expansion targeting additional Viv Ansanm
leadership while coordinating with Haitian National Police to deploy operations during succession violence
windows when gang organizations are internally weakened.
Businesses



## TALKING POINTS

The registration silence creates massive uncertainty about political stability timeline as elections without major
opposition participation would face immediate legitimacy challenges triggering potential civil unrest or institutional
paralysis that disrupts commercial operations. The Bel-Air six-day massacre demonstrates that gang territorial
control remains entrenched despite international security assistance with government deliberately choosing
non-intervention allowing violence to continue in slum neighborhoods that house significant workforce
populations. The February 7 constitutional deadline approaching in 56 days without resolution framework means
businesses will operate under government lacking constitutional authority for seven months creating legal risks for
contracts, permits, and regulatory decisions made during unconstitutional period.
RECOMMENDED DECISION
Suspend major capital commitments and long-term contract negotiations until December 22 candidate list
publication provides clarity on electoral viability and opposition participation levels. Develop scenario planning for
three outcomes including robust multi-party competition, minimal participation indicating boycott, or mixed results
requiring further assessment. Revise security protocols to assume Haitian National Police will not intervene in
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

gang territorial disputes in neighborhoods housing employee residences requiring enhanced private security for
workforce transportation and housing. Consider accelerated timeline for relocating expatriate dependents before
February 7 constitutional deadline given political uncertainty and potential for institutional instability. Ensure all
critical business agreements, permits, licenses, and contract renewals are finalized before February 7 to secure
constitutional foundation before governance vacuum begins. Establish legal review process for any agreements
signed between February 7 and August 30 to assess enforceability risks if transitional government actions during
unconstitutional period are later challenged.
Political Actors



## TALKING POINTS

Candidates who registered by December 15 must immediately demand written CEP confirmation specifying
registration is for August 30, 2026 election with legal citations establishing constitutional basis to prevent future
timeline disputes or candidacy challenges. The registration silence from major opposition creates strategic fork
where participating candidates can position themselves as legitimate democratic actors engaging transition
process while boycotting parties risk political irrelevance and exclusion from governance. The December 22
candidate list publication will define competitive landscape revealing whether elections feature genuine multi-party
competition or reduced fields that undermine result credibility and provide grounds for challenging outcomes. The
February 7 CPT mandate expiration provides leverage to demand constitutional guarantees and
CARICOM-brokered extension frameworks before committing campaign resources to electoral process potentially
occurring under illegitimate governmental authority.
RECOMMENDED DECISION
Form unified candidate coalition by December 14 to submit formal written demands to CEP requiring official
confirmation of August 30 timeline with constitutional legal basis and written guarantees that registration
completions will be honored under final calendar. Establish public criteria for continued participation setting
December 22 candidate list as decision point for potential withdrawal if major parties boycotted or constitutional
crisis remains unresolved. Engage CARICOM representatives immediately demanding mediation on February 7
constitutional deadline making clear candidates will not legitimize elections held under unconstitutional authority
without international guarantees of governance continuity. Develop dual campaign strategies optimized for
eight-month timeline with March 2026 official launch while maintaining flexibility to pivot to boycott position if
electoral conditions deteriorate. Coordinate with international observer organizations to establish independent
monitoring of CEP registration process and candidate list compilation ensuring transparency prevents
manipulation. Demand CEP publish registration statistics by December 18 showing total candidate numbers by
office and political party affiliations to enable public assessment of participation levels before final list publication.
Diaspora



## TALKING POINTS

The electoral calendar clarification to August 30 provides diaspora communities eight months to organize voter
registration drives, mobilize financial support for preferred candidates, and coordinate return travel for voting
rather than compressed timeline under obsolete February proposal. However, registration silence raises
fundamental concerns about electoral viability and whether major opposition participation will materialize making
diaspora investment of time and resources potentially futile if elections lack legitimacy. The February 7
constitutional deadline approaching without transition plan confirms Haitian political class has not seriously
prepared for elections despite years of international pressure requiring diaspora communities prepare for
extended uncertainty and potential constitutional crisis scenarios. The Bel-Air massacre and government
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

non-intervention policy demonstrates that security improvements remain fragile with gang territorial control
persisting despite MSS mission suggesting diaspora return for voting may face safety risks.
RECOMMENDED DECISION
Diaspora organizations should systematically document current electoral confusion by archiving contradictory
official statements, media reports, and government communications establishing clear record of institutional
dysfunction for future accountability and potential legal challenges to results. Monitor December 22 candidate list
publication closely organizing rapid response analysis to assess whether major parties participated and whether
candidate field represents genuine democratic choice or boycott scenario. Coordinate with international diplomatic
missions and election monitoring organizations demanding transparent electoral process and constitutional crisis
resolution as conditions for diaspora voting participation. Establish diaspora observer delegations for candidate
registration verification and list publication to provide independent documentation of participation levels and party
engagement separate from official CEP reporting. Defer major financial commitments to candidates or parties until
January 2026 when constitutional framework for post-February 7 governance becomes clearer and candidate
viability can be assessed based on campaign development. Develop contingency plans for diaspora voting
participation including safety protocols for return travel given gang territorial control and government security
limitations. Support diaspora voting rights advocacy while maintaining realistic expectations that 2026 election
may face legitimacy challenges complicating result acceptance and governmental transitions.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

Today
Monitor whether any major candidate or political party issues surprise announcement in final 48 hours before
Sunday December 15 registration deadline potentially breaking the silence pattern with last-minute declarations.
Track whether Prime Minister Office or CPT issues any statements addressing electoral process, candidate
registration status, or December 22 list publication timeline. Observe whether Bel-Air violence extends into
seventh day or if any Haitian National Police deployment occurs breaking six-day non-intervention pattern. Watch
for any government statements explaining non-intervention policy or addressing humanitarian crisis in affected
neighborhood. Monitor social media and local Haitian outlets for additional unverified candidate speculation that
might indicate private registration activity occurring without official announcements.
This Week
Sunday December 15 candidate registration deadline will close the window forcing all participants to commit
without further delay and ending speculation about last-minute entries. The deadline will reveal through immediate
post-deadline candidate and party statements which electoral timeline participants believed was operative during
registration period. Monday December 16 begins CEP contestation period through December 19 allowing
registered candidates to challenge competitor registrations on eligibility or procedural grounds. Track whether
major opposition parties issue statements after deadline explaining participation decisions or announcing boycott
strategies. Monitor whether CEP releases preliminary registration statistics showing total candidate numbers by
office before December 22 final list publication. Observe whether CARICOM or OAS issue statements addressing
February 7 constitutional deadline and governance gap requiring emergency mediation. Watch whether Bel-Air
violence concludes or spreads to other Port-au-Prince neighborhoods as Krache Dife attempts to consolidate
territorial gains.
Strategic
December 22 candidate list publication represents single most critical data point for assessing 2026 electoral
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

viability and legitimacy prospects with robust major party participation indicating genuine democratic competition
versus minimal participation signaling coordinated boycott and fundamental legitimacy crisis. The period from now
until February 7 represents final 56 days to establish constitutional mechanisms for governance continuity past
CPT mandate expiration with failure to resolve framework by late January triggering accelerating political crisis
and potential challenges to transitional government legitimacy. Monitor whether international partners including
United States, France, Canada, and European Union adjust electoral support commitments based on December
22 candidate list results potentially suspending assistance if major boycott is confirmed. Track whether additional
gang leadership figures receive UN or bilateral sanctions designations and whether subsequent internal
organizational responses follow Kempes Sanon pattern of violent succession creating opportunities for
coordinated security operations during gang vulnerability windows. Observe GSF deployment timeline
announcements and rules of engagement clarifications determining whether international forces will intervene in
gang-on-gang violence or limit operations to protecting government institutions creating different security
outcomes for civilian populations in contested territories.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre official calendar announcement for upcoming elections
Haiti Info Project Twitter post on CEP electoral calendar
Facebook post from Widden Official on presidential candidate speculation
Wikipedia entry on 2026 Haitian general election
EFE News Agency report on Haiti approving electoral decree
France24 report on Haiti setting August 2026 elections
Gazette Haiti on candidate registration fees and requirements
CEP official electoral decree document
Latin Times report on violent clashes between Haitian gangs killing dozens published December 13, 2025
KSAT News coverage of dozens killed in Haiti capital following internal gang coalition clashes
United Nations press release on Security Council Resolution 2794 adopting sanctions
Security Council Report on Haiti vote renewing sanctions regime
CNN report on gangs launching large-scale attack in central Haiti region
All Tech is Human global election guide for Haiti
Venice Commission document reference on Haiti
Human Rights Watch world report 2025 Haiti chapter
Facebook post from Vant Bef Info on Bel-Air violence
Security Council Report on Haiti briefing and consultations
Haiti government communications official website
Le Monde international reporting on gang-squeezed Port-au-Prince
sources are verified through multiple channels and confidence ratings reflect analytical certainty based
on source triangulation and institutional reliability assessment.
Saturday, December 13, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*