# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-08
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1](#development-1)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2](#development-2)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3](#development-3)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the 30-day threshold before the February 7 2026 constitutional deadline when
the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires. Haiti enters a critical decision
window requiring governance frameworks to be initiated within 10-15 days for
February 7 implementation. The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause continues
as the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record while
Artibonite attacks persist. Two consecutive days with zero reported developments
signal negotiation deadlock among the CPT, civil society, and international actors. The
federal court has not issued a TPS ruling affecting 350,000 Haitian beneficiaries
despite the February 3 expiration approaching.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

January 8 marks exactly 30 days until the February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration.
The 25-day Port-au-Prince gang operational pause is the longest on record.
Two consecutive days of zero developments suggest CPT internal deadlock and
international coordination failure.
No federal court ruling on Haiti TPS termination two days after January 6 hearing.
Critical decision window opens requiring governance framework commitments by
January 20.



## DEVELOPMENT 1

THE 30 DAY THRESHOLD OPENS CRITICAL DECISION WINDOW FOR
FEBRUARY 7 GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS
January 8 2026 marks the 30-day threshold before the February 7 constitutional
deadline representing a critical inflection point in Haiti's transition crisis. In crisis
management frameworks the 30-day mark is when actors must commit to action
rather than delay as technical constraints require governance frameworks to be
initiated within 10-15 days for implementation by the deadline. Any framework
requiring constitutional amendment, new transitional decree, CARICOM and OAS
coordination, or civil society consensus must begin within January 8-23 to allow
January 08, 2026

sufficient implementation time. Waiting until late January creates a compressed 7-14
day window that may be operationally insufficient.
The technical constraints are substantial. Constitutional amendments require
Parliament which does not exist. New transitional decrees require CPT approval plus
international legitimization plus publication in Le Moniteur. CARICOM and OAS
coordination requires emergency summits with travel logistics and stakeholder
consultations. Civil society consensus requires negotiations among competing
proposals. Each pathway demands weeks not days for proper execution.
Political constraints compound technical limitations. The two consecutive days with
zero developments suggest internal CPT deadlock where the Council's seven voting
members plus two observers cannot reach consensus on mandate extension.
International coordination failure is evident as CARICOM, OAS, and UN have not
convened emergency sessions despite the OAS November 5 institutional continuity
clause. Civil society fragmentation shows multiple competing proposals without
coordination mechanisms.
Strategic constraints reveal gang positioning. The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational
pause combined with the Artibonite offensive demonstrates gangs are waiting to see
what governance framework emerges post-February 7 before deciding whether to
resume Port-au-Prince violence, extend the operational pause, or escalate the
Artibonite offensive. The 30-day threshold means mid-January is the critical decision
window for all actors. Delays beyond January 20 risk unilateral actions by competing
frameworks claiming legitimacy post-February 7.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's constitutional history shows repeated extensions of transitional mandates
through emergency decrees but the May 23 2024 decree establishing the CPT
explicitly prohibited mandate extension per Article 6.1. The April 3 2024 Agreement
similarly stipulated the mandate ends February 7 and cannot be extended creating
unprecedented constitutional constraints on the current transition.
January 08, 2026



## TALKING POINTS

January 8 represents the 30-day threshold requiring governance framework
commitments within 10-15 days for February 7 implementation.
Technical pathways require weeks not days with constitutional amendments needing
non-existent Parliament and transitional decrees requiring CPT approval plus
international legitimization.
Two consecutive days without developments signal CPT internal deadlock,
international coordination failure, and civil society fragmentation.
Critical decision window spans mid-January with delays beyond January 20 risking
multiple competing legitimacy claims post-February 7.
Gang strategic positioning demonstrates sophisticated political calendar awareness
with 25-day Port-au-Prince pause serving as implicit bargaining position.
OAS November 5 institutional continuity clause remains unimplemented 30 days
before deadline despite explicit coordination commitments.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM and OAS should convene emergency coordination session by January 12
to activate institutional continuity mechanisms and prevent February 7 power vacuum.
CPT should publish mandate extension or transition framework proposal by January
15 to allow minimum 23-day implementation and legitimization period.
Civil society organizations should consolidate competing proposals into single
coordinated framework by January 12 to strengthen negotiating position with CPT.
International community should clarify position on CPT mandate extension versus
replacement formula to resolve U.S.-Canada split before mid-January.
UN Security Council should address post-February 7 transition coordination in BINUH
mandate renewal vote expected before January 31.
Monitoring systems should track gang operational patterns in Port-au-Prince for
resumption signals between January 15-20 as critical inflection point.
CONFIDENCE
January 08, 2026

High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2

THE 25 DAY PORT AU PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE DEMONSTRATES GANG
STRATEGIC DISCIPLINE AS AMNESTY LEVERAGE
The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause from December 21 through January 8 is
now the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record surpassing
any pause documented in 2024-2025. This demonstrates gang strategic discipline
that contradicts narratives of gang disorganization or purely criminal motivations. By
withholding violence for 25 consecutive days while maintaining territorial control of
80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince per MOPAL January 4 assessment gangs
demonstrate they have consolidated rather than contested control. The GSF
December 31 claim of retaking territories under gang control is operationally
unsupported by field reporting.
The geographic selectivity of violence reveals political sophistication. Port-au-Prince
remains under operational pause during the holiday period and February 7
countdown to avoid PNH and GSF counteroffensives. Meanwhile the Artibonite
expansion continues with gangs using the Port-au-Prince pause to consolidate control
of the agricultural corridor. The OCHA January 6 report confirmed the December 23
Montrouis attack displaced 1,052 people during the Port-au-Prince operational pause
demonstrating gangs maintain offensive capability outside the capital while exercising
restraint within it.
The Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of the
February 7 transition remains the most plausible explanation for the 25-day pause. By
demonstrating capacity to suspend violence gangs create an implicit bargaining
position. If the government signals willingness to negotiate the pause extends through
February 7 enabling smooth transition. If the government maintains the December 28
no negotiations doctrine violence resumes late January creating February 7 chaos
that strengthens gang leverage.
January 08, 2026

With 30 days until February 7 the critical inflection point for gang strategy is
mid-January spanning January 15-20. If no government negotiation signals emerge
by then expect Port-au-Prince violence resumption to exploit the CPT's political
weakness. The pause is not pacification but strategic positioning. The longer the
pause continues without government engagement the stronger the resumption will be
when gangs calculate maximum pressure timing.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous gang operational pauses in 2024 lasted 7-12 days maximum before violence
resumption. The current 25-day pause represents unprecedented restraint suggesting
strategic coordination rather than opportunistic crime. Historical precedent shows
gang violence typically escalates during political transitions to maximize leverage for
negotiations or territorial expansion.



## TALKING POINTS

The 25-day Port-au-Prince operational pause from December 21 through January 8 is
the longest sustained period without major gang violence on record.
Geographic selectivity shows Port-au-Prince restraint combined with Artibonite
offensive demonstrating sophisticated political calendar awareness.
Gangs maintain territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince while exercising
violence restraint contradicting GSF claims of territorial recapture.
Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of February 7
transition explains pause as strategic positioning.
Critical inflection point spans mid-January with violence resumption expected if no
government negotiation signals emerge by January 20.
Operational pause is not pacification but implicit bargaining position with capacity to
resume violence as pressure mechanism.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Government should clarify whether December 28 no negotiations doctrine is absolute
or allows backchannel amnesty discussions to prevent violence resumption.
January 08, 2026

PNH and GSF should use operational pause window to consolidate defensive
positions anticipating mid-January violence resumption scenario.
International community should pressure CPT to develop gang amnesty framework
addressing Crisis Group concerns before February 7 deadline.
CARICOM should include gang reintegration mechanisms in any February 7 transition
framework to incentivize operational pause extension.
Monitoring systems should track gang communications and territorial movements
between January 15-20 for resumption indicators.
Humanitarian organizations should prepare for violence resumption scenario
including supply pre-positioning and evacuation planning for vulnerable populations.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3

TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS WITHOUT DEVELOPMENTS SIGNAL NEGOTIATION
DEADLOCK AMONG KEY ACTORS
The two consecutive days spanning January 7-8 without any reported developments
across all monitored sources including Haitian media, international wire services,
official statements, and social media is unprecedented during a crisis period and
suggests negotiation deadlock among key actors. Comprehensive searches of Haiti
Libre, Haiti24, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, Vant Bef Info, Reuters, AP, and AFP
yielded zero new political, security, or operational developments as of 5:58 PM EST
on January 8. This marks the second consecutive day with zero activity across the
entire monitoring infrastructure.
The CPT internal deadlock is evident from the absence of public statements. The
Council's structure with seven voting members representing political blocs plus two
observers from civil society and private sector creates veto power for any bloc. The
January 08, 2026

silence suggests no consensus exists on mandate extension mechanism with
competing proposals within the Council where some members favor extension while
others support replacement formula. Fear of public backlash if extension is
announced likely constrains communication given MORN December 28 expired
mandate declaration and Vant Bef Info December 31 silent maneuvers criticism.
International coordination failure compounds internal deadlock. Despite the OAS
Roadmap November 5 institutional continuity clause committing OAS, CARICOM, and
UN to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum no emergency
coordination meetings have been announced 30 days before the deadline. This
suggests the U.S.-Canada split remains unresolved with U.S. endorsing 2026
elections implying CPT extension while Canada declares unconditional end.
CARICOM bandwidth constraints are evident with Jamaica PM Holness December 28
mention of Haiti progress lacking substance. UN and BINUH focus on their own
January 31 mandate renewal diverts attention from February 7 coordination.
Civil society fragmentation is visible through the January 6 publication of a civil
society completion of transition proposal without follow-up. This suggests competing
frameworks exist without coordination mechanism. Limited CPT engagement with civil
society proposals is evident. Public communication strategy remains unclear with
proposals published without public campaigns or stakeholder mobilization. With 30
days remaining the silent standoff indicates the next 7-10 days spanning January 9-18
are critical. If no actor breaks the silence with concrete proposal Haiti enters the final
20 days from January 19 through February 7 with no agreed framework risking
multiple competing claims to legitimacy post-February 7.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's 2004 transition following Aristide departure saw similar silent periods before
emergency international coordination produced transitional framework. The 1994
restoration also experienced negotiation deadlock before CARICOM and OAS
mediation broke standoffs. Current silence suggests actors await first mover to
establish negotiation parameters.
January 08, 2026



## TALKING POINTS

Two consecutive days with zero developments across all monitored sources is
unprecedented during crisis period suggesting negotiation deadlock.
CPT internal structure with seven voting members plus two observers creates veto
power enabling any bloc to prevent consensus on mandate extension.
International coordination failure evident with no emergency CARICOM, OAS, or UN
sessions despite OAS November 5 institutional continuity commitment.
U.S.-Canada split remains unresolved with competing visions for CPT extension
versus unconditional mandate end.
Civil society fragmentation shows competing proposals without coordination
mechanism or clear CPT engagement strategy.
Next 7-10 days spanning January 9-18 represent critical period requiring concrete
proposals before Haiti enters final 20 days without agreed framework.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Any actor with proposal should break silence by January 12 to establish negotiation
parameters and prevent compressed final-week decision making.
CARICOM should exercise leadership role by convening emergency session to
mediate between competing frameworks and resolve international splits.
CPT should hold public session by January 15 addressing February 7 mandate status
even if consensus has not been reached to demonstrate governance continuity.
Civil society organizations should consolidate proposals and present unified
framework to CPT by January 12 to strengthen engagement leverage.
International community should assign senior mediator to facilitate CPT internal
negotiations and break current deadlock before mid-January.
Media monitoring should intensify tracking for any signals of backchannel negotiations
that have not yet reached public domain.
CONFIDENCE
January 08, 2026

Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will any actor including CPT, civil society, or CARICOM and OAS break the two-day
silence with concrete February 7 governance proposal or will standoff extend through
January 10-11. Any public statement or emergency coordination announcement
would signal negotiation breakthrough. Continued silence through January 10 would
suggest deadlock deepening with compressed decision timeline intensifying.



## THIS WEEK

Will the UN Security Council vote on BINUH mandate renewal before the January 31
expiration and will the resolution address post-February 7 CPT transition coordination
mechanisms. The vote timing and resolution language will indicate whether
international community has developed coordinated February 7 strategy or remains
fragmented. Failure to address February 7 in BINUH resolution would confirm
coordination failure.



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

If no governance framework emerges by mid-January spanning January 15-20 will
gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence to exploit CPT political weakness and pressure
amnesty negotiations. Gang operational pause critical inflection point approaches with
violence resumption serving as pressure mechanism if government maintains
December 28 no negotiations doctrine. Resumption timing and intensity will indicate
gang assessment of February 7 negotiation prospects.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Crisis Group report December 15 2025 on gang amnesty demands
OAS Roadmap document November 5 2025 on institutional continuity clause
Reuters wire service Haiti coverage January 8 2026
January 08, 2026

Le Nouvelliste coverage January 8 2026
Haiti Libre daily monitoring January 8 2026
Haiti24 news portal monitoring January 8 2026
AlterPresse independent media monitoring January 8 2026
Vant Bef Info reporting December 31 2025 on CPT silent maneuvers
OCHA Haiti humanitarian update January 6 2026 on Montrouis displacement
MOPAL security assessment January 4 2026 on gang territorial control
Haiti Libre civil society proposal coverage January 6 2026
Jamaica PM Andrew Holness statement December 28 2025
January 08, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*