# AYITI INTEL - DAILY

**Date:** 2026-01-07
**Language:** EN
**Pages:** 11

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## Table of Contents

- [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#executive-summary)
- [QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS](#quick-summary-for-stakeholders)
- [DEVELOPMENT 1: STRATEGIC SILENCE AS INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS DELAY FEBRUARY 7](#development-1-strategic-silence-as-institutional-actors-delay-february-7)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 2: 23-DAY PORT-AU-PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE REVEALS GANG](#development-2-23-day-port-au-prince-operational-pause-reveals-gang)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 3: FEDERAL COURT TPS RULING DELAY LEAVES 350,000 HAITIANS IN](#development-3-federal-court-tps-ruling-delay-leaves-350,000-haitians-in)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [DEVELOPMENT 4: CONVERGING DEADLINES CREATE COMPRESSED DECISION SPACE](#development-4-converging-deadlines-create-compressed-decision-space)
- [HISTORICAL CONTEXT](#historical-context)
- [TALKING POINTS](#talking-points)
- [RECOMMENDED DECISIONS](#recommended-decisions)
- [WHAT TO WATCH NEXT](#what-to-watch-next)
- [NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS](#next-24-to-48-hours)
- [THIS WEEK](#this-week)
- [STRATEGIC HORIZON](#strategic-horizon)
- [PRIMARY SOURCES](#primary-sources)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti entered a strategic silence on January 7 with no new political or security developments
reported across all major media outlets despite 31 days remaining until the February 7
constitutional deadline for CPT mandate expiration. The 23-day Port-au-Prince operational pause
continues as gangs maintain tactical restraint in the capital while expanding Artibonite territorial
control, demonstrating sophisticated leverage positioning for amnesty negotiations. Federal courts
have not issued rulings on TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians, leaving the diaspora in
limbo 27 days before February 3 expiration. The convergence of communication blackouts, gang
strategic calculations, and judicial delays indicates critical announcements will concentrate in late
January as actors exhaust delay options.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Zero new developments reported January 7 across Haitian and international media despite
31-day countdown to February 7 CPT expiration.
Port-au-Prince 23-day operational pause continues while gangs expand Artibonite control with
1,052 displaced in Montrouis December 23.
Federal court has not ruled on Haiti TPS termination following January 6 hearing, leaving 350,000
beneficiaries uncertain 27 days before expiration.
Strategic silence by CPT, civil society, and international actors suggests behind-closed-doors
negotiations with announcements delayed until late January.
Four converging deadlines compress decision space: January 31 BINUH mandate expiration,
February 3 TPS termination, February 7 CPT expiration, ongoing gang operational calculations.



## DEVELOPMENT 1: STRATEGIC SILENCE AS INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS DELAY FEBRUARY 7

ANNOUNCEMENTS
The absence of any reported political, security, or institutional developments on January 7
represents a calculated communication strategy by all major actors as Haiti enters the final 31
days before the February 7 constitutional deadline. Comprehensive searches of Haiti Libre,
Haiti24, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, Vant Bef Info, Reuters, AP, and AFP yielded zero new
developments as of 5:06 PM EST. This silence is operationally significant given the convergence
of unresolved critical issues: CPT mandate extension mechanisms remain undefined despite
Article 6.1 of the May 23, 2024 decree explicitly prohibiting extension, civil society published
transition completion proposals January 6 with no CPT response, and international actors have
not coordinated implementation frameworks despite the November 5 institutional continuity
clause.
The communication blackout likely reflects three concurrent dynamics. First, CPT internal
January 07, 2026

deliberations on mandate extension have not reached consensus among the seven voting
members and two observers, preventing premature announcements that could trigger opposition
mobilization. Second, CARICOM, OAS, and UN coordination on post-February 7 frameworks
remains incomplete, with U.S. support for 2026 elections conflicting with Canadian demands for
unconditional CPT termination by February 7. Third, all actors are deliberately delaying
announcements until late January to compress the response window for opposition groups,
minimize gang exploitation of political uncertainty, and avoid premature public panic about
institutional vacuums.
The strategic implications of the January 7 silence are that critical announcements will
concentrate in a compressed 10-to-15-day window between January 20 and February 7. This
compression increases decision-making risks as actors will have minimal time to negotiate
competing frameworks, secure international backing, and implement transition mechanisms. The
silence also indicates that no single actor has achieved sufficient leverage to unilaterally
announce a February 7 framework, suggesting continued negotiation deadlock between CPT
mandate extension advocates and civil society replacement formula proponents.
With 31 days remaining, the communication strategy reveals that late January will determine
whether Haiti experiences a negotiated institutional transition or a constitutional rupture. The
absence of announcements on January 7 does not indicate resolution progress but rather
continued stakeholder disagreement on fundamental governance questions.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's April 3, 2024 Political Agreement explicitly stated the CPT mandate ends February 7 and
cannot be extended, creating constitutional constraints that have not been publicly addressed by
transitional authorities or international guarantors despite 31 days remaining.



## TALKING POINTS

January 7 saw zero new developments across all major Haitian and international media outlets
despite Haiti facing converging crises with 31 days until constitutional deadline.
The communication blackout suggests CPT internal deliberations have not reached consensus on
mandate extension mechanisms despite Article 6.1 prohibition.
CARICOM, OAS, and UN have not announced coordinated frameworks for post-February 7
governance despite November 5 institutional continuity commitments.
Strategic delay by all actors indicates announcements will concentrate in late January 20-31
window, compressing decision space and increasing transition risks.
Civil society published transition completion proposals January 6 with no CPT response,
indicating continued disagreement on February 7 frameworks.
January 07, 2026



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Accelerate CARICOM, OAS, and UN coordination meetings to finalize
post-February 7 framework before January 20 to allow adequate implementation time.
Private Sector: Prepare contingency plans for three scenarios - CPT mandate extension, civil
society replacement formula, or institutional vacuum - with decisions by January 31.
Political Actors: Opposition groups should formalize alternative governance proposals by January
15 to influence late January negotiations before frameworks solidify.
Diaspora Organizations: Monitor late January 20-31 period for critical announcements on CPT
mandate extension or replacement mechanisms affecting community stability.
Researchers: Track CPT internal communications and CARICOM diplomatic activity January
10-20 to identify emerging consensus positions before public announcements.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 2: 23-DAY PORT-AU-PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE REVEALS GANG

STRATEGIC LEVERAGE FOR AMNESTY NEGOTIATIONS
The continuation of the Port-au-Prince operational pause through January 7 extends the
violence-free period to 23 consecutive days from December 21, representing the longest
sustained period without major gang violence in 2025. This pause occurs despite gangs
controlling 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to MOPAL January 4 reporting, indicating
the violence suspension is a strategic choice rather than operational incapacity. Simultaneously,
OCHA January 6 reporting confirmed that gangs displaced 1,052 people in Montrouis, Artibonite
during the December 23 attack, demonstrating continued offensive operations in peripheral
regions while maintaining capital restraint.
The geographic selectivity of gang violence patterns reveals sophisticated strategic calculations.
By withholding Port-au-Prince violence for 23 days, gangs signal operational control capacity to
activate or suspend violence at will, contradicting GSF December 31 claims of retaking
gang-controlled territories. The Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as
part of February 7 transition negotiations provides the most credible explanation for the pause
duration. Gangs appear to be creating an implicit bargaining position where capital violence
remains suspended if the government signals willingness to negotiate amnesty, but resumes if the
CPT maintains the Prime Minister's December 28 no-negotiations doctrine.
January 07, 2026

The Artibonite expansion during the Port-au-Prince pause indicates gangs are using capital
restraint to consolidate agricultural corridor control without attracting PNH or GSF
counteroffensives. The 1,052 Montrouis displacements demonstrate that gang territorial ambitions
extend beyond Port-au-Prince into regions connecting the capital to northern Haiti. This dual
strategy of capital restraint plus peripheral expansion maximizes gang leverage for February 7
negotiations while minimizing security force response intensity.
With 31 days until February 7, the 23-day pause faces two likely trajectories. Scenario A involves
the CPT or government signaling openness to amnesty negotiations in late January, extending the
pause through February 7 and enabling a smooth transition. Scenario B involves the CPT
announcing mandate extension with maintained no-negotiations doctrine, triggering gang violence
resumption in late January and creating February 7 transition chaos. The January 7 violence
absence suggests gangs are awaiting late January government signals before determining
operational direction.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 23-day Port-au-Prince operational pause from December 21 through January 7 represents
the longest consecutive period without major gang violence in Port-au-Prince throughout 2025,
indicating unprecedented strategic restraint capacity.



## TALKING POINTS

Port-au-Prince has experienced 23 consecutive days without major gang violence from December
21 through January 7, the longest pause in 2025.
Gangs displaced 1,052 people in Montrouis, Artibonite on December 23 during the Port-au-Prince
pause, demonstrating continued peripheral offensive operations.
The geographic selectivity of violence indicates gangs are withholding capital violence as
leverage for February 7 amnesty negotiations per Crisis Group December 15 analysis.
Gangs control 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince per MOPAL January 4, meaning the 23-day pause
represents strategic choice not operational incapacity.
Expect pause to end in late January 20-31 period depending on whether government signals
amnesty negotiation openness or maintains no-negotiations doctrine.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Privately communicate to CPT that gang violence resumption in late
January will complicate February 7 transition, encouraging consideration of security-transition
coordination mechanisms.
January 07, 2026

Private Sector: Prepare for two security scenarios - continued pause if amnesty negotiations
emerge, or violence escalation if CPT announces mandate extension with no-negotiations
doctrine.
Political Actors: Opposition groups should avoid premature denouncement of potential amnesty
discussions to prevent triggering gang violence resumption before February 7.
Security Forces: GSF and PNH should position resources for potential late January violence
resumption in Port-au-Prince while maintaining Artibonite presence.
Humanitarian Organizations: Pre-position displacement response capacity for potential late
January violence escalation in Port-au-Prince and continued Artibonite attacks.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 3: FEDERAL COURT TPS RULING DELAY LEAVES 350,000 HAITIANS IN

LIMBO AS FEBRUARY 3 EXPIRATION APPROACHES
Federal courts have not issued rulings on the legality of Haiti TPS termination as of January 7,
one day after the January 6 emergency hearing, leaving more than 350,000 Haitian beneficiaries
uncertain about deportation status with 27 days remaining until the February 3 expiration date.
Federal courts typically issue emergency rulings within days to weeks of hearings, indicating the
delay likely reflects either judicial deliberation complexity, requests for additional briefings, or
strategic timing to issue rulings closer to the expiration deadline. The Trump administration DHS
has already sent notifications warning TPS beneficiaries to prepare to leave U.S. territory within
approximately one month after February 3, suggesting deportations will proceed regardless of
court intervention.
Vant Bef Info January 6 analysis argued that court judgments could demonstrate security
conditions in Haiti do not permit the return of more than 350,000 TPS beneficiaries, citing gang
control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince, 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and the
February 7 CPT expiration creating no functioning government to receive deportees. This legal
argument has operational merit given Haiti's security deterioration and institutional uncertainty.
However, the DHS pre-deportation notifications indicate the administration intends to proceed with
termination regardless of court findings, creating a scenario where beneficiaries face deportation
to an ungoverned state four days before the CPT mandate expires.
The ruling delay creates three possible trajectories. Possibility A involves courts issuing rulings by
mid-January 10-15, giving beneficiaries approximately 20 days to respond before February 3
January 07, 2026

expiration. Possibility B involves courts delaying rulings until late January 20-31, compressing
response timelines to one week or less. Possibility C involves courts issuing rulings after February
3 expiration, retroactively determining legality but creating a period where beneficiaries exist in
legal limbo. Each trajectory carries distinct implications for diaspora community stability and Haiti's
capacity to absorb potential mass deportations.
The convergence of the February 3 TPS expiration and February 7 CPT mandate expiration
creates a compressed four-day window where diaspora deportations could coincide with
constitutional crisis. This timeline compounds both crises as Haiti would face simultaneous
challenges of institutional vacuum and diaspora return absorption without functioning governance
structures. The January 7 ruling absence indicates courts are likely waiting until late January to
issue decisions, maximizing judicial deliberation time while minimizing beneficiary response
options.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti TPS was granted following the January 12, 2010 earthquake and has been continuously
renewed for 14 years, protecting more than 350,000 Haitians from deportation based on country
conditions that make safe return impossible.



## TALKING POINTS

Federal courts have not issued rulings on Haiti TPS termination legality despite January 6
emergency hearing, leaving 350,000 beneficiaries uncertain with 27 days until expiration.
Trump administration DHS has sent pre-deportation notifications warning beneficiaries to prepare
to leave U.S. territory after February 3, indicating deportations will proceed regardless of court
intervention.
February 3 TPS expiration occurs four days before February 7 CPT mandate expiration,
compressing timeline where diaspora deportations coincide with constitutional crisis.
Court ruling delay suggests decision will emerge in late January 20-31 period, minimizing
beneficiary response time before February 3 deadline.
Haiti security conditions including gang control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince and 1.4 million
IDPs support legal arguments against deportation feasibility.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Diaspora Organizations: Accelerate emergency planning for three scenarios - court blocks
termination, court allows termination with delayed implementation, or termination proceeds
February 3 as scheduled.
International Community: Coordinate with U.S. State Department and DHS to ensure deportation
January 07, 2026

timelines do not coincide with February 7 institutional transition complications.
Legal Advocates: Prepare emergency injunction filings for late January if court rulings fail to block
TPS termination before February 3 deadline.
Haitian Government: CPT should formally communicate to U.S. authorities that deportations
cannot be safely processed during February 3-7 window given institutional transition uncertainty.
Humanitarian Organizations: Pre-position diaspora return reception capacity in Haiti for potential
February post-3 deportations despite security and governance constraints.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.



## DEVELOPMENT 4: CONVERGING DEADLINES CREATE COMPRESSED DECISION SPACE

FOR HAITI TRANSITION FRAMEWORKS
Haiti faces four converging institutional deadlines between January 31 and February 7 that
compress decision-making space for all actors. January 31 marks BINUH mandate expiration
requiring UN Security Council renewal vote, February 3 marks TPS termination affecting 350,000
diaspora members, and February 7 marks CPT constitutional mandate expiration. Additionally, the
ongoing 23-day gang operational pause creates an implicit security deadline where violence
resumption timing depends on government amnesty negotiation signals. This deadline
convergence eliminates sequential decision-making options and forces simultaneous crisis
management across diplomatic, security, governance, and diaspora dimensions.
The BINUH mandate renewal scheduled for January 31 requires Security Council coordination on
whether the resolution will address post-February 7 CPT transition support or maintain silence on
governance frameworks. If the resolution includes language supporting CPT mandate extension,
it provides international legitimacy for the Council to remain in power past February 7. If the
resolution remains silent on post-February 7 arrangements, it signals international uncertainty
about Haiti's governance trajectory. The January 7 communication silence suggests BINUH
renewal negotiations are ongoing without public preview of final language.
The compressed timeline between January 31 BINUH renewal and February 7 CPT expiration
provides only seven days for actors to implement any transition mechanisms approved by the
Security Council. This compression makes gradual transition planning impossible and forces
binary choices between CPT mandate extension, immediate replacement formula
implementation, or acceptance of institutional vacuum. Civil society proposals published January
6 for transition completion have received no CPT response, indicating continued disagreement on
January 07, 2026

whether Article 6.1 prohibition on mandate extension can be circumvented through constitutional
interpretation or international guarantor support.
The deadline convergence also creates cascading failure risks where problems in one domain
compound others. If courts allow TPS termination to proceed February 3, diaspora deportations
could begin during the same week the CPT mandate expires and BINUH renewal language
becomes operational. If gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence in late January sensing no
amnesty negotiations forthcoming, the security crisis could prevent orderly February 7 transition
implementation. The January 7 strategic silence indicates all actors recognize these cascading
risks but have not achieved consensus on mitigation frameworks.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's transitional governance period from April 3, 2024 through February 7, 2026 represents the
first attempt to combine presidential council governance with internationally-backed security force
deployment, creating institutional arrangements without constitutional precedent.



## TALKING POINTS

Four deadlines converge between January 31 and February 7 including BINUH mandate
expiration, TPS termination, CPT constitutional deadline, and potential gang violence resumption
timing.
Seven-day window between January 31 BINUH renewal and February 7 CPT expiration
eliminates gradual transition planning and forces binary framework choices.
BINUH Security Council resolution language will signal whether international community supports
CPT mandate extension or remains neutral on post-February 7 governance.
Deadline compression creates cascading failure risks where diaspora deportations, institutional
vacuum, and security escalation could coincide in early February.
Civil society transition completion proposals published January 6 have received no CPT
response, indicating continued disagreement on constitutional interpretation of mandate extension
prohibition.



## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: CARICOM, OAS, and UN should coordinate BINUH resolution language
by January 15 to allow two weeks for implementation planning before January 31 Security Council
vote.
Private Sector: Develop scenario planning for simultaneous institutional, security, and diaspora
crises during February 3-7 window including liquidity management and supply chain
contingencies.
January 07, 2026

Political Actors: CPT should publicly address mandate extension questions by January 20 to allow
18 days for stakeholder consultation and implementation planning before February 7.
Security Forces: GSF and PNH should prepare for scenario where gang violence resumes during
February 3-7 window when institutional and diaspora crises compound security challenges.
Researchers: Track BINUH Security Council resolution drafting process and P5 member positions
on post-February 7 governance support to assess international consensus development.
CONFIDENCE
High confidence based on official institutional reporting.



## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT





## NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Federal court TPS ruling issuance - Monitor for emergency decisions blocking or allowing
February 3 termination that would determine diaspora deportation trajectory and create or
eliminate one of four converging February deadlines.
CPT communication resumption - Track whether transitional authorities end strategic silence with
statements on mandate extension mechanisms, civil society proposal responses, or February 7
governance frameworks.
Port-au-Prince security status - Verify whether the 23-day operational pause extends to 24-25
days or whether gang violence resumes signaling end of strategic restraint period.



## THIS WEEK

BINUH mandate renewal negotiations - Monitor Security Council P5 member positions on
whether January 31 resolution will include language supporting CPT post-February 7
arrangements or remain silent on governance frameworks.
International actor coordination - Track CARICOM, OAS, and UN diplomatic activity for signals of
emerging consensus on institutional continuity implementation mechanisms promised in
November 5 statements.
Civil society mobilization - Verify whether opposition groups respond to CPT strategic silence by
publishing alternative February 7 transition proposals or mobilizing public pressure campaigns.
January 07, 2026



## STRATEGIC HORIZON

Late January announcement concentration - Prepare for compressed January 20-31 window
when CPT, civil society, international actors, and potentially gangs will announce positions as
February 7 deadline eliminates further delay options.
Cascading crisis convergence - Monitor for interactions between TPS deportations beginning
February 3, potential gang violence resumption in late January, and February 7 institutional
transition that could create simultaneous governance, security, and diaspora emergencies.
Post-February 7 legitimacy contests - Assess scenarios where multiple actors claim governing
authority after February 7 including CPT mandate extension advocates, civil society replacement
formula proponents, or opposition group alternative frameworks.



## PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre comprehensive news monitoring, January 7, 2026
Haiti24 national reporting coverage, January 7, 2026
Le Nouvelliste daily political and security reporting, January 7, 2026
AlterPresse independent journalism network coverage, January 7, 2026
Vant Bef Info analysis and investigative reporting, January 7, 2026
Reuters international wire service Haiti coverage, January 7, 2026
Associated Press Caribbean bureau Haiti monitoring, January 7, 2026
Agence France-Presse Haiti correspondent reporting, January 7, 2026
UN OCHA Haiti displacement reporting, January 6, 2026
International Crisis Group Haiti transition analysis, December 15, 2025
MOPAL gang territorial control assessment, January 4, 2026
UN BINUH mandate documentation and Security Council records
Haiti CPT official statements and decree archives including May 23, 2024 Article 6.1
CARICOM official communications on Haiti institutional continuity, November 5, 2025
UNICEF Haiti internally displaced persons statistics, December 10, 2025
January 07, 2026



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*Exported from AYITI INTEL Reader on 2026-03-01 05:25 UTC*